3 In A Row, New Chinese 052D Destroyers

After commissioning the first Type 052D earlier this year, three more 052D destroyers have been launched, awaiting their final electronics fitting and eventual commissioning.  

 

Three Type 052D Luyang III guided missile destroyer (DDG), seen here in various stages of construction, are lined together at the Jiangnan Changxingdao Shipyard. The first Type 052D DDG, the Kunming, has already entered into PLAN service in March 2014. The second 052D, on the left, may enter service in the second half of 2014, while the two less completed destroyers to its right, will be commissioned in 2015. In service, the 052D destroyers’ likely missions could range from anti-piracy patrols to aircraft carrier escort to air defense for Chinese civilian activities like oil drilling rigs. 

 

In the past decade, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has built up a formidable area air defense capability, with an eye on deterring attack by enemy carrier groups and anti-ship missiles. While the ship’s powerful Type 346A radars provides for an air defense role, the 052D's modular vertical launch systems also gives it powerful land attack and anti-submarine capabilities. In addition, the Type 0346A radar and other sensors give the 052D vast intelligence gathering capabilities, which is vital for anti-access/area denial operations. 

The first 052D destroyer, Kunming, sails in the waters of Qingdao, China. The 052D is distinguished by the powerful Type 346A radars located under the bridge, and 64 vertical launch system cells located forward of the bridge and in the middle of the hull. 

 

It is expected that at least 12 052D destroyers will be built before production shifts to the projected Type 055D multi-role cruiser. The rapid production of the 052D is indicative of China's commitment to building a modern “blue water” navy. What is even more illustrative about China's determination is that the mass production of the 052D overlapped with the production run of the 6 less advanced 052C destroyers. The fact that the PLAN has chosen to rapidly produce both the 052C and 052D DDGs instead of waiting and concentrating on only one class of advanced warships demonstrates Chinese confidence in both its warship technology and the urgency to quickly develop multirole surface warships in the context of an Asian arms race.

Three 052D, from the air. Seen here are three 052D destroyers in the shipyard, as viewed from a commercial airliner. 

 

Source: www.hobbyshanghai.net & remono via 1t.cdjby.net

What China still seek from Russian military export

With the recent signing of the major gas deal between China and Russia amidst the entire situation in Ukraine, there has been a big push by the media and Putin himself to frame all of this as somewhat of an alliance between the countries. While I generally think this is overplayed, I think the military cooperation part of things can be explored. Russia is coming to China from a position of weakness and is probably willing to sell technology they were not willing to before. The question is what China actually wants from Russia at this point.

Su-35

 

Last year, I talked about the possible Su-35/Lada deals here. At this point, I would bet that neither deal goes forward. Even if some kind of conventional submarine deal gets signed, it will be more for a design based on Lada that will use mostly Chinese combat systems, engine and weaponry. The Su-35 talks have floated since 2008 and still have not ended up anywhere. The closer we get to J-20, the less it makes sense for China to purchase Su-35. In the recent visit by Putin, the 2 countries signed deals for cooperating on a new upgraded version of Mi-26 and large airliner. In the aviation fields, China’s biggest import from Russia remains to be high performing turbofan engines.

 

Lada Class Submarine

In the most recent join sea drill between China and Russia, Russia sent a fleet consist of the Slava-Class Cruiser Varyag, a Udaloy class destroyer, a Sov class destroyer and a landing ship. Chinese fleet was consisted of No. 151 Zhengzhou (Type 052C), No. 139 Ningbo (Sov class), No. 112 Harbin (Type 052), 2 Type 054As and landing ships. The drill lasted for 5 days in East China Sea, so it was probably the largest such drill between the 2 countries. If this exercises had taken place in 2005, there would’ve been many articles about how this is a showcase of Russian weaponry for export to China. We certainly don’t hear that kind of talk now. Just by focusing on Type 052C Zhengzhou and Slava-Class Varyag, we can see the different approach China has taken in its naval modernization vs Soviet naval philosophy. In the role of area air defense, Type 052C probably has comparable to superior capabilities to Slava with its 48 cell HHQ-9 VLS and more modern AESA MFRs + combat system vs 64 cell S-300 VLS. It’s pretty much weaker in everything else (close-in air defense, ASuW and ASW). Like its big brother Kirov class, Slava class can operate and pack a lot of punch (with 16 P-500 missiles) by itself, whereas 052C is better served as an air defense escort in a flotilla with other offensive options. When looking at where PLAN has proceeded in its modernization, it makes a lot of sense why China did not purchase the unfinished Slava class Ukraina when it could have done so in the middle of last decade. I have talked about how Sov class had become the white elephants of PLAN, because they could not effective communicate and operate with other ships due to having different combat system, communication equipments and data link. Numerous projects were started in recent years to create subsystem to solve these problems when the Sov destroyers go through their mid-life overhaul. Purchasing the Ukraina or any other Russian warships will have cause similar difficulties in combat and logistics. PLAN seems to have a pretty good direction forward with mass production of Type 052D and Type 055, so it has not been tempted to buy Russian hardware since early 2000s.

Since combat aircraft and submarine purchases also seem unlikely with the slow progress of talks over Lada and Su-35, what else is China still buying from Russia outside of the engines? New purchase of S-400 SAMs is possible, but China seems to be doing pretty well with the success of HQ-9 in the Turkey competition. Transport and utility helicopter is another such area. Russia is just finishing the delivery of 48 Mi-171s to China this year and has signed agreement for developing an improved Mi-26 with China. It looks like both of these helicopters should see more orders in future even as more domestic options like Z-15 and Z-20 become available, since they occupy different roles. Another area is in large transport aircraft and tankers, where China has been purchasing refurbished IL-76s from Russia and IL-78s from Ukraine. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine could possibly give Ukraine more incentive to sell refurbished IL-76/78s and former Soviet designs (possibly improved version) to China. One interesting example is Zubr class LCAC where Russia and Ukraine argued over Ukrainian right to sell license production of Zubr class to China. The second Zubr was shipped early to China due to its shipyard’s location in Crimea. Now that Crimea has become part of Russia, China will probably continue to build more Zubrs as needed without further negotiation with Russia.

The final area where China would want Russian help is nuclear submarines and strategic bombers. I think even with China’s stronger bargaining power, it is still nearly impossible for Russia to sell plans for Tu-160 or Akula-II to China. The most it could get here are design help for these strategic platforms.

As we move forward, I think we will get to a point where Russia will start buying military subsystems from China. That will be quite a shift from where things were 2 decades ago.

The Master 'PLAN': China's New Guided Missile Destroyer

China’s navy appears on the verge of creating a new class of warship. It could eventually alter the balance of naval power in the region.

Chinese Type 052D Luyang II Guided Missile Destroyer

We are loyal followers of baseball philosopher Yogi Berra, who reportedly proclaimed that “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Like the great Yogi, we seldom venture prophecies. But we did hazard one in The Diplomat late in 2010, namely that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would defy those Western experts who opined that Beijing had slowed or halted its naval buildup.

For evidence, such experts claimed that the PLAN had stopped building guided-missile destroyers, or DDGs. If so, Beijing had made a conscious choice to limit its navy’s offensive punch. Not so, said we. Having experimented with various DDG designs, the PLAN was simply settling on a model that incorporated the best of each test platform. And indeed, DDG serial production has recommenced in earnest, judging from pictures of the new Type 052D Luyang II-class DDG that have surfaced on the Internet.

Until recently it was fashionable for Western PLA-watchers to contend that Chinese shipyards had slowed or stopped construction of major surface warships like DDGs in favor of smaller, shorter-range, seemingly more defensive-minded vessels like guided-missile frigates and fast-attack boats. They cited the dearth of clear-cut proof of DDG-building since 2005 as evidence of this supposed trend. From this they inferred that Chinese naval development had taken a less menacing turn.

This was counterintuitive at best. And indeed, a series of photos on Chinese and Western military websites over the past few years dispels such sanguine prognoses. The images indicate that Chinese shipyards had already resumed DDG construction by 2010, when we essayed our prediction about Chinese shipbuilding.

The latest reports suggest that Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai launched its sixth Type 052C DDG and is laying down an average of two hulls per year. The new combatant under construction within a nearby hangar appears to be the Type 052D, the 052C’s successor. Indeed, a well-known China-watcher confirms that one of the new vessels was launched last week. By no means does this mean the ship is ready for sea. An enormous amount of work doubtless remains to be done on it alongside the pier, per shipyards’ usual practice. Still, putting the first of its kind in the water represents an important milestone toward sending a new ship class to sea.

The PLAN may have found its premier surface combatant.

According to the Taipei Times, this shadowy new vessel is an improved variant of the Type 052C, itself a man-of-war touted by Chinese naval enthusiasts as “China Aegis,” an equal to state-of-the-art U.S. Navy vessels. (We remain unconvinced by these claims.) The Type 052D is a stealthy, 6,000-ton, gas-turbine-driven ship boasting 64 vertical launch cells (VLS in Western parlance). A VLS cell is essentially a canister embedded in a ship’s hull. Each can disgorge one to four missiles, depending on the missile load. VLS allows for quick firing of anti-air, anti-ship, or land-attack missiles without the bother, delay, and technical headaches associated with uploading munitions onto launchers from magazines deep within the ship.

On paper, at least, the Type 052D appears to be a more modest version of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDGs and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers. The PLAN DDG displaces less than the American vessels, which displace 11,000 tons and 9,600 tons respectively. This indicates that it has smaller fuel capacity and thus shorter cruising range. On the other hand,its dimensions are more than adequate for the types of regional missions it will likely be assigned in the “near seas” or the Indian Ocean. Its armament is smaller than that of the Burkes or Ticonderogas, which carry 96 and 122 VLS cells, respectively. But again, this Chinese destroyer packs a punch for localized conflicts in Asian waters. It will also operate under shore fire support in most cases, evening the firepower balance.

Since commencing its naval buildup in earnest in the late 1990s, Beijing has taken an eminently sensible approach to fleet development. So long as China’s strategic surroundings remained hospitable and the United States was content guaranteeing safe passage through international waters and skies, the PLAN could pursue leisurely “fleet experimentation.” Shipwrights built small classes of ships, kept the best features of each, and discarded the rest. This risk-averse approach made technological sense while the Chinese were attempting a qualitative leap in naval engineering.

The Chinese surface fleet, which consists of five relatively new destroyer classes of no more than two hulls apiece, bears out this go-slow approach. These ships need not remain close to home. The PLAN can extract real value from them, dispatching experimental vessels to distant waters to fine-tune crews’ skills, develop doctrine, and smooth out technical kinks. It has doubtlessly done so during counter-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean.

Ultimately, however, the PLAN had to settle on a single design for mass production. The timing appears auspicious for drawing this phase of Chinese fleet experimentation to a close. The PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, the refitted Soviet-built flattop Varyag, has undergone a series of sea trials. Recent reports indicate that the PLAN has been flight testing the J-15, a reverse-engineered derivative of the Russian Su-33 fighter plane that can operate from the Varyag’s decks. The chief element missing from an initial PLAN carrier group is a versatile picket ship to defend the capital ship against air and missile threats. The Type 052D could be it.

Admittedly,a new DDG will only complete the strictly material dimension of China’s carrier ambitions. Forming a Chinese carrier battle group on par with its American counterparts will remain a formidable challenge.Chinese planners will need to combine the carrier, its air wing, surface combatants, and possibly a nuclear attack submarine screen into a seamless, mutually supporting team.This is no easy feat.

But the destroyer’s usefulness will not hinge entirely on the fate of China’s carrier program. These are workhorse ships. A multirole DDG could be put to many other uses while the PLAN methodically masters the art of carrier operations. Notably, the Type 052D could join a surface action group (SAG) or amphibious task force to support and defend high-value ships other than carriers. It could also act as the centerpiece of such a group depending on the mission.

And it could do so throughout broad sea areas. Over the past five years numerous surface action groups, numbering up to eleven ships, have transited the international straits separating the Ryukyu island chain to reach the open Western Pacific. Four such groups voyaged to the high seas in the first six months of 2012 alone. Such naval activism strongly suggests that the surface action group will be a key organizing principle around which surface combatants will be deployed, with the Type 052D leading the way.

What will they do? Specifically, improved Luyangs could fend off air attacks against China’s Soviet-built Sovremenny-class destroyers, which specialize in ship-killing engagements. They could also accompany the small but growing numbers of amphibious assault ships Beijing has constructed to project power ashore. Such expeditionary strike groups easily outmatch those deployed by Southeast Asian navies. They would be particularly well-suited to seize islands in the South China Sea. The Type 052D, furthermore, could extend its protective air-defense umbrella over the nimble and stealthy Type 022 Houbei catamarans. These craft belie their diminutive size,sporting long-range anti-ship cruise missiles that allow them to assert or deny control of the seas vis-à-vis superior fleets.

In a Taiwan contingency, moreover, cutting-edge DDGs would offer Beijing a sea-based air-defense option that would further threaten the survivability of the embattled Taiwan Air Force.With its long detection and engagement horizon, a single Type 052D could cover wide swathes of airspace near or over the island, beyond the effective firingrange of shore-based surface-to-air missile units emplaced on the Chinese mainland. Type 052Ds cruising east of Taiwan could in effect surround the island’s air defenders, mounting a threat from all points of the compass when pilots take to the air.

Finally, the PLAN could dispatch such imposing frontline warships overseas, showcasing China’s military prowess to foreign audiences while advancing naval diplomacy. The bottom line is that more—and more capable—large-displacement destroyers will allow China to imaginatively combine different elements of its naval power for a wider range of missions.

In closing, it is worth speculating whether the regional naval balance of power will shift as a result of China’s DDG buildup. The short answer: yes. A casual calculation based on the IISS Military Balance is telling. If the PLAN puts ten Type 052Ds to sea, as the Taipei Times forecasts, then China will boast a fleet of six teen Aegis-equivalent warships—even in the unlikely case that it builds no more combatant ships of this type. By comparison, Japan and South Korea, the only Asian powers with similar naval heavyweights in their inventories,currently possess six and three Aegis-equipped destroyers, respectively.

On paper, at least, this officially makes China’s the leading indigenous Asian navy. Once the 052D contingent joins the fleet, the PLAN can expect to take on any regional fleet—excluding the U.S. Navy, of course—with better-than-average prospects of success. It will command a 16:6 advantage over the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, 16:3 over the South Korean Navy, and 16:9 over the combined Japanese and South Korean fleets. That’s significant.

Will the prospect of a tilt in China’s favor spur a new round of naval construction across the region in the coming years? Much depends on the United States’ staying power in the region, and on Asian countries’ capacity and willingness to bear the costs of an arms race. Now that the debate about the PLAN’s supposed building pause is over, it is time to ponder this troubling prospect.