The Real Reason Behind China’s Military Rising

Many in the West view China’s rapid military expansion as a growing threat to global and regional security. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, or so writes Ai Zhong-Guo. Beijing has little time for global or regional domination, which it reminds everyone in its 2013 Defence White Paper.

In July, China’s ambassador to Washington spoke to CNN. Addressing the issue of the USA’s “strategic pivot” to Asia, Cui Tiankai said it was “not quite in proportion to the real threat”. Cui also suggested the USA was using the threat of North Korea as a pretext to strengthen military alliances in the region. 

 

A month earlier, in June, Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama vowed to build a “new type of relationship” during the Chinese leader’s landmark visit to the USA. However, there are several points of friction between the two powers, among them Taiwan, the aforementioned “pivot” and territorial disputes. Cui was dubious the USA would not take sides in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, for example. “It’s a matter of how the US would really stick to this position of taking no side. Sometimes, when the US is talking to us, they say one thing; and when they are talking to Japan, they say another. So what is the real position of the USA?” he queried.

For a long time, China has been receiving a bad rap for its climb to prominence. Indeed, the international media is fixated on portraying China as a threat to regional peace, a loose cannon that must be contained. Nothing could be further from the truth, according to this author. This article seeks to redress some of the imbalances in public perception, and set out from a Chinese viewpoint, what the growth of China’s military really amounts to.

Warmongering or Peaceful?

One accusation bandied about is that China is spoiling for a fight with neighbours or the USA. A simple comparison suffices. The last war China engaged in was a brief border dispute with Vietnam in 1979. This conflict occurred nearly 35 years ago. If we compare US adventurism during the same timeframe, we find that this superpower has engaged in the following missions or invasions:

• Lebanese Civil War (1982-84)
• Bombing of Libya (1981, 1986, 1989)
• Invasion of Panama (1989-90)
• Gulf War (1990-91)
• Somali Civil War (1992-94)
• Bosnia (1993-95)
• Haiti (1994-95)
• Kosovo (1999)
• Colombian Conflict (1998-)
• Invasion of Afghanistan (2001-)
• War on Terror (2001-)
• Invasion of Iraq (2003-11)
• Liberia (2003)
• Libyan Civil War (2011).

Right now it is on the verge of striking Syria. While some items on this list are admittedly international peacekeeping missions, it does serve to highlight the fact that the USA, more than anyone else, likes to throw its weight around. Our latest Defence White Paper, issued in April 2013, states unequivocally, “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature. China opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.”

Some argue the Taiwan issue shows China’s intent to wage war. The status of Taiwan is one very dear to the Chinese heart, because no nation wishes to have its territory and people divided. Taiwan was forcibly separated from mainland China when it was seized by Japan in 1895 and subjected to five decades of imperial rule. Indeed, Taiwan’s continued estrangement is a visible reminder of past injustices wrought by imperial powers. Of course, the current division is a result of China’s civil war against the corrupt Kuomintang administration in the late 1940s and it is entirely an internal Chinese matter. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) would one day like Taiwan to peacefully reunite, just as Germany did in 1990 after the Cold War fizzled out.

Many unfairly accuse China of not renouncing the threat of force to reunite Taiwan. Article 8 of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law states: “In the event that ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This law simply continues the status quo and provides a legal basis to protect China’s interests. Has the USA ever promised any potential adversary that it will never use force to respond to some future provocation? No right thinking government makes such rash promises by discounting particular courses of action.

China’s 2013 White Paper promises, “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked. Following this principle, China will resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The ‘China threat’ towards Taiwan is grossly overblown. Indeed, China is enjoying warming social, economic and political ties, especially since President Ma Ying-jeou assumed office in 2008. Furthermore, China’s relations with Taiwan can never be construed as indicative of wider Chinese ambitions in Asia; Taiwan is a one-of-a-kind issue.

In fact, China believes US military aid to Taiwan is the most serious disturbance to regional peace. The Taiwan Relations Act, under whose auspices the USA provides modern military equipment, is an anachronism. It originated in 1979 at a time when the USA was still afraid of communism spreading around the globe. The end of the Cold War rendered such treaties out of date. If this situation was reversed, readers may better understand how upsetting the USA’s arming of Taiwan actually is. Imagine that Puerto Rico, for example, decided to cut ties with the USA, and that China began actively arming it with high-tech military weapons. This is very similar to what the USA is doing to China.

It is therefore no surprise that China is developing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons such as anti-ship ballistic missiles to prevent US military interference in a Chinese matter. Just as the USA felt it intolerable to have Russian missiles deployed in its Cuban backyard in 1962, so the PRC resents American intrusion on the issue of Taiwan.

General Chang Wanquan, China’s defence minister, made his first official visit to the Pentagon on 19 August to meet Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel. Chang conveyed disquiet over the USA’s Asia-Pacific “pivot”. The US should not “target a specific country in the region”, he said. “[Both nations should refrain] from imposing one’s will on the other, or gaining one’s own interests at the expense of the interests of the other.”

China’s Growing Military

China’s defence budget rose 10.7% this year to USD114.3 billion. The White Paper claims, “Over the years, the PLA has been proactively and steadily pushing forward its reforms in line with the requirements of performing its missions and tasks,and building an informationised military.”

The PLA is becoming more mobile with smaller modular units, yet it has also shrunk dramatically after undergoing progressive downsizing in 1985, 1997 and 2003. These programmes reduced the armed forces by one million, 500,000 and 200,000 personnel respectively. In other words, the PLA cut its size by 40+% over a ten-year period! Today the army service of the PLA has total manpower of 850,000. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is a major beneficiary of new equipment under China’s offshore defence strategy; a blue-water capability is necessary to conduct mobile operations, cooperate internationally and counter non-traditional security threats. The PLAN has 235,000 personnel and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 398,000 people.

Modernisation of the armed forces cannot be separated from the transformation of Chinese society in general. The PLA was a very late starter in terms of modernisation. In the 1980s, expenditure was static so the defence budget started from a very low baseline. Since then the budget has grown in parallel with the economy as a whole. Rather than raw figures, the percentage of GDP is a better indicator of defence spending levels. In the past decade it has varied from 1.22% to 1.42%, which is not outlandish. In contrast, the USA averaged 4.7% in 2010-11. Furthermore, unlike Europe and the USA, China does not have a network of alliances and international technological partners with which it can jointly develop weaponry. China is not pursuing a sudden arms race, but it is gradually upgrading a hopelessly obsolete force. Much spending goes to improving pay and living conditions – for example, in 2011 salaries and benefits for non-commissioned officers (NCO) increased 40%.

Despite new equipment reaching the PLA, older weapon systems predominate. For instance, only a third of in-service ground systems can be considered modern. Similarly, just 25% of naval surface vessels and aircraft are modern. Comparing raw numbers of weapons on paper does not reflect just how outdated PLA equipment in China’s inventory actually is. China recognises its equipment cannot compete directly with that of the USA, for instance. Additionally, the aircraft and amphibious vessels necessary to project power from Chinese shores are also lacking. Most analysts agree that the PLAN’s capability still falls behind that of Japan’s navy.

China has no recent combat experience either. Our recently commissioned Liaoning aircraft carrier is an all-new capability and it will take years to master its use. In comparison, the US Navy has a wealth of accumulated wisdom after operating carriers for 91 years. It is inevitable a nation will develop its military as its economic power rises. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was launching a new submarine every month. In comparison, China’s build-up has been measured and unhurried.

Defence Minister Liang Guanglie told US Defence Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011, “I also firmly believe that in terms of the level of modernisation of the PLA, we can by no means call ourselves an advanced military force. The gap between us and that of advanced countries is at least two to three decades.”

It is true there are maritime territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas. However, the PLA has been careful not to get involved. These are the domain of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) agency. It is hoped these disputes can be solved diplomatically, as China has strong historical claims on these territories.

Another half-baked idea thrown around, particularly by Indian media, is the ‘string of pearls’ notion of Chinese naval ports stretching across the Indian Ocean. This theory has no truth, something confirmed by Jane’s Intelligence Review in an article entitled ‘Harbouring Ambitions’ published in November 2009. China contributed financially to build commercial ports in Myanmar (Sittwe), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota) and Pakistan (Gwadar), but these are not used for naval purposes. Conversely, the USA maintains bases or has access to facilities in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, Australia and Singapore. This is the equivalent of China possessing naval bases in Canada, Mexico, Cuba and Greenland to surround the North American continent. Such an action would doubtlessly make Americans feel uncomfortable. The Chinese people feel the same way about this robust US presence. To date, China has made no effort to establish overseas bases, and it even declined an offer from the Seychelles Islands.

Painful History

The USA complains the PLA is “not transparent”. It must be remembered that China is emerging from a very turbulent past. While the military may not yet have attained the standards of US or European openness, it is making progress. A series of White Papers has given progressively more information as the country moves towards greater transparency. Since 2002, the PLA has held 28 joint exercises and 34 joint training sessions with 31 different countries as it opens up. Indeed, on 6 September three PLAN warships sailed into Hawaii to begin a three-day search-and-rescue exercise with the US Navy. The last such visit to US territory was seven years ago.

Remember, too, that history has scarred the Chinese psyche. European nations invaded and imposed unfair treaties on China (e.g. the opium wars). Japan’s invasion from 1937-45 caused terrible suffering and resulted in numerous atrocities. That conflict left 20 million dead and 100 million internal refugees. Japan has not fully admitted to many atrocities (e.g. the Nanjing Massacre), and this is a deep-seated irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. An increasingly nationalistic Japan is thus a great source of concern. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s promise to restore his country’s “greatness” is like a red rag to our nation. China has already suffered from Japanese nationalism, and we remain mistrustful of European, US and Japanese intentions based on past injustices.

Multiple Tasks

In fact, the PLA has little time for ‘regional or global domination’! Common threats frequently highlighted by the Chinese government are terrorism, separatism and extremism. Uygur separatists in Xinjiang Province, for example, are constantly fomenting trouble. The country has 22,000km of land borders with 14 neighbours, plus an 18,000km coastline. Safeguarding these borders is difficult and arduous, and it occupies a good proportion of the country’s manpower.

The PLA is also responsible for providing support in cases of natural disaster and public-health outbreaks (e.g. SARS). For example, in 2008, the armed forces/ militia contributed 1.26 million members to combat snowstorms in southern China. Another 221,000 mobilised after the deadly Sichuan earthquake that year. In 2011-12, the PLA contributed 370,000 servicemen, 197,000 vehicles/pieces of equipment, obilised 870,000 militiamen/reservists and flew 225 sorties to support rescue operations.

The PLA is constitutionally required to support national and local plans for economic and social development too. It commits personnel and assets to key infrastructure projects, environmental protection and poverty alleviation measures. The PLA does much more than defend the country, for it is an integral component of societal development and improving people’s livelihood.

Greater Reach

Fuelled by a booming economy, the PRC needs to import a continuous stream of raw materials. It must then send its commodities to export markets, primarily by sea. Last year, China’s imports and exports were worth USD3.87 trillion, surpassing the USA for the first time and making China the globe’s largest trader. The country thus needs to protect its sea lines of communication (SLOC), and non-traditional security threats such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden have demonstrated the need for countries to protect domestic shipping. China, as a responsible global player, has worked closely with other nations to successfully thwart would-be pirates. Since the first naval task force was despatched to the Gulf of Aden on 26 December 2008, the PLAN had escorted 4,984 ships till the end of last year.

Some say China does not contribute enough to international alliances, but the facts reveal otherwise. The PLA has despatched 22,000 personnel to 23 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions to date. As at July 2013, 1,703 officers and soldiers were deployed on UN missions. Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China supplies more personnel than any other. The USA, for instance, had a mere 24 servicemen on UN missions, and the UK just 278. Furthermore, since 2002, the PLA has conducted 36 international humanitarian-aid missions to 27 disaster-struck countries.

The PLAN conducted a landmark evacuation of nationals from Libya in 2011. In the PRC’s largest ever overseas evacuation, the rescue of 35,860 nationals was assisted by a frigate (on a Gulf of Aden escort mission at the time) and four aircraft. Such crises demonstrate the need for a capable navy, as China does not wish to rely on external powers like the USA to protect its people and interests.

Sci-fi movie ‘Gravity’ Hopes to attract Chinese Audience

The new science-fiction space thriller “Gravity” has moviegoers buzzing after opening this past weekend and earning a record-breaking $55.6 million at the U.S. box office, the top October opening in cinema history. While success in the American market is important, the space drama also seems to have Chinese viewers in mind.

The movie’s release in Chinese theaters has not been confirmed yet, but the movie does stand a good chance against China’s notoriously difficult movie approval and censoring system. Hollywood films that hope to open in Chinese theaters go through the country’s often ruthless media censorship bureau, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television. While “Gravity” wasn’t a Chinese co-produced film, like some other blockbusters, it has done a decent job of appeasing the Chinese audience.

Tiangong Space Station in movie "Gravity"

In the film, China comes to the rescue of the main character, Ryan Stone, played by Academy Award-winning Sandra Bullock, allowing her to find refuge in its state-of-the art space station. In reality, China’s only space station to date is the Tiangong-1 (which means Heavenly Palace), launched in 2011, and hardly the multi-module facility where Bullock’s character seeks shelter in the movie. Finally, shuttling her way back to safety on Earth, Bullock finds herself a spot on a — where else, but a Chinese space capsule? The movie does take a jab at China’s notorious counterfeiting of technology and design, when Bullock’s character questions her ability to operate a Chinese-language escape pod. It turns out it is actually a copy of the Russian capsule Soyuz, on which she was trained. Nevertheless, the upgrade on China’s nationally revered space program and China-positive plot line is likely to impress officials previewing the movie.

While the possibility of attracting China’s potential 1.3 billion people as viewers has shaken up Hollywood, there was a time when the country was considered public enemy No. 1. In the past, Cold War-era thinking dominated the West, where China and the rest of the Communist states were America’s biggest threats. But as China’s growth and development has shifted its economy and social values, the U.S. and China have found themselves more linked than ever. Just as businesses began catering to the Chinese, so have Hollywood films.

The reboot of action flick “Red Dawn” was an example of how China has taken a step back as Hollywood’s villain. The plot of the remake of the original film from 1984 painted China as the movie villain, leading an American invasion with the help of its North Korean allies. However, upon the realization that the Chinese are a lucrative market that shouldn’t be alienated, and North Koreans are not, China’s involvement was scrapped altogether.

Another film, “World War Z,” the Brad Pitt-led apocalypse summer blockbuster, went through a similar realization. Executives of the Hollywood studio producing the film decided to re-edit a plot point which points to China as ground zero for a disease outbreak that causes a zombie apocalypse.

Whether it’s writing in parts for Chinese actors (“Iron Man 3″ added parts for Chinese actress Fan Bingbing for its special China release), or setting scenes in famous Chinese cities, Hollywood filmmakers are showing China that they want a piece of the country’s growing market.

How are PLA Female Soldiers trained in army camp

U.S. APACHE HELICOPTER APPEARED IN CHINA

Chinese Fighter Jet( J-10B) AND ( J-10C) PHOTOS DAY

Chinese Fighter Jet( J-10B) but there are many indications of J-10Cs as well but we really don't know much about it can any senior let us know about it more along with pictures

FIrst batch of PLZ45 155 mm self-propelled howitzer arrived in Agleria

First batch of Norinco's PLZ45 155 mm self-propelled howitzer arrived in Agleria  as spotted by sadral forcesdz (here) and confirmed by Chinese military websites.   This marks Agleria as the third operator of such a long range artillery system after Kuwait (75 tubes) and Saudi Arabia (54 tubes). 

Here are old PR posters from 2006 and some of the spec might be dated.

U.S. Fighter Gap: Myth or Reality?

Many senior members of the U.S. military, defense officials, members of Congress, and analysts have long-warned of the growing fighter gap facing the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and its implications for U.S. national security. A fighter gap is essentially a deficit between the services' fighter aircraft inventories and their operational requirements based on emerging and possible air threats to U.S. security.

At a hearing just last year, defense officials testified projecting a "most-optimistic" deficit of 125 strike fighters for the Department of the Navy, including 69 aircraft for the U.S. Navy and 56 for the Marine Corps. This projected gap, set to peak around 2017, was considered optimistic because it assumed that the service life of F/A-18 Hornets could be extended from 8,000 flight hours to 10,000. The original service life was 6,000 flight hours. At the same hearing, the Air Force was projected to also have a requirement gap of over 800 fighters by 2024.

A Congressional Research Service report in April 2009 unveiled a potentially larger gap, citing a briefing in which the Navy projected that its strike fighter shortfall could grow to 50 aircraft by FY 2010 and 243 by 2018 (129 Navy and 114 Marine Corps fighters).

Yet, at a recent conference hosted by the Air Force Association, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates dismissed talk of the fighter gap as "nonsense."

Military Requirements and Current Inventory

The U.S. achieves and maintains air superiority and supremacy with fighters from the Air Force, the Navy's aircraft carriers, and the Marines' carrier-based and land-based air wings. Typically, a fighter force is superior to any potential opponent if it has at least the following three elements: Technically superior aircraft, including flight performance (speed, range, and maneuverability), avionics (sensors, navigation systems, computers, sensor fusion, data displays, communications, electronic support measures), and armament. Numerical sufficiency. Exceptionally trained pilots and crews and an adequate pool of replacements and well-trained new pilots.

The modern battlefield demands that multi-mission combat aircraft perform air-to-air combat; air-to-ground strike missions with precision-guided bombs and autonomous cruise missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

Fifth-generation fighters are also highly effective in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations. In addition to carrying large payloads and operating over vast areas, such as Afghanistan, fifth-generation fighters can better coordinate attacks against insurgent forces by sharing the same tactical picture through data links and tracking moving ground targets with their active electronically scanned array radar. Using sensor fusion capability to integrate targeting information from their own sensors and other sources into a single tactical picture, the F-22 and F-35 can more accurately identify and target enemy forces. This also helps to reduce casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage.

Foreign Capabilities

To fully assess the implications of the widening U.S. fighter gap, Congress must consider the future capabilities of states that may potentially challenge U.S. fighter aircraft in the coming decades as fifth-generation fighters become the mainstay of the future force and legacy aircraft retire. These capabilities include foreign advanced attack aircraft, jammers, infrared search and tracking sensors, ultra long-range missiles, surface-to-air missiles, radar detection, anti-stealth technologies, and electronic warfare.

Twenty years after the Cold War, new regional military powers and former peer competitors are expanding their military capabilities. Regional powers, such as China and possibly Iran, are acquiring Russian air superiority and multirole fighters based on the Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker family. Closer to home, Venezuela is aggressively expanding its air force.

Russia and China

Russia is fielding the Su-34 Fullback strike aircraft, which is based on the Su-27 Flanker and can carry supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and short-range air-to-air missiles for self-defense. The Russian Air Force plans to field 58 by 2015 and 300 by 2022. The Russian Air Force also has a requirement of about 300 Sukhoi PAK FA fifth-generation fighters. However, Russia appears to be planning for a production run of 500 to 600, which most likely includes planned exports. Russia also appears to be in the early stages of developing a sixth-generation fighter.

China has ordered an estimated 76 Su-30MKK Flanker-Gs and can produce an additional 250 under license, including at least 100 "knock-down kits." It has also received at least 24 Su-30MK2 naval strike fighters. If China modernizes its 171 Su-27SK/UBs to the Su-27SKM standard and assembles another 105 Su-27SKMs under license, it will have roughly 626 multirole fighters available for air superiority missions. This would place China in the same league as the U.S., which has 522 F-15A/B/C/Ds, 217 F-15Es and a planned fleet of 187 F-22s. China is also developing a stealth fifth-generation fighter, variously identified the J-X. It may also benefit from information allegedly stolen on the "design and electronics systems" of the F-35 Lightning II.

Future of the U.S. Fighter Force

The President's proposed FY 2010 budget would diminish U.S. fighter capability. The President has proposed reducing acquisitions of fifth-generation fighters and limiting their upgrades. If Congress complies, the U.S. will risk falling behind internationally and in the technological race for air power. Congress and the President would do well to remember how France, despite having pioneered the use of military aircraft, tanks, and motor transport in World War I, had fallen behind Germany by the beginning of World War II.

Large production runs of air superiority fourth-plus-generation fighters equipped with fifth-generation technology, such as the Su-35BM in Russia and China, could put the U.S. Air Force with its fewer numbers of F-22s and an aging F-15C fleet at a serious disadvantage. History and the ongoing technological arms race suggest that it would be dangerous for the U.S. to assume that the F-22 will have no equal and thus have a decisive advantage over any other fighter aircraft for the next 20 years.

The President's 2010 defense budget request would eliminate one of the two remaining fifth-generation fighter production lines. This would severely limit the options available to Congress if it wants to restart production at some later date. The cost to the taxpayer would also be much higher than if production continues. Finally, the nation would permanently lose many highly skilled aerospace designers and engineers if they are laid off.

Specifically, the U.S. should:

Purchase additional F-22s in 2010. Russia's state-run military industrial base is focusing on producing advanced fifth-generation fighters with some nearly sixth-generation capabilities. Given the U.S. military's global commitments, the 187 F-22s will likely operate in the different theaters, all but ensuring that they will be outnumbered in any potential engagement. Congress should appropriate funds to buy at least the full initial order of 286 F-22s to ensure air superiority over the next two decades, beginning with a purchase of 20 F-22s in FY 2010.

Encourage sales of F-22 allied variant to Japan and Australia. It would provide U.S. allies with the most advanced fighter on the market, increase their interoperability with U.S. forces, reinforce America's hedging strategy in the Pacific, and keep the production line open while reducing the unit cost.

Research viability of building a strike variant of F-22. The FB-22 has a greater bomb load capacity than the F-35, could replace the F-15E, and carry out many missions currently performed by the B-1 and B-2 strategic bombers. The FB-22 could also then become a platform to introduce operational sixth-generation fighter technology. Congress should direct a Pentagon study on the viability of pursuing the FB-22 this year.

Immediately begin research and development of a sixth-generation fighter. Sixth-generation technologies may include a flying wing with morphic wings that deflect and minimize its radar signature and a visual stealth structure that would use micro cameras to take on the appearance of the sky and the ground to make it invisible.

Conclusion Congress needs to examine carefully whether the planned numbers of new and modernized fighters in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps inventories will meet service and operational requirements. Careful scrutiny is required given the reported structural problems caused by the stress of combat operations, the current and planned numbers of fifth-generation fighters, and the scheduled phase out of legacy fighters. In the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review process, Congress and the Pentagon should carefully examine the inherent capabilities and qualities of each model of fighter to verify that it can fulfill these requirements and defeat the technological challenges that may be posed by future challengers. Congress must ensure that the U.S. military maintains both its technological edge and adequate numbers of aircraft to maintain U.S. air superiority well into the 21st century.

China's SLBM JL-2 is near initial operational capability

This would put China in the league of other major nuclear power (US, Russia, UK and France), the only nations with SLBM capability.

For the first time in the country’s history, China’s sea-based nuclear deterrence nears initial operational capability (IOC), according to a forthcoming report by a US congressional commission on China.

China’s JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile could reach IOC later this year, according to an early draft of the report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

With a range of 4,000 nautical miles, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will have its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent against the US mainland, mated with the Type 094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China has deployed three Jin-class SSBN and “probably will field two additional units by 2020.”

The report also states that China is pursuing two new classes of nuclear submarines — the Type 095 guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN) and the Type 096 SSBN. The Type 096 will likely “improve the range, mobility, stealth, and lethality” of the PLAN’s nuclear deterrent.

Though China does not have the ability to strike land targets with sea-based cruise missiles, the report states China’s navy is developing a land-attack cruise missile capability, most likely with the Type-095 SSGN and Luyang-III (Type 052D) guided-missile destroyer. This will enhance China’s “flexibility for attacking land targets throughout the Western Pacific, including US facilities in Guam.”

In June, according to the report, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force accepted 15 new H-6K bomber aircraft. An improved variant of the H-6, the K variant (with new Russian Engines) has extended range and can carry China’s new long-range, land-attack cruise missile (LACM). “The bomber/LACM weapon system provides the PLA Air Force with the ability to conduct conventional strikes against regional targets throughout the Western Pacific,” including Guam.

The report states China is working on extending the range of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. With its current range of 810 nautical miles, it can already threaten US naval vessels throughout the Western Pacific. At 1,600 nautical miles from China, Guam falls outside the DF-21D’s range.

Other developments cited in the report include progress on China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which conducted its first successful carrier-based takeoff and landing with the J-15 Flying Shark fighter jet in November 2012, certified its first group of aircraft carrier pilots and landing signal officers during the ship’s first operational deployment in June, and verified its flight-deck operations process in September.

“The PLAN will continue to conduct short deployments and shipboard aviation training until 2015 to 2016, when China’s first J-15 regiment is expected to become operational,” the report states.

The document discusses other impressive surface ship developments. In 2012, China launched two new classes: the Luyang-III guided-missile destroyer and the Jiangdao (Type 056) corvette. Construction resumed for the Luyang-II (Type 052C) guided-missile destroyer and serial production continues for the Jiangkai-II (Type 054A) guided-missile frigate. “Most of these units will likely be operational by 2015,” according to the report.

Quoting Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, both renowned PLA experts, the report states that “by 2015, China will likely be second globally in numbers of large warships built and commissioned since the Cold War’s end ... by 2020, barring a US naval renaissance, it is possible that China will become the world’s leading military shipbuilder in terms of numbers of submarines, surface combatants and other naval surface vessels produced per year.”

One of the many disturbing conclusions in the report is the suggestion that China’s military modernization is “on track to alter the security balance in Asia over the next five to 10 years, challenging decades of US military preeminence.”

China's aircraft engine development

China has always been relatively backward in the field of aircraft engine, still relies on Russia to supply most engines.

But the leadership has decided to pour billions of dollars into engine development.
Simultaneously, China is developing many different classes of Turbofan, Turboprop, Turboshaft engines.

Below is a nice chart detailing the engine models, thrust, and applications.

 

 

A History of Disgrace_N-series of the F-16s

Introduction

The US Navy was the only operator of the special N-series of the F-16. They were specifically designed for the Navy to be used as agressor aircraft in a dissimilar combat environment. The airframes featured a strenghtened structure and although derivatives of the C/D-models they had the older APG-66 radar installed.

US Navy aggressor: VF-45 'Blackbirds' TF-16N #163281 [Photo by Keith]

Inventory

F-16N & TF-16N

The U.S. Navy announced in January 1985 that it had selected the F-16 to fulfil its dissimilar air combat training (DACT) requirement. The F-16s were going to be used as adversary aircraft, emulating Soviet aircraft capabilities and tactics. A total of 22 single seat F-16N's and four two-seat TF-16N trainers were ordered by the Navy.

The F-16N and F-16N aircraft were based on F-16 Block 30E models, and were all built during 1987/1988. They were optimized for one thing only: the Dissimilar Air Combat Training mission. The airframes were made lighter, and they were strengthened to cope with the continuous high-G loads associated with air combat manoeuvring. To save weight, the F-16N was fitted with the less cabable but lighter APG-66 radar of earlier F-16A/B models, the M61 A1 internal gun was removed, and all provisions for external stores were removed. All F-16Ns used the General Electric F110-GE-100 engine. TF-16N models are identical to F-16Ns except for the addition of a second seat.

Deliveries of the F-16N to the Navy began in early 1987 and ended in May 1988. In April 1987, VF-126 Bandits based at NAS Miramar achieved IOC with 6 aircraft. Three other units followed: VF-45 Blackbirds from NAS Key West, VF-43 Challengers from NAS Oceana, and the Navy Fighter Weapons School at NAS Miramar. The latter operated one aircraft in "Marines" markings to represent the USMC's participation in the adversary program.

Despite the fact that (T)F-16Ns were strenghtened, the airframes were experiencing metal fatigue before the end of their operational lifetime. This resulted in their premature withdrawal from service. In 1991, the Navy temporarily grounded its F-16 fleet. The adversary training mission was more and more shifted to F-14s and F-18s. Finally, in 1994, the US Navy announced the retirment of the (T)F-16N fleet; the last F-16N arrived at Davis-Monthan AFB in January 1995.

Embargoed Pakistani F-16s

After the withdrawal of the (T)F-16N's, the Navy found itself lacking a high performance aggressor aircraft, and the decision was made to re-introduce the F-16. Fourteen airframes, ordered by Pakistan in the early nineties but never delivered to the country because of a weapons embargo, were taken out of storage and delivered to the Navy. Since the aircraft were stored at AMARC straight from the production line, these airframes have a very low airframe life, making them useful for the demanding aggressor task. These aircraft are also the last Block 15s ever built, and are more advanced than any other F-16A/B stored at AMARC. Additional Pakistani aircraft will go to the USAF.

U.S. Navy F-16B #92-0460, one of fourteen embargoed Pakistani F-16s, now used for Dissimilar Air Combat Training by the Navy. [Tailslides photo by Fred Krause]

Modifications & Armament

Armament

The F-16N was optimized to conduct DACT. The only 'armament' they could carry was an ACMI pod under the engine intake.

Avionics

Contrary to normal C/D models, these aircraft had the earlier A/B models' AN/APG-66 radar installed, mainly to save weight. The (T)F-16N aircraft were fitted with an ALR-69 radar warning receiver, instead of the standard ALR-56M fitted to USAF F-16s, plus an ALE-40 chaff/flare dispenser.

Arrestor hook

It is worth noting that even though the U.S. Navy F-16Ns and TF-16Ns retained the standard runway arrestor hook fitted to all F-16s, it was not able to land on aircraft carriers. The F-16 and its landing gear in particular are simply not designed to absorb the high impact energy associated with carrier landings. The arrestor hook is used only in emergencies, e.g. to prevent runway overruns.

Source: www.f-16.net

Limited & Superficial Comparison of Air Assets of the PAF & IAF

This is a paper to provide a limited comparison of the JF-17 / FC-1 with the Su-30 MKI and to look at Sean O'Connor's analysis to see if in fact, it is a inferior plane that will not stand against the IAF. Sean is a USAF intelligence officer who does some analysis on the side as a hobby and can be found to frequent keypublishing forums as SOC.

 

 Here are some of the salients of SOC's analysis:

The FC-1 will be the primary aircraft for the PAF and the SU-30MKI will be the same for the IAF

This in my opinion is an oversimplification that really takes out the heart of any real analysis of assets. When all is said and done, Pakistan will have 250 FC-1s, Yes, BUT (and there is a big but):

• Only the first 50 will have the basic configuration, later blocks will be significantly more advanced.
• Even the first 50 will have a whole host of features, some of them SOC has underestimated. For instance, the radar can simultaneously engage 4 not 2 as SOC mentions. Also, detection range for something the size of an MKI are likely to be a good deal more than 75 kms. Further, data linking between the fighters and with the radar network and AEW assets means this is even greater, particularly as SOC admits, any such scenario would be over Pakistani territory.
• The PAF is likely to have a 500 fighter airforce and 250 is merely 50% of its air assets. Other assets are perhaps projected to include 100 J-10s and about a 100 more F-16s. While 100 J-10s in my estimate, it makes historical sense as the PAF has typically placed a first order and if they liked the performance, almost always ordered a second batch. You would be hard put to find an aircraft that the PAF liked that they did not order at least (over its lifetime) 100 units of (or wanted to, in the case of the F-16).
• If seems clear that the J-10 will be focused on countering the 230 odd MKI that India will eventually have. Various interviews indicate this. 100 J-10s reflect a good direct comparison to 230 MKI, given the over all exchange ratio between the larger IAF and smaller PAF. Further, in actual operational service this will actually be even better - the twin engined and maintenance intensive MKI, run by less qualified Indian technicians will generate markedly lower sortie rates than PAF's WS-10A fitted J-10s. This is not bias, but a fact based on the Indian maintenance record.

PAC JF-17 Thunder

Superiority of the MKI's PESA radar, with a detection range of 160 Km

• AEW&C assets will also negate any advantages the MKI has over any potential encounter with the FC-1 / JF-17. When both sides have this, it levels the playing field for the FC-1 / JF-17
• SOC admits later in his comments section that in fact, detection range of the Bars is (according to Janes, for a 2m squared target), 80-100 km head on. About half what was first estimated, and that assuming a 2m squared target. More probable would be a calculation for 1 meter squared target, and that is being generous, given that the JF-17 is smaller than the F-16, and hides its blades AND has RAM coating.
• Meanwhile, SOC sticks with 75km as the detection range of the JF-17, for a "fighter sized target". Clearly, for the MKI, specially loaded out for offensive operations, this will be way bigger. Again, assuming that what was originally MY estimate of the detection range is in fact accurate (I actually never said 75 kms but > 75 kms, implying a minimum of, rather than a typical range. Further, given revelation of info on the KLJ-7's surpising modernity and the increased radome size on the JF-17, the point becomes even less arguable).
• Later blocks of the JF-17 are likely to have an AESA radar

The Bars radar has Jet Engine Modulation (JEM) technology, allowing for a target to be identified at range by simply analyzing the radar returns from the target's engine compressor face.

• Point is moot when its clear that the FC-1 / JF-17 does not expose its blades AND uses RAM coating, as has been discussed in interviews with officials.

There is also the passive engagement option for the MKI, something else speculated for future FC-1 blocks.

• One must understand the nature of passive engagements, very useful in less sensor rich environments. Its like putting your torch light off in a dark room. However, of limited importance in a well lit room (sensor-rich environment), one that is likely to be the case given the sheer number of radars, AEW assets and fighters on air in the Indo-Pak scenario. Lets not forget its a lot harder to hide, being the size of an elephant.

 

Some other issues:

• The PAF is actively acquiring an aerial refueling capability. Loitering is significantly lengthened for the FC-1 / JF-17 with aerial refueling.
• Later blocks are likely to be significantly more advanced.
• The Pakfa and the J-13 are not as far away as some people imagine.
• Pakistani J-10s will be a step up from the present J-10s and would easily act as force multipliers.
• Indian MRCA is also to be very seriously considered and countered, so are the present fleet of M-2000s and MiG-29s.
• Many IAF airbases are within easy range of Pakistani cruise missiles. Remember that the best place to destroy an enemy air force is on the ground..

Ultimately, success in the air will be determined by not only system effectiveness and capability, but by pilot skill, and the parameters of the engagement. That being said, it doesn't help to voluntarily go into a fight with one hand already tied behind your back, does it?

• As with the above analysis, it seems clear that nobody is going to a fight with their hands tied behind their back, at least not to me.
• It also does not help going into a football match with half the number the other team has.
• It also does not help if you never build an industrial base, and are forever tied to importing something vital like a fighter plane from abroad. And being dependent on a backstabbing "ally" that will make you pay for every purchase in blood.

Some other thoughts:

Building the right mix is important. Otherwise one ends up with spending billions of dollars on "some fighter" that is a technological miracle but can only afford - even after being the world's super power - less than 200 of them. Yes, the PAF could have afforded perhaps, 250 J-10s and had 100 F-16s and maintained a 350 plane fighter force against a foe having approximately twice that number. However, numbers do count, as has been observed in virtually every major sustained air war thus far, and the ability to take punishment and continue operating after the typical 2 weeks becomes a major issue, specially in a grand-and-classic scenario like the Pakistan - India duo. This is particularly true, now, given the better coordination, control and the rich sensor environment. All of which allow larger formations to engage on both sides. Imagine titanic clashes to take out major enemy air assets such as AWACS, and massive formations to protect the same.
It must be noted that when I say that the J-10s will be earmarked to counter the MKI, it does not mean that the FC-1 cannot handle the MKI. It is an unlikely scenario that in combat, the FC-1 will shy away from the MKI. However, aircombat exercises in China have shown that the J-10 is ideal at close combat against the MKI. Rather than the argument that the JF-17 is an inferior plane, its really quite a different matter. It is hoped that the J-10s, acting as force multipliers. As in the army, you have the regulars and then you have the elites, it does not mean that your regulars are useless inferior cr@p, nor that you build an army of elites only. Numbers surely count, and its always a general's art in knowing the right balance, knowing how valuable each asset is, and employing them optimally.
The best part of SOC's analysis is the consideration of long range SAMs, these might make things a bit more interesting, particularly for the IAF. This will be particularly true if they are well layered and linked to the overall airspace picture. However, present long range SAMs seem prohibitively expensive and this inevitably means something else might need to be left out.
Continuation of the Debate:

The range for the present Chinese radar is very likely to be more than 100 kms; considering that the PAF chief was comparing with PAF F-16s. The PAF F-16s underwent OCU which increased their range and made it close to MLU (see this)
"The Pakistan Air Force currently has the Block 15 F-16A/B model in operation, which has an upgraded APG-66 radar that brings it close to the MLU (Mid-life Update) radar technology. The main advantage is the ability to use the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles if they were ever to be released to the PAF. Furthermore, the radar is capable of sorting out tight formations of aircraft and has a 15%-20% range increase over previous models. All the earlier F-16s were brought up to OCU standards and have received the Falcon UP structural modification package."
Consider this bit of information, and also that the APG-66 later modification values are against 1m^2 targets which will be further increased against a significantly greater RCS for the MKI.
Now consider statements made by the PAF Chief about the KLJ-7: is *much better* than their APGs (and these are the upgraded OCU APGs).
Secondly if you visit SOC's old post on FC-1 and see the exchange of comments, one poster pointed out that KLJ-7 beat the Grifo- S and PAF did not lowered their requirements (this includes a link that PAF did not lower it's requirement, and on that is by none other than Richard Fischer :D). SOC in fact commented that it is a very potent radar looking at some mentioned features.
Clearly, the KLJ-7 was chosen over this "very potent radar" and clearly the PAF Chief mentions that the KLJ-7 is "much better" than the present APGs.

One would also want to ask what is the detection range by JET modulation when intakes are hidden and treated with RAM. Why does one poster think it is more important and potent than detection by using returns from the airframe when clearly returns from airframe of a non-stealthy aircraft will be in abundance.
Another assertion made is that the MKI has phased array and JF-17 has Pulse doppler and MKI can avoid JF-17 lock by using doppler notch where as MKI will have no problems with locking on as it's radar is not PD.

This is what is common knowledge at various forums:

1)Doppler notch has been known since time ancient and tactics against Doppler notch were known by USAF even back in Vietnam Era.

2) According to one of the viper pilots at the F-16 forum, they have way more modes on their radars and just by switching to different mode of detection and maneuvering your aircraft so that there is no 90 degrees between both aircrafts this dopler notch could be taken care of.

3)Another aviator said "no modern AI radar is worth it's salt if it can't resist doppler notch"
All of the above should be on F-16 forums if you search "doppler notch"
Here is a link to the F-16.net dicussion regarding beaming/doppler notch tactic to break lock of a pulse doppler radar.
To me it seems some bloggers out there find it easy to feed garbage to folks thinking they know nothing. With a small Pakistani online community it becomes a recurring problem, yet it seems one would never try this on Chinese posters.