SS Soryu Class Submarines, Japan

The Soryu Class diesel-electric submarines are being built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Soryu Class is an improved version of the Oyashio Class submarine.

Soryu Class submarine is an improved version of the Oyashio Class submarine.

The keel for the first submarine in the class, Soryu (SS-501), was laid down in March 2005. It was launched in December 2007 and commissioned in March 2009. Unryu (SS-502) was laid down in March 2006, launched in October 2008 and commissioned in March 2010.

Hakuryu was laid down in February 2007 and launched in October 2009 for commissioning in March 2011. The fourth and fifth submarines under construction are scheduled to be commissioned in 2012 and 2013 respectively.

The diesel-electric propulsion system provides a maximum speed of 20kt.

The class is also referred to as the SS 2,900t and the 16SS project. Soryu and Unryu have been named after the World War II aircraft carriers. Soryu was one of the carriers that participated in the Pearl Harbour attack. Both submarines are home-ported at Kure and operated by Subron 5, S-flotilla-1 of the JMSDF.

Soryu Class design and features

The Soryu Class carries a hydrodynamic design based on the Oyashio class submarine. It has a larger displacement than any other submarine class in JMSDF's service. The hull form is made of high tensile steel and is covered with anechoic coating to reduce the reflection of acoustic waves. Interiors of the submarine boast acoustic isolation of loud components. The submarine features computer-aided X control planes. The design incorporates highly automated systems.

The submarine is equipped with Stirling engines for increased propulsion performance and underwater endurance. The engine supports superior submerged operations. The high-performance sonar onboard improves surveillance capabilities. The submarine also features stealth capabilities and enhanced safety measures such as snorkel equipment.

The submarine has an overall length of 84m, beam of 9.1m and depth of 10.3m. The normal draft of the sub is 8.4m. It has a surfaced displacement of 2,950t and submerged displacement of 4,200t. The Soryu Class can complement a crew of 65 including nine officers and 56 enlisted members. The submarine can sail at a surfaced speed of 13kt and submerged speed of 20kt. It has a maximum range of 6,100nm at 6.5kt speed. 

 

Weapon systems

The Soryu Class is fitted with six HU-606 533mm torpedo tubes for Type 89 torpedoes and UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The Harpoon has a range of over 124km and speed of 864km/h.

Type 89 is a wire-guided torpedo with active and passive homing modes. It has a maximum speed of 130km/h and can engage targets within the range of 50km. The torpedo can carry a warhead of 267kg.

Sensors / radars

The submarine is equipped with a ZPS-6F navigation or surface search radar. The sonar suite integrates four low frequency flank arrays, a bow-array and a towed array sonar.

Countermeasures

Soryu features ZLR-3-6 electronic support measures (ESM) systems. There are two 3in underwater countermeasure launcher tubes installed for launching acoustic device countermeasures (ADCs). 

The Soryu Class submarine can be armed with UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

Propulsion

Soryu is powered by a diesel-electric propulsion system. Two Kawasaki 12V 25/25 SB-type diesel engines and four Kawasaki Kockums V4-275R Stirling engines provide a total power output of 2,900kW surfaced and 6,000kW submerged. 

Soryu is the first submarine of the JMSDF to be equipped with Stirling engines manufactured by Sweden-based Kockums.

Stirling is a silent and vibration-free external combustion engine. The Kockums Stirling air independent propulsion system onboard reduces the need for frequent battery charging surfaced and thus increases the submerged endurance of the submarine.

The electric propulsion motor drives a propeller through a single shaft. The submarine is also fitted with an X rudder to provide high manoeuvrability to the submarine when operating very close to the seabed. This X rudder configuration was initially developed by Kockums for the Swedish Gotland class. The propulsion system provides a maximum speed of 20kt. 

 

Source: Naval Technology

Pakistan signs deal for Chinese J-10B fighters

Pakistan has reportedly reached a deal with China to buy 36 Chengdu J-10B fighters in a deal worth around $1.4 billion.

If confirmed, this would form the first phase of a purchase that includes options for several dozen more aircraft and result in Islamabad eventually acquiring around 150 of the multirole fighters.

To be designated as FC-20s in Pakistan, the aircraft will be upgraded versions of the J-10 fighter that officially entered Chinese air force service in early 2007. The type is China's most advanced indigenously developed military aircraft.

Deliveries to Pakistan are likely to begin from 2014-15, but the country is unlikely to have any workshare in the programme.

China has been a major supplier of aircraft to Pakistan's armed forces for more than 30 years, supplementing purchases of Dassault Mirage fighters in the 1970s and Lockheed Martin F-16A/Bs in the 1980s.

Relations with the West cooled in the 1990s, when Washington imposed an arms embargo after Pakistan tested a nuclear bomb. Relations improved earlier this decade, when Islamabad emerged as a key ally in the war in Afghanistan.

Last year, Pakistan confirmed an order for 18 new F-16C/D Block 52 fighters, with options for another 18. It is also buying several refurbished F-16s, and Lockheed is also under contract to upgrade 34 F-16A/B Block 15s.

However, Islamabad has also maintained its close relationship with China. The partners have jointly developed the Chengdu/Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) FC-1/JF-17 fighter, with Islamabad having received its first two Chinese-built examples in March 2007. It has since taken delivery of around a dozen JF-17s.

The first example to be manufactured by PAC will fly before year-end, and Islamabad will eventually buy at least 150 domestically produced fighters. These will replace its air force's ageing fleets of Nanchang A-5s, Chengdu F-7s and Mirage IIIs and Mirage Vs.

The JF-17 will be capable of carrying a variety of conventional and precision-guided bombs, plus air-to-air and anti-shipping missiles of both short- and beyond-visual ranges.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...ghters-334681/

Its an old article. So J-10bs are to be expected from 2014-2015.

Will China’s Nuclear weapon Modernization bring more transparency？

 

 A drill of Chinese nuclear forces

 

2014-04-14 (by Nicolas Giacometti and from thediplomat.com) — Recent events in late 2013 and early 2014, including China’s demonstration of its nuclear submarine force, have once again brought the issue of the country’s policy of nuclear opacity to the fore. Among the P5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), China officially communicates the least about the size, status and capabilities of its nuclear forces. Indeed, although some uncertainty remains, the other members of the P5 all give public approximations of the size and characteristics of their deployed arsenal. Beijing’s policy of nuclear opacity or nuclear secrecy is often noted in official reports and mentioned by specialized NGOs as limiting the possibility for strategic dialogue with other great powers (especially the U.S.) and as arousing suspicions and misperceptions about China’s intentions.

Indeed, an absence of information favors the development of alarmist reports about the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, which is depicted by some analysts as dangerous, aggressive and destabilizing. Although some of the concerns of those who increasingly worry about Beijing’s nuclear capabilities are surely legitimate, there is an alternative view: the potential for China’s nuclear modernization to remove some of the incentives driving the opacity policy.

Since the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, opacity has been a strategic tool for Beijing to compensate for the material shortcomings and limitations of its nuclear forces in terms of survivability and destructive power, and thus to increase their overall deterrent effect on would-be aggressors (mainly the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S.).

Until 2006, China’s only ballistic missile able to deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental U.S. was the liquid-fuelled and silo-based DF-5A, which existed only in very limited numbers (20 or so). These characteristics made the Chinese ICBM force highly vulnerable to a disarming first strike, especially in the absence of an efficient early warning system. Indeed, liquid-fuelled missiles take more time to launch than their solid-fuelled counterparts because the missile must be fueled first. This operation takes at least a few hours, during which the missile remains in the silo and is vulnerable to a direct hit. As such, various actions were required to increase the survivability of the missiles to guarantee they wouldn’t be destroyed before launch. If this aim wasn’t achieved, there could be no credible threat of retaliation against an adversary that could have launched a disarming first strike. Thus, among other possibilities that included for example the building of mock silos, secrecy about the numbers and location of ICBMs helped create uncertainty in enemy planning processes that made a disarming first strike more difficult to plan and execute.

Similarly, the very limited number of missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. (especially after a potential destruction of some of them through a U.S. preemptive strike) limited the credibility of the threat China could issue against its rivals. The handful of nuclear warheads Beijing could have launched against the U.S. appeared very limited when compared to the total obliteration that the U.S. could have inflicted upon China. Again, secrecy could act as a palliative to the limitations of China’s arsenal, by introducing ambiguity into the mind of enemy decision-makers about actual Chinese strength. This ambiguity would then have a deterrent effect on any cautious decision-maker who would not easily embark on aggression against China without a thorough knowledge of the intensity of the retaliatory strike he might have to face.

Overall, in broad terms, China’s fundamental nuclear inferiority compared to other great powers created structural pressure on Beijing to adopt a policy of opacity during and after the Cold War.

A Modernized Arsenal

Notwithstanding this observation, it appears from all relevant sources that China has been, is, and will modernize its nuclear arsenal in a way that precisely addresses the shortcomings outlined above. The pace of this modernization is slow and China’s nuclear forces are still the least developed of the P5, but their survivability and destructiveness is growing steadily, slowly enabling China to reach a capacity of assured retaliation it has been seeking for so long. In this process, the introduction of the DF-31A and DF-41 ICBMs and the development of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force have been and will be particularly critical.

Several developments protect China’s nuclear forces from a disarming first strike and give them an assured capacity to retaliate. The increasing size of Beijing’s arsenal makes it statistically harder to destroy entirely in a first strike. Indeed, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the continental U.S. has increased to around 40 today, a number that is expected by the U.S. intelligence community to grow to around 100 in the mid-2020s. Although U.S. intelligence has often exaggerated the Chinese threat, it is clear that the number of threatening missiles will increase in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the replacement of the silo-based and liquid-fueled DF-5A ICBM with the solid-fueled and mobile DF-31A ICBM since 2006 (a process that is still ongoing) critically reduces the preparation time of missiles that could now theoretically be launched immediately if the warheads were already fitted, which means that they are no longer vulnerable during a prolonged preparation process. Moreover, the mobility of the DF-31A makes it much more difficult to attack as its location can be changed quickly. Finally, the DF-31 introduces new countermeasures and capacities that would help it evade a U.S. missile defense shield. This capacity will probably be increased by the hypothetical DF-41, which might include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV). Finally, the slow (and difficult) development of China’s SSBN/SLBM force is a process that is progressively giving the country an assured second strike capability because of the relative undetectability of nuclear submarines.

Similarly, the ongoing modernization and evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal also increases its destructive power. As already explained, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the entirety of the continental U.S. is growing. As such, although China will not catch up with the U.S. or Russia in terms of absolute numbers of warheads (something Beijing is not aiming to do anyway), it would be increasingly capable of inflicting tremendous and unacceptable damage upon the U.S. This in turn would increase the credibility of Chinese nuclear deterrence by establishing what resembles mutual assured vulnerability and destruction.

Overall, China’s ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces is clearly addressing the shortcomings of its deterrent, which provided some of the incentives for the adoption of a policy of nuclear opacity. However, the removal of some of the fundamental drivers behind the adoption of a policy doesn’t necessarily mean this policy will be scrapped anytime soon. The pace of China’s nuclear modernization is slow and so is the removal of the drivers that lie behind the adoption of nuclear opacity. Other reasons for opacity linked to culture or Chinese diplomatic stance might keep in place incentives to retain as much information as possible about the deterrent.

Still, we can hope that China, freed of the fear of a disarming first strike and assured of its capacity to deter other nuclear powers, might feel sufficiently assured about the security of its arsenal to communicate more openly in the medium and long terms about the status, capacities and programmed evolution of its nuclear forces. This would represent a first step towards creating opportunities for clarification and dialogue about China’s capabilities and intentions and thus help reduce misperceptions and maybe suspicion. More openness on China’s side might then open up more space for confidence-building measures and lay the ground for future arms control discussions.

Nicholas Giacometti is a specialist in nuclear issues and missile defense. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institutions he has been affiliated with. The numbers and technical information used in this article are mainly drawn from the publications of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

The Black Box of China’s Military

2014-03-07 (foreignpolicy.com and by Isaac Stone Fish) — The People’s Liberation Army does not have a website. There is China Military Online, which boasts that it’s “approved by the Central Military Commission,” (CMC) the 11-member body chaired by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which oversees the PLA, and is the military’s “only news portal website.” There are other Chinese news sites, like Chinamil, which hosts Liberation Daily, a newspaper put out by the PLA’s general political department, the shadowy department tasked with running the army’s political activities. And there’s a website for China’s Ministry of National Defense, an organ which is subordinate to the CMC, and which is nominally the public face of the PLA. But the world’s largest standing army, and the CMC which oversees it, has decided not to bother.

Shenguang laser project

 

On March 5, during an annual meeting of its legislature, Beijing announced that it is increasing its military budget by 12.2 percent, to a total of $131.6 billion in 2014. While still less than a third of the $496 billion that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel proposed in February for the U.S. military in 2015, it still represents a significant expansion, even after two decades of double-digit growth in the PLA’s official budget. But few doubt that the grand total allocated to China’s military is yet higher, and many in the U.S. government wish they had more insight into the method to the darkness surrounding the PLA.

There is general consensus that China, like many nations, spends more on its military than it reports: In February, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said that China’s military budget reached $240 billion in 2013, according to Bloomberg. As the most salient data point of China’s military, Beijing’s official budget gets a lot of attention. And that’s largely because there’s little other information that comes with it. “The single number, without any accompanying detail, represents the sum total of public transparency by the world’s second-largest defence spender and the fastest rising military power, pored over by intelligence agencies and military experts from around the world in an effort to glean any clues about China’s future strategic intentions,” reported the Financial Times.

So how opaque is the PLA, and how much insight and information does the United States possess? It’s important to distinguish between what the general public and the media understands, and classified information on the PLA available to U.S. government officials. “There’s a big difference between what you know and what we know,” said a senior Pentagon official, who asked to speak on background because of the sensitivity of the matter. The United States has long worried about the Chinese military’s lack of openness. “They mock us some times, for how much we repeat” this call for a higher level of transparency, said the senior Pentagon official. Most recently, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, expressed concerns about the “aggressive” growth of the Chinese military and “their lack of transparency” in a February speech.

Overall, though, the Chinese military is probably growing more transparent; or at least the United States’ non-classified understanding of it is improving. On a February trip to Beijing, the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno said the two countries’ militaries were planning to start a formal dialogue and exchange program before the end of 2014. “We know a lot about China’s defense budget, especially when compared to a decade ago,” said a China military researcher, who asked to speak on background. Part of the reason, he said, is the proliferation of open source material. While the PLA might not have a website, it does support a media industry whose role, just like in the United States, is to explain it and critique it. There are countless newspapers, blogs, and military journals in China that regularly run articles about the Chinese military and what it should or should not be doing. “Technically our understanding of China’s military has improved over the last five to ten years, and we have a decent sense” about intelligence, said a U.S. defense official, who asked to speak anonymously.

The military itself does seem to have taken steps to make itself better understood to domestic audiences and foreign governments. In November, seven units of the PLA and China’s paramilitary People’s Armed Police appointed spokespeople. (Prior to that, a single spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense fielded comments for the PLA.) Not much has changed: six of the spokespeople wrote New Year’s greetings, which The PLA Daily newspaper dutifully published on its Sina Weibo account, and at least two of the spokespeople have, since being named, actually made public addresses. The PLA has made itself more open “in very small increments,” said Avery Goldstein, director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania. They’re starting to publish with more frequency “things like defense white papers” and other reports, he said.

The biggest hole in U.S. understanding of the Chinese military appears to be in how it makes decisions. “We are still pretty much in the dark” about decision-making, both in terms of personnel and other areas, said the U.S. defense official, a sentiment widely shared by others interviewed for this article. “We have pretty much zero insight into how the PLA makes decisions,” said the military researcher. “Zero.”

When asked about how much control Xi has over the PLA — perhaps the most important question if a crisis were to occur — the senior Pentagon official paused for a minute, before replying:

On one level, being able to control what information it releases benefits the PLA. “It’s calculated,” said Goldstein. “The Chinese don’t want to reveal too much that exposes weaknesses.” The PLA, he notes, realizes that it’s weaker than the U.S. military. They often say, “‘if you have a gun and I have a knife, transparency does not make me safer,’” said Dean Cheng, a scholar at the Heritage Foundation. Misinformation, and the selective release of information, plays a bigger role in Chinese tactics than it does in the United States. “Mao Zedong said warfare is 70 percent political,” said a former U.S. defense official with extensive experience in Beijing, who asked to speak on background. He cited the concept of san zhan, or three warfares: psychological, media, and legal. “From the Chinese perspective, political warfare, including legal warfare, is seen as a form of combat,” Cheng wrote in a May 2012 article.

But the opacity also raises concerns about the intentions of the Chinese military. “They flat out refuse to put limits on what they may do!” said the senior Pentagon official. “There are interminable meetings, where we say, ‘How many submarines? Are you going to build a lot of anti-satellite weapons? 100? Five?’ Anything that would possibly jeopardize U.S. forces, we’d like to know about. But they flat refuse to say anything at all about the limit or future size of the force they might build. ‘Go straight to hell’ is their attitude.” That has consequences both in the Pentagon, and repercussions back in Beijing. “Do you think when the Chinese speak this way to an [American] admiral or general, the admiral just takes a sip of tea? No! It makes them paranoid,” he said. “The secrecy turns into inadvertent provocation for U.S. defense hawks to spend more on the rebalance” — the U.S. policy of moving forces toward the Asia-Pacific region. “I hate to say it, but [the PLA] have brought this onto themselves.”

It’s not only foreigners who are kept in the dark. “One of the biggest discoveries of the last 10 years is that the PLA doesn’t share with the civilian leadership,” said the senior Pentagon official. Indeed, an editorial announcing the institution of PLA spokespeople in the Global Times, a Communist Party newspaper, politely offered suggestions for making the PLA more open: “They could also create an ‘Open Barracks’ day for some troops garrisoned in cities, allowing the public to observe the troops going about their daily tasks. This is done by not a few foreign armies, and the positive effects are clear.”

Whether the PLA will choose to adopt such nominal efforts at openness is still an unanswered question. What’s not is that China’s military is still a black box. “Is there a Chinese doctrine on military space? How does the military command? If there is a crisis, who do we call. We just don’t know,” Cheng said. The key questions are the unknown unknowns in a time of potential crisis. If there is a major, unannounced build-up of China’s military, said the senior Pentagon official, “then not knowing is a disaster.”

What China still seek from Russian military export

With the recent signing of the major gas deal between China and Russia amidst the entire situation in Ukraine, there has been a big push by the media and Putin himself to frame all of this as somewhat of an alliance between the countries. While I generally think this is overplayed, I think the military cooperation part of things can be explored. Russia is coming to China from a position of weakness and is probably willing to sell technology they were not willing to before. The question is what China actually wants from Russia at this point.

Su-35

 

Last year, I talked about the possible Su-35/Lada deals here. At this point, I would bet that neither deal goes forward. Even if some kind of conventional submarine deal gets signed, it will be more for a design based on Lada that will use mostly Chinese combat systems, engine and weaponry. The Su-35 talks have floated since 2008 and still have not ended up anywhere. The closer we get to J-20, the less it makes sense for China to purchase Su-35. In the recent visit by Putin, the 2 countries signed deals for cooperating on a new upgraded version of Mi-26 and large airliner. In the aviation fields, China’s biggest import from Russia remains to be high performing turbofan engines.

 

Lada Class Submarine

In the most recent join sea drill between China and Russia, Russia sent a fleet consist of the Slava-Class Cruiser Varyag, a Udaloy class destroyer, a Sov class destroyer and a landing ship. Chinese fleet was consisted of No. 151 Zhengzhou (Type 052C), No. 139 Ningbo (Sov class), No. 112 Harbin (Type 052), 2 Type 054As and landing ships. The drill lasted for 5 days in East China Sea, so it was probably the largest such drill between the 2 countries. If this exercises had taken place in 2005, there would’ve been many articles about how this is a showcase of Russian weaponry for export to China. We certainly don’t hear that kind of talk now. Just by focusing on Type 052C Zhengzhou and Slava-Class Varyag, we can see the different approach China has taken in its naval modernization vs Soviet naval philosophy. In the role of area air defense, Type 052C probably has comparable to superior capabilities to Slava with its 48 cell HHQ-9 VLS and more modern AESA MFRs + combat system vs 64 cell S-300 VLS. It’s pretty much weaker in everything else (close-in air defense, ASuW and ASW). Like its big brother Kirov class, Slava class can operate and pack a lot of punch (with 16 P-500 missiles) by itself, whereas 052C is better served as an air defense escort in a flotilla with other offensive options. When looking at where PLAN has proceeded in its modernization, it makes a lot of sense why China did not purchase the unfinished Slava class Ukraina when it could have done so in the middle of last decade. I have talked about how Sov class had become the white elephants of PLAN, because they could not effective communicate and operate with other ships due to having different combat system, communication equipments and data link. Numerous projects were started in recent years to create subsystem to solve these problems when the Sov destroyers go through their mid-life overhaul. Purchasing the Ukraina or any other Russian warships will have cause similar difficulties in combat and logistics. PLAN seems to have a pretty good direction forward with mass production of Type 052D and Type 055, so it has not been tempted to buy Russian hardware since early 2000s.

Since combat aircraft and submarine purchases also seem unlikely with the slow progress of talks over Lada and Su-35, what else is China still buying from Russia outside of the engines? New purchase of S-400 SAMs is possible, but China seems to be doing pretty well with the success of HQ-9 in the Turkey competition. Transport and utility helicopter is another such area. Russia is just finishing the delivery of 48 Mi-171s to China this year and has signed agreement for developing an improved Mi-26 with China. It looks like both of these helicopters should see more orders in future even as more domestic options like Z-15 and Z-20 become available, since they occupy different roles. Another area is in large transport aircraft and tankers, where China has been purchasing refurbished IL-76s from Russia and IL-78s from Ukraine. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine could possibly give Ukraine more incentive to sell refurbished IL-76/78s and former Soviet designs (possibly improved version) to China. One interesting example is Zubr class LCAC where Russia and Ukraine argued over Ukrainian right to sell license production of Zubr class to China. The second Zubr was shipped early to China due to its shipyard’s location in Crimea. Now that Crimea has become part of Russia, China will probably continue to build more Zubrs as needed without further negotiation with Russia.

The final area where China would want Russian help is nuclear submarines and strategic bombers. I think even with China’s stronger bargaining power, it is still nearly impossible for Russia to sell plans for Tu-160 or Akula-II to China. The most it could get here are design help for these strategic platforms.

As we move forward, I think we will get to a point where Russia will start buying military subsystems from China. That will be quite a shift from where things were 2 decades ago.

Bangladesh Navy - Modernization (Article Part-II)

Continued from previous post......

Accounts vary as to the details of the navy plan, but one source reported it included purchase of three frigates, three large patrol aircraft, 12 patrol craft, two landing craft utility (LCU), one hydrographic unit, one salvage vessel, four missile boats and installation of new missiles in some ships to strengthen its surface fleet. It proposed introducing its own aviation fleet to consolidate combat capability of the surface fleet by purchasing three maritime patrol aircraft and four helicopters in the coming 10 years.

The navy also discloses a plan for purchasing a submarine by 2019 for the flotilla. It said the government has approved in principle this proposed purchase. “Before purchasing the submarine, steps have already been taken to build infrastructure and train up personnel. When the preparatory work is completed, it will be possible to initiate steps to purchase a submarine by 2019,” the navy report added.

The navy said based on the possible allocation of funds every year, the process of purchasing and building surface and aviation platforms to achieve three-dimensional ability will continue. Off-the-shelf purchase process will also continue simultaneously that would cost less and save time, it adds. “Additional allocation of Tk 1,200 crore will be required for purchasing submarine, the hydrographic unit and the salvage ship,” the navy said, adding, “An estimated allocation of Tk 5,000 will be required for principal purchase and development in the next 10 years.”

The principal purchase excludes the submarine, hydrographic unit and the salvage ship. As per the plan, three large patrol craft and 12 patrol craft will be built at the navy’s own shipyards. Purchase of two helicopters and two maritime patrol aircraft were under process as of 2009.

In defence for replacing three frigates — Abu Bakar, Omar Faruk and Ali Haider — the navy said the ships were built in 1953, 1953 and 1957 and Tk 300 crore will be required to upgrade those. Upgrading the old vessels was not viable, the navy claimed. The navy also proposes replacing four out of the eight missile boats — Durbar, Duranto, Uttal and Durdanto. Those were commissioned in 1983, 1983, 1992 and 1988. It said Tk 200 crore would be required to upgrade the missile boats.

The report says as many as 82 ships, small and large, were in the navy’s fleet. Most of the ships were older that 25 years. Only 15 ships/craft are aged under 25 years. Combat capability of the old ships has decreased and their maintenance and operation cost is high as well as risky, the navy adds. “With the old ships and present infrastructures, it is becoming difficult to discharge [the navy's] crucial duties.”

During the three years 2009-2011, a total of 2 OPV, 1 survey ship, 8 high-speedboats, helicopter handling system, early warning radar system and 2 marine helicopters were added to the Bangladesh Navy. Process for purchasing C-704 missile system, QW-2 SAM, OTOMAT MK-II missiles, 2 large patrol craft, 5 patrol craft and 1 oil tanker had been completed. The survey ship newly purchased for Bangladesh Navy has been commissioned.

The Navy attained double capability through addition of 2 newly purchased marine helicopters. In February 2010 AgustaWestland announced the award of a contract by the Bangladesh Navy for two AW109 Power maritime helicopters. The helicopters will be used for a wide range of naval missions including search and rescue, economic zone protection, surface surveillance and maritime security. The two Agusta AW 109E helicopters on 14 June 2011 were delivered in 2011 and were capable of being operated from the frigate BNS Bangabandhu.

In 2010 BN signed a contract with China Shipbuilding and Offshore Company (CSOC) to built two Large Patrol Craft in Wuchang Shipyard in China. The ships will be of 600 tons and will be armed with 4 x C-704 SSM, 1 x 76.2 mm gun with FCS and RDC. In another contract with CSOC, BN will construct 5 units of 350-ton patrol craft at Khulna Shipyard under Chinese technical assistance.

On 12 April 2010 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said soon two more frigates will be included to BangladeshNavy fleet. Sheikh Hasina said during her recent China visit, she had requested the Chinese government to provide Bangladesh Naval Force with two newly-constructed frigates including helicopters, and the Chinese government gave consent in this regard. Besides, naval ship Bangabandhu, decommissioned during the last BNP-Jamaat government on political ground, will be made fully operational again.

On 21 June 2010 it was reported that the Bangladesh Navy planned to expand cooperation with China's national defense industry in the framework of the activities of two frigates, making the Navy to a total number of frigates to seven. The relevant supply agreement was reached in March 2010. At that time it was reported that, in addition to procurement of two frigates from China, the Bangladesh Navy will receive three British warships. The UK Disposal Services Authority (DSA) successfully negotiated the sale and handover of HM Ships LEEDS CASTLE and DUMBARTON CASTLE (Castle Class Offshore Patrol Vessels) for £2.45m and HMS ROEBUCK offshore hydrographic launch for £4.4m, to the Bangladesh Navy. All 3 vessels have since sailed to Bangladesh and were delivered in June 2010. Maintenance and improvement work had been started in the UK on two patrol boats of the Bangladesh Navy.

On 29 December 2010 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said the government had plans to include submarine with base facility in Bangladesh Navy by 2019 to build it as an effective 'deterrent force'. As of 2005 the plan was to acquire 4 subs within 2012, although by 2012 Bangladesh appeared no closer to acquiring submarines than it had seven years previously. It is said that Bangladesh is prepared to spend Tk.1,200 crore [ie, Tk.12,000,000,000, or about US$150,000,000] on 4 submarines. The amount of money Bangladesh might spend on submarines would probably not be enough to buy new ones. The Scorpene submarine comes in at US$300-$400,000,000, and the Agosta-90B Submarine (from DCN) is also US$300-$400,000,000 apiece. So possibly Bangaldesh would buy used U-209s for Italy or some other European country which is replacing them with the new U-212 from Germany. Even an "old" Upholder cost around $200 million a piece.

In June 2011 Army Chief General Mohammad Abdul Mubeen inaugurated the building of a LCVP Type C landing craft vessel personnel (LCVP) at Khulna Shipyard. The 19.75-meter long and 7-meter wide craft was built for Bangladesh Army. The army will use the LCVP for transportation of soldiers and equipment when needed. The vessel was expected to be handed over to the Army within a year. Khulna Shipyard already built modern firefighting boats for the Fire Service, ferries for the BIWTC and a speedy patrol boat for Bangladesh Coast Guard. LCVP-012 was delivered on 2010-04-17.

A contract was signed on 23 June 2011 with Ruag Germany for the supply of two Dornier 228 NG MPA within 24 months. Following customers in Japan, Norway and Germany, in July 2011 the Bangladesh Navy purchased two modern Do 228NG (New Generation) turboprop aircraft. The aircraft will be used for maritime air patrol and rescue mission along the countries’ coastline. Delivery of both aircraft was scheduled for early summer 2013.

In October 2011 Bangladesh’s state-owned Khulna Shipyard signed a contract with China’s Shanghai-based Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard and the China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Ltd (CSOC) for licence-building five inshore patrol vessels (IPV) and seven guided-missile corvettes. While the IPVs are based on the 80-ton Huang Pu-class vessel, the guided-missile corvettes, to be built to a brand-new design, will each have a displacement of 260 tons, length of 46 meters, beamwidth of 7.4 meters, and have a top speed of 30 Knots. While the CSOC would supply the first two guided-missile corvettes off-the-shelf, the remaining five will be licence-built by Khulna Shipyard. Each such vessel will be armed with up to four CPMIEC-built C-802A anti-ship cruise missiles.

As of 2012 it was reported that the Navy was planning to purchase two corvettes and two frigates. According to unofficial information, Bangladesh Navy was seeking two "Jiang Wei II" class (Type 053H3) frigates from China. The Turkish Navy will be retiring four early MEKO 200 class frigates, which reportedly have been offered to Bangladesh. Those warship's combat systems would be upgraded to BN requirement before delivery.

The second-hand submarine that Bangladesh was seeking in order to further safeguard its offshore assets is likely to be sourced from China. Despite an interest in contributing more fully to international peace-keeping missions, the protection of offshore energy resources in the face of competition from India and Burma is Bangladesh’s prime motivation.

The first-ever warship, BNS PADMA built in Bangladesh by Khulna Shipyard Limited (KSY) was commissioned in Bangladesh Navy on 24 January 2013 by Honorable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. It may be mentioned that the 2nd Patrol Craft has also been launched on 23 January 2013 which is expected to deliver 2 (two) months ahead of the schedule. The rest 3 (Three) will be delivered within December 2013.

On December 20, 2013 Bangladesh finalized a deal to purchase two Ming-class submarines from China. The deal for the two submarines, which was waiting for final approval from the Finance Ministry, was worth $203.3 million. The type 035G diesel-electric run submarines are scheduled to be delivered in 2019. Government officials hinted that there was a plan to purchase at least three submarines in the next few years. Besides submarines, Dhaka was also negotiating with Beijing to buy two frigates under a state-to-state purchase deal. Beijing offered two of its old 053H2 frigates at a very low rate on the condition that Dhaka would bear the refurbishment and defence equipment costs for the off-the-shelf ships. An estimated Tk 6.55 billion will be needed to add two frigates to the country's existing frigate fleet of six.

Source:www.globalsecurity.org

Bangladesh Navy - Modernization (Article Part-I)

The most formidable ships in the navy were three vintage frigates purchased from Britain in the late 1970s. These included two Leopard-class Type 41 frigates, renamed Abu Bakr and Ali Haider, and one Salisbury-class Type 61 frigate, renamed Umar Farooq. The most modern craft in the inventory were twenty-four patrol boats purchased from the Chinese between 1982 and 1984. These included four Hegu-class fast attack craft, armed with missiles; four P4-class fast-attack craft, armed with torpedoes; and eight Hainan-class and eight Shanghai II-class fast attack patrol craft. These vessels patrolled coastal waters and rivers to interdict foreign fishing vessels and assert Bangladeshi sovereignty over its territorial waters.

Other vessels in the Bangladeshi inventory included vintage patrol craft purchased from China, Yugoslavia, India, Japan, and Singapore; a recommissioned Pakistani patrol boat; a similar craft converted from a Thai fishing boat; and five indigenously built Pabna-class riverine patrol craft. Bangladesh also maintained a merchant fleet comprising 274 vessels. Since all were government owned, merchant vessels could be pressed into service during hostilities.

During the 1996-2001, the then Awami League government implemented many steps to build the Navy as a modern force. Commissioning of Naval ships Titas, Kushiara and Barkat, incorporation of modern LPC Madhumati, diversion of BNS Shoibal into modern survey ship, establishment of Bangladesh Navy's Hydrographic and Oceanographic Center and inclusion of School of Maritime Warfare and Tactics are among the development works done by the Awami League government.

In 2002 the Prime Minister announced that Bangaldesh would buy a pair of Lupo-class frigates from the Italian Navy, but the ships were sold to Peru instead. Victory day is celebrated on December 16 in Bangladesh. On this day in 1971, the Pakistani Army surrendered to the Indo-Bangladeshi High Command in Dhaka, ending the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. Bangladesh gained independence after 9 months of a long and bloody struggle. One interesting feature of the 2003 Victory Day celebration was the military armament exhibition, organised by the three armed forces between 16 and 20 December 2003. The Bangladesh Navy displayed some future projects like submarine and helicopter carriers.

With limited resources, materialisation remained a difficult proposition.'The Draft Forces Goal 2020 for BN' in 2005/06 envisaged the Bangladesh Navy (BN) with submarines, helicopters, maritime patrol aircrafts and so forth. As of 2005 Bangladesh was thinking about purchasing Lupo class frigates from Italy. Bangladesh was interested in Type-23 Duke class friagtes but could not confront the cost. as of 2007 Bangladesh was said to be interested in a "Sapsan 2100" Ukranian frigate, but nothing came of this, and the "Sapsan 2100" is un-attested outside of Combat Fleets of the World.

In early 2009 the navy sent the Armed Forces Division (AFD) an ambitious ten-year plan to upgrade it into a three-dimensional force, in line with the proposed Forces Goal-2020. The report placed before the parliamentary standing committee on the defence ministry on 08 June 2009. Bangladesh Navy sought new frigates, a submarine, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and other equipment with an estimated cost of Tk 6,000 crore. The plan was prepared after considering the recent maritime situation, budgetary allocation, market prices of required equipment and other matters.

“Bangladesh Navy will obtain capability of a three-dimensional force if its aviation wing and a submarine are added to its fleet,” believes the navy, tasked with protecting the nation’s territorial waters, safeguard Bangladesh’s economic interest and exercise maritime control within the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Citing the need for a three dimensional modern force, the navy said aircraft and submarines along with surface fleets are considered essential parts to increase a navy’s combat capability. “It was not possible in the past to introduce aircraft and submarines in the fleet due to various adversities despite having the plan and desire,” the navy observes.

Apart from purchasing equipment, it also proposed formation of Special Warfare and Diving Salvage (SWADS) Command for carrying out a special warfare to control militancy and smuggling in sea and rivers. “If the special force is formed, it will be able to play active role along with the two other forces in sea and rivers,” the navy said.

The navy also proposed increasing its personnel, setting up naval bases and training institutes. The proposals now await the government’s consideration. On manpower, the navy proposed increasing 4,000 personnel of various ranks in the next 10 years. The existing approved manpower of the navy as of 2009 was 17,000.

The proposals include setting up bases for naval commandos, divers, rescuers and naval aviation, and development of a naval base in Mongla. Other proposals are installation of a junior staff training institute, navy hydrographic unit, oceanographic centre and operational sea training guide, and approval of the organogram of Khulna and Narayanganj shipyards.

The navy was also preparing more proposals to this end for sending to the government for consideration. Those include setting up of a naval base at St Martine’s Island, submarine base, setting up a separate naval base in Dhaka, and restructuring the organogram of the naval headquarters and area commanders’ headquarters.

Is The Design Finalized For Chinese Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN)?

China-Defense Forum members were somewhat astounded today when pictures were released on Chinese internet forums of what is certainly a model of the first Chinese nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) on display at an official event in Zhongshan. While it being just a model might not seem that significant to many, there are telltales about the model in these pics that indicate it's genuine. In fact, it represents a final design for the new CVN has been approved by PLAN for production.

The design clarifies some previous questions: four catapults (presumably EMALS), no ski-jump, three elevators. It also appears to be a very large carrier in the NIMITZ/FORD Class displacement range.

The hull number 18 falls in line with previous expectations that the first "all-indigenous" Chinese carrier design would be nuclear-powered and is expected to be the "002 Class". As the currently in-service CV LIAONING is hull number 16, this seems to imply hull number 17 will be the 001A class, a Chinese-built KUZNETSOV-class CV.

Defence budget 2014-15: Rising trend continues

AS I write this, the budget for the FY 14-15 has not yet been placed in the Parliament. Meanwhile, it has been reported in the media that the total budget this year will be over Tk. 2,50,000 crore (over $31 billion). Of this amount, Tk. 16,400 crore ($ 2.05 billion) will be earmarked for defence. The amount represents 6.56% of the national budget and a 12.7% rise from last year's budget ($1.86 billion).

Defence budget in Bangladesh has always remained a taboo -- not to be discussed in public forum or in the Parliament. The Parliament session, which must pass the budget by June 30, is yet to start. Given the weekends and holidays, there will be very little time left to discuss the budget in threadbare. Moreover, with virtually no opposition inside the parliament, we can only expect speeches long on eulogy and short on substance. Issues brought up by the MPs continue to be those of their own areas, or of their business or professional interest. Although there have been attempts by the present government to introduce the MPs and top government functionaries to the defence matters by conducting short courses for them in the National Defence College (NDC), we are yet to see its outcome in the national arena.

There is a Parliamentary Committee on Defence, but there too major policy or procurement decisions are not discussed. We are often told of a “Forces' Goal 2021” chalked out by the Ministry of Defence, but ordinary citizens are not privy to its content. While there had been numerous discussions, debates and suggestions from various trade bodies, pressure groups and civil society organisations on what fiscal measures government should take to accelerate the pace of development, there has been total silence regarding defence expenditures. In Bangladesh, we leave the need assessment to the defence professionals, namely the military organisation itself. Defence represents only a part of the national security apparatus; in a developing country like Bangladesh, security of people from hunger, disease, poverty and lawlessness is often of primary concern. Yet when we talk of national security we think primarily of defence against external aggression, hence the need for the defence forces.

A standing military force is a hallmark of an independent, sovereign nation. Its primary mission is to defeat external aggression and internal subversion. Military forces provide the muscle behind diplomacy, and also project national power overseas. In recent years, Bangladesh armed forces have played a key role in UN peacekeeping operations. They had been our goodwill ambassadors to the global hotspots and been able to restore democracy and good governance in areas where only chaos reigned before. In many parts of trouble-torn Africa, Bangladesh is a household name fondly remembered for restoring peace and order in the wake of violent civil wars. At home too, not only have the military forces been at the forefront of disaster management, they have also been usefully deployed in various nation-building activities. The defence forces, therefore, continue to enjoy a high respectability.

In a democratic country, such as ours, the military is always subordinate to the civilian political authority and acts within the parameters set by the government. Even in case of war or warlike situation, while the military works out the strategic planning and tactical details, the broad strategic objectives are defined and circumscribed by the civilian political masters. However, where political institutions are weak or unstable, the military exercises powerful influence in the allocation of resources and exercises extra-constitutional power in the national politics. In our own neighbourhood, we have the examples of Pakistan and India -- in Pakistan the military often calls the final shot in national affairs, whereas in India the military operates under tight civilian control and has no role to play in the functioning of the political process. The results are apparent for all to see; while Pakistan is tottering on the brink of failure, India is a emerging as a major power in Asia. It is, therefore, important that the military's role and task must be overseen by the political masters and not the other way round. 

Bangladesh inherited a rudimentary defence force in 1971; the army had three ill-equipped brigades, the air force had no aircraft and the navy had no ships. Since then, of course, the forces have come a long way. The Army has 7 infantry divisions and additional armoured and artillery components. The Air Force now operates modern fighters and transport aircraft. The Navy has seen exponential growth in recent years with the acquisition of naval ships, aircraft and soon to join submarine. We had no training establishment at the time of liberation, yet today we are not only self-sufficient in training facilities, but also attract trainees from many friendly countries. We have set up a number of cantonments, naval and air bases. We have set up facilities for the maintenance of sophisticated weapon systems. However, most of the operational equipments are imported from abroad by spending hard currencies. In a resource-strained country, these are difficult choices to make.

The defence budget has more than doubled in the last six years; it is likely to increase at a higher rate over the years as the payment of arms deals already made falls due. Defence competes for funding with other vital sectors such as education, health, agriculture or rural development. States around the world are failing not because of external aggression, but because of the failure to address the primary concern of the people -- security of life and property, a life without hunger and disease, and a prospect for a better future. While making defence budget, the policy planners will have to keep these competing demands in mind.

Bangladesh holds a key geo-strategic position -- a bridge between South and Southeast Asia and China. It will gain in importance as trade and commerce within the region increase through the land and sea corridors. Unlike countries such as China, India or Pakistan, we do not have a major territorial dispute with our neighbours. Our 3,500 km border with India is demarcated except for three small patches totaling about 6.5 km. Our southern border with Myanmar is demarcated too. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Myanmar has already been settled; we expect the EEZ between Bangladesh and India to be settled through arbitration by this year.

Although, conventional threats from external sources are minimal for Bangladesh, there is the danger of internal dissension, especially the threat of terrorism and extremism. Military will continue to provide muscle to resist and defeat such forces. While we grapple with scant national resources, making judicious use of the defence funding should be a top priority. In the decision-making and implementation process, transparency and accountability at all levels are vitally important. Striking the right balance between national development and national defence is, therefore, most important.

Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury