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| Damascus, Rally for the Government |
Here, in the blog (source is linked below), it is already to read for weeks: the Zionist-Wahhabi war front against Syria has no more a chance to win the terror and propaganda war against Syria due to a number of strategic successes of the Syrian army.
In the first weeks and months after the begin of the NATO and GCC states supported Ramadan offensive “Volcano in Damascus – Earthquake in Syria” by the militias from July 2012 were the successes of the Syrian army mainly of a defensive nature.
The attempt of the storming of Damascus was blocked, in Aleppo and other cities of Syria, the government has kept, if not the whole city, then at least each a significant part of the city under control, and the army has managed to maintain the substantial army bases and civilian as well as military airports in all provinces under their control.
However, the anti-government forces have succeeded, coming from neighbouring states, to push beyond the borders and to conquer border crossings and areas near the borders as well as to have de facto control of the ground in many villages, some smaller towns and neighbourhoods of large cities, but nowhere was the control of the anti-government forces strong enough to establish somewhere in Syria a location for an alternative “government”, which then, according to the model of Benghazi, would have asked the NATO states (from within Syria) for military aid in order to carry out a military campaign on Damascus.
With wide attacks, organized out of neighbouring countries, the anti-government forces admittedly succeeded to conquer further villages and smaller town, to make the roads impassable for the supply of the army and also to force the Syrian army to abandon small posts and military bases, but the Syrian army managed to keep the major military bases and airports as well as its presence in the major cities in all provinces, so that the situation, that the anti-government forces had no territory in Syria strong enough under their control in order to establish a government in exile, nothing has fundamentally changed.
Given the conquests of increasingly more territory by the anti-government forces, their supporters were euphoric and encouraged to carry out their offensives until the victory and to reject any negotiations with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad about a peaceful plan for the transitional period up to the democratic elections.
But the superficial image of an increasing territory, which is controlled by the anti-government forces, has deceived them. Driven from their foreign sponsors and cheered on by the permanent propaganda about the imminent fall of the Syrian president, the anti-government forces made mistakes in their impetuous offensives, which now lead to their inevitable defeat.
The most serious mistake of the foreign-backed anti-government forces was, apart from the mistake that they have disdains the democratic path and rejected their participations in elections that would have conferred legitimacy, that they have behaved as a bunch of robber bands and they have carried out endless rows of serious crimes almost everywhere in Syria where they won something or where they occupied it.
The regularly committed crimes by the anti-government forces, everywhere where they have the power, range from kidnapping, highway robbery, looting, and robberies in order to get money up to the establishment of a tyranny, the persecution of members of religious minorities as well as the desecration of sacred religious sites, drug use, spontaneous violence, rapes, senseless vandalism, and the brutal suppression, torture, and killing of arrested government forces and other, somehow not acceptable, persons.
The anti-government forces have perpetrated several bombings, murders and kidnappings in the areas that are controlled by government supporters. The serious crimes of the anti-government forces on their military campaigns were far too numerous and also directly to experience by the population, who supposedly has to be liberated from the yoke of dictatorship in Syria, as it would have been still possible to blame the crimes of the anti-government forces successfully onto the government forces with the help of the propaganda campaign, or to downplay such crimes, carried out by the anti-government forces, as regrettable exceptions.
Generally detested crimes are not carried out by all armed opponents of the government in Syria, but are those among them who commit such crimes in series, and by this, their crimes are correctly blamed on the anti-government forces, which has an effect on the public opinion. With their countless crimes, the anti-government forces have scared away their followers, supported, and the undecided in large numbers, while they encouraged the government forces and supporters in their cohesion and their steadfastness. Of course, the alienation from the people is for a force, which claims about itself to represent a people’s revolution, just devastating.
The criminal behaviour of the anti-government forces ultimately resulted in the situation that the conquests and territorial gains of the anti-government forces at the first sight ended in the result that it became a huge bloody advertising campaign for their opponents, and thus, for the Syrian government and its supporters
Another strategic mistake of the anti-government forces in their military campaign to obtain the power in Syria was to completely bet on a full offense, maximum territorial gains, and on a quick victory with the use of foreign support.
Although the offensive strategy produced many euphoric headlines about the gains on ground by the always victorious rebels, but finally brought the anti-government forces in militarily hopeless positions.
The population fled immediately from many places, where the foreign anti-government forces have appeared on their conquest, whereby it is anyone’s guess whether the population fled from the anti-government forces or from the battles.
The anti-government forces have thus lost in the places where this has happen, at least the possibility to hide themselves as guerrilla fighters between the population and they had instead to fight like an army; and this against an army that has the air supremacy in its operations and that has been trained, equipped and also prepared over decades exactly for such a scenario – namely, to fight against invading armies. In addition, the large-scale conquest campaigns of the anti-government forces had the inevitable result for them that the ways for the supplies from abroad became longer.
The military situation has literally changed into its opposite by the withdrawal of the army in large bases, big cities, and small towns with people who are more likely to be supporters of the army.
Were the military achievements of the anti-government forces based on the situation that they have attacked small military bases and supply lines of the Syrian army by the use of ambushes and with a certain surprise effect in the early days, and thus, they inflicted heavy losses at the army with a kind of “needle stick tactics” on the principle of “hit and run”, so it is now the Syrian army that started to attack the long supply lines of the anti-government forces, leading through many small bases, from the air and by the use of unexpected ambushes, and this has led to the situation that the Syrian army constantly inflicted heavy losses on the anti-government forces.
The soldiers of the army were thereby generally in front of modest but solvable problems, so as to hide in large bases and in areas where the population is likely to support them, and if it is possible, to protect essential infrastructure such as stockpiles for food, power plants, and communication nodes, and to provide transports on ground or by air between the military bases and the population centres that are protected by the Syrian army, while the army units weakened the anti-government forces, depending on the strength and capacity, by surprise attacks and targeted “needle sticks” on their supply routes and bases – and, whenever the army leaders thought it is possible and useful, they have begun with troop concentrations in preferable less populated areas to encircle the anti-government forces – also by the use of the local established material superiority as well as the personnel superiority in order to defeat the groups of the anti-government forces.
Solvable tasks provide reserves. Those government forces, to which these tasks were insufficiently challenging, and which had the intention to particularly stand out in the defence of the home land against the terrorist war, carried out by foreign powers, were able to do so; for example, by accepting dangerous military operations or missions such as the infiltration of anti-government groups.
The anti-government forces, for which retreats, talks, and ceasefires were and are no options, stood and stand often in front of unsolvable tasks with their long supply routes, the distribution of their fighters on numerous small bases for the securing of conquered territory and the dysfunctional friend-or-foe detection due to their indiscipline and by the infighting.
The failure to solve their duties were often only recognized by the anti-government forces, when they were arrested or were killed; not least because of the relentless propaganda of GCC and NATO countries from the imminent and inevitable “victory” of the anti-government forces.
While the anti-Syrian propaganda rambled nonstop about the imminent victory of the NATO and GCC-supported robbers and terrorist gangs against the supposedly fundamental evil Syrian government forces, and pushed the anti-government forces by this from one devastating offensive operation to the next devastating operation, the defensive strategy of the Syrian governance actually had unique successes on the ground, which were usually overlooked and deliberately concealed by the anti-Syrian propaganda of the West and regional powers.
The success of the Syrian governance, based on a patience defensive strategy, is probably most clearly to see in the central megacity of Homs, which is located in the west of Syria. The finally besieged centre of the city of Homs by Syrian troops was previously called the “centre of resistance” and the “capital of the Syrian revolution” by the BBC and other opponents of Syria in autumn 2011.
The anti-Syrian TV channel “Sky News” reported from Homs after the successful February army offensive in Homs in May 2012, so at the time of a ceasefire, which was overlooked by the UN observers, and as the armed anti-government forces still had the control about “large areas of the city”.
In those days when the anti-government forces controlled areas of the city of Homs, despite some territorial gains of the army in the south of the city centre, they still practically controlled the whole northern city centre of Homs and also some northern and south-western districts, including large parts of the countryside of Homs, for example, the areas of Talbiseh and Rastan in the north and Houla and Husn in the north west, but also the town of Qusair and its surroundings in the south west of Homs.
How it has been proven by many Western journalists, who travelled illegally from Lebanon to the Syrian city of Homs, the anti-government forces also possessed functional smuggling routes for the supply of weapons and ammunition from Lebanese territories under control of the March 14 Alliance to the Syrian city of Homs. Since some months, the anti-government forces and their supporters have stopped to publish maps, in which they have bragged about how much control they would have in the areas of Homs.
In December 2012, the British newspaper “The Independent” confirmed the Syrian reports that the city of Homs is again relatively peaceful and safe and for the most part also under control of the government. Shortly afterwards, the Western media confirmed Syrian reports that the existing neighbourhood security groups, consisting of Syrian men and women, are upgraded to a paramilitary force by the Syrian government with the name “National Defense Force”, whose job it is, in cooperation with the Syrian army and other government security groups, to secure their neighbourhoods against the attacks of the anti-government forces.
Meanwhile the situation in Homs has slowly and steadily improved. While the life in most areas of Homs is already almost back to normal, the remaining anti-government forces in Homs are encircled in a very low populated area in the northern centre of the Syrian city of Homs. And on 3 May 2013, the Lebanese newspaper “Daily Star”, sympathizing with anti-government forces in Syria, reported that the Syrian Arab army managed it to gain more ground after clashes against the armed anti-government forces in Homs and that the already small areas, which are still occupied by the anti-government forces, were divided into two small parts by the successful operations of the Syrian army.
Thus, the city of Homs, a half year ago still referred to by Western media as the “centre of resistance” and “Capital of the Revolution”, has become within one and a half year a stronghold of the government, protected by the “National Defense Force” – and thus, protected by Syrian men and women against the attacks of the US-backed anti-government forces.
In parallel, the Syrian army and the forces of the “National Defense Forces” – how the neighbourhood watch that is cooperating with the army is officially called – have in the south-western region of Homs secured Qusair (Qusayr) and its countryside in recent weeks, and thus, they have cut off the smuggling routes for the supply of weapons across the border to Lebanon.
The situation of the last persevering armed opponents of the Syrian government in the enclaves in the city of Homs is so completely hopeless.
The anti-government forces have mainly failed in Homs because they had overestimated their temporarily acquired position of power by the foreign support in the form of propaganda, money, and weapons, and they have used this temporary position of power in the areas for almost nothing else than to commit heinous crimes, and thus, they made themselves permanently unpopular within the majority of the population of the Syrian city of Homs. Because of this, it is also not unlikely that the current Syrian government in the former “opposition stronghold” Homs will also receive a lot of voices in the forthcoming free and fair elections.
In the suburbs of Damascus, Aleppo, and other cities, which are controlled by the anti-government forces, similar psychological and military processes are taking place currently like in Homs, where they are almost as good as finished.
The anti-government forces, which themselves see them as the “revolutionists of the people”, penetrate into these areas, where an oppositional attitude towards the Syrian government is existent within the population. Afterwards, they behave like hordes of bandits and bloodthirsty extremists. They force the population to flee by their reckless behaviour or they change the stance of the parts of the population who have previously supported them by their heinous crimes in the occupied areas until a clear majority of the population sees the government at least finally as the lesser evil of both sides and starts to actively support the Syrian army in order to get rid of the so-called “revolutionists of the people”.
In Daraya, the hundreds of thousands inhabitants stronghold of the opposition, which is located in the south of Damascus, the anti-government forces have virtually lost the complete support of the population in the time when they started to invite all kinds of anti-government fighters to Daraya in order to storm the centre of Damascus at the end of November 2012.
To encircle several thousand militiamen in a deserted town, even if the militia are very well equipped, is for a large and well equipped army like the Syrian army a tedious but not unsolvable task, especially when they has the air superiority. The task would be unequal more difficult for the army when the armed opponents would be able to hide between a sympathizing population, what is, for example, the main reason for the remarkable stability of the weak Hamas against the strong Israeli army in Gaza.
The support of the population decides in a guerrilla war between a victory and a defeat. A people’s revolution is impossible without the support of the population.
The situation in the rural areas of Syria is slightly different than in the big cities and urban centres of Syria, where the villages have developed based on religious communities over the centuries.
While the neighbourly relations and the circles of friends of the Syrians, despite the emergence of local denominational priorities, are practically interdenominational in all areas of the major cities in Syria, a one-dimensional denominational stance of the population has remained in the many villages and small cities despite the secular ideology of the Syrian state.
This one-dimensional denominational stance of the population of small villages and towns in Syria is still often organized around a house of worship within the community and thus, the importance of religious preference remained stronger than in the major cities of Syria (a good and also sad example is Syria’s Idlib). When a second house of prayer eventually has been built in a village, then it sometimes has been the situation that two faiths live together without problems, but in small villages with only one house of prayer, there is practical often only one denomination.
Whoever relocates into this small village, or marries into a family in this village, or converted (in terms of his religious stance), remains in some ways an outsider. It is possibly that a different denomination (sect) is the dominant denomination in the neighbouring village – this has, over time, established a carpet of villages, and in which is often a different denomination (sect) dominant.
The juxtaposition of villages, each with different denominations, makes communities vulnerable to the sowing of distrust and sectarian incitement up to religious violence (just search for “Salvador option”).
When a crime takes place in a heated atmosphere or something else is destroyed, then it is very convenient to collectively accept that this was not been done by one of the own brothers, sons, or fathers – but that somebody from the neighbouring villages, where the people are mainly strangers because they have a different religion, bears the responsibility for the crime or destruction or whatever..
Well, so it is not surprising at all that the incitement to sectarian hate and rage by the TV preachers from the GCC states and the massacres under false-flag as well as by the use of propaganda against the government and the religious minorities, especially Alawites (Alawis), has shown to be even more effective in numerous Sunni-dominated villages and small towns in rural areas of Syria, than in the large cities, where the religious affiliation of the population has virtually played no important role in recent decades.
Unlike in the major cities in Syria, the local armed anti-government forces have not alienated so much from the population in the villages and small cities than this happened in the larger cities because they did not commit their crimes regularly in their local town but against the residents of other neighbouring villages and cities – and if crimes were committed in their “home towns”, then the residents of other neighbouring cities were blamed for the crimes, and these often had a different faith than the residents of the village, where the crimes were committed by the armed anti-government forces.
The incitement to sectarian hatred has led to the situation that the men of numerous Sunni towns have joined the anti-government forces with the approval of their local communities in order to fight against the government and the believers of a different religion. The motivation by sectarian hatred has so far worked to the result, that many rural anti-government forces have started the fight against the Syrian soldiers.
At the same time, however, they have just committed countless horrible massacres and other crimes of all kinds against people of other faiths, such as against Alawites and Shiites, but also against Christians and Ismailis, in other villages because of their sectarian hatred.
They have spread a founded fear of their sectarian madness of the anti-government forces, due to all of their crimes, in the ranks of people with a different faith, which has led to the situation that the people of other beliefs are working hand in hand with the Syrian army and even with the utmost determination against the anti-government forces.
Wherever it has been possible, mainly in villages inhabited by Alawites, Shiites and Christians, these villages were jointly transformed into areas with heavily armed forces, including the residents, and even into something like fortresses – due to the fear of the sectarian madness of the anti-government forces. The mass executions in villages inhabited by other faiths, also carried out by the anti-government forces, ultimately only lead to the fact that the determination of the other faiths continued to grow to defend themselves against the violence of the anti-government forces, driven by a racist madness.
The war strategy, built on sectarian hatred, is finally only defeating itself. Instead to fetch more and more government supporters on their side in order to strengthen the anti-government forces with each victory, the anti-government forces have only strengthen, with every victory (and the following crimes), the unity of the government supporters and their determination to defend themselves.
Given the fact that virtually all rural areas are a patchwork of villages with different denominations in all provinces of Syria, the anti-government forces had almost nowhere success to completely expel the Syrian from the rural areas in Syria. Everywhere in Syria, there are towns and villages of government supporters and religious minorities, whose inhabitants protect themselves together with the Syrian army against the murderous hatred of the anti-government forces.
With their heavy weapons as well as their better organization and better training, the Syrian army is able to counter all the attacks of the anti-government forces. The villages of other faiths can serve as bases for the army to fight against the armed gangs in the area who are driven by racial hatred. If the anti-government forces carry out assaults on persons or things outside of their villages or areas, the Syrian army eliminates the anti-government forces in this town and if there is no other possibility, they do it by the use of heavy weapons or even by the use of the Syrian air force. In case if there are many anti-government forces in one place, then there will be inevitably many dead by the battles of the Syrian army against the anti-government forces, and usually, much will be destroyed in this place – and this even more, the more aggressive the anti-government forces do represent themselves in the area and the better they are armed. This ultimately leads to the situation that even in the small towns similar painful psychological processes are triggered like in the cities.
The euphoria of the early days of the attempt of an armed overthrow of the government in Syria has long gone. The realization that the armed struggle against the government and its supporters is hopeless and just leads to nothing but more and more death, suffering, and destruction in their own towns, gains more and more space.
The offers of the Syrian government about an amnesty for the ending of the armed struggle is winning, over time, increasingly more acceptance even in smaller villages, although some of the anti-government forces are driven by sectarian hatred and thoughts of revenge for the suffered defeats, and thus, they only agree grudgingly to local peace treaties.
The declining enthusiasm of the parts of the population who supported the anti-government forces initially, is currently also limiting the effects of the outside-led invasion of Syria by the use of irregular forces, which are trained by the anti-Syrian war coalition in the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan, while they are recruited from prisons and slums in the Arab world.
While the irregular fighting units, were coming from Turkey, from Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, over the Syrian borders in their violent campaigns of conquest, and were able to still find some areas in Syria were at least some significant parts of the population have greeted them as liberators, the population in Syria now regularly quite closed seeks the escape in case if the foreign anti-government fighters arrive in order to invade their town or their district.
The gangs of mercenaries, who are penetrating on Syrian soil from abroad, have sometimes the success, also by the use of a surprise effect, to conquer some territory in Syria, and because – as it has just happened in Hatla and Khan al-Assal – they carry out gruesome massacres among the government supporters and the pro-government civilians, the gangs of the anti-government forces are missing – as in Daraya – the necessary coverage by the residents in order to keep the control of the occupied areas in the battles against the Syrian army. The gangs of mercenaries are thus not able to protect their occupied areas against the attacks of the Syrian forces. In effect, these attacks result now, in case they do not completely end with the death of the attackers, at most to losses on both sides. Tangible progress for the anti-government fighters are missing since a long time.
Were the previous offensives of the anti-government forces still to considerable conquests such like the conquest of about half of Aleppo and the larger suburbs of Damascus, the current major offensives of the anti-government forces usually have no more success while faced with the bullets of the army. The current major offensives of the anti-government forces lead to nothing else but heavy losses among the attackers.
Not least, this creates the increasing disillusionment of the opponents of the government in regards of their chances of success, which means currently that the anti-Syrian war coalition, despite continuous promises of more and better weapons, has less and less the chance to make use of reserves of “partisan” and mercenaries from the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan for the war against Syria. Only government forces are currently able to regularly achieve their goals. Virtually no one has changed the side and left the Syrian army / government forces in order to join the ranks of the anti-government forces in recent months, and their combat power and strength through an increasing number of volunteers of all denominations for the neighbourhood militias is also constantly increasing.
Sooner or later, this shift of popularity of the anti-government forces will result in their complete defeat. The anti-government forces have made themselves simply thoroughly unpopular with their criminal behaviour in the Syrian population in the last year.
The rising popularity of the government since the start of the open attack by the anti-government forces in contrast to the sinking popularity leads, via the associated continuous strengthening of the neighbourhood guards, to the fact that the anti-government forces are finally no more able to win this war. The incitement of anti-government forces to sectarian hatred and its associated incitement to atrocious crimes are finally just counterproductive tactics. Without the support of significant parts of the Syrian population, this unconventional warfare, by which the Wahhabi-Zionist war coalition wanted to conquer Syria, just does not work.
The only theoretical option, which remains available for the anti-Syrian war coalition in order to achieve their war goal, the establishment of an anti-Iranian puppet regime in Syria, is an open war of aggression by the use of U.S. units. However, the problem with this direct U.S. military option is still that this option is incalculably expensive. But the costs of about a billion dollars a month, which were recently made available for an open U.S. attack military operations against Syria by the U.S. military chief, are not so much the reason why the United States still have not started to use this option. It is rather the view that, in case of an open war of aggression by the United States against Syria, the Iran will be in its treaty obligations and finally enter the war against the US-led anti-Syrian war coalition and this is a situation, which the U.S. government wants to still avoid.
In this case, a continuous war zone would arise from the Mediterranean up to the Hindu Kush. To wage a war against all U.S. enemies from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush at the same time, could become a much more expensive and a more protracted situation than the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan for the United States. Of course, there is still the possibility that the insane warmongers in Washington and Tel Aviv “envisage” such an (horrible) option, despite the high risks. However, they could be hit between the eyes, because such a war could easily become much larger and more expensive.
In case if Russia gives military aid for the protection of Syria against the US-led war of aggression, and China will lock the loan for the United States as a response of their war of aggression against Syria and instead start to provide economic aid for Syria and Iran, a war from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush could (in the end) significantly exceed the economic and military possibilities of the so-called “Western community of values”.
This is the reason that the U.S. military aid has not yet happened for their Syrian lackeys, and, as the situation of the U.S. lackeys in Syria deteriorated continuously for months, it is not to expect that something will change in the near future.
This means for the anti-government forces in Syria, that they have no chance to win this war and the main reason for this situation are their own carried out crimes on Syrian soil.
In the first weeks and months after the begin of the NATO and GCC states supported Ramadan offensive “Volcano in Damascus – Earthquake in Syria” by the militias from July 2012 were the successes of the Syrian army mainly of a defensive nature.
The attempt of the storming of Damascus was blocked, in Aleppo and other cities of Syria, the government has kept, if not the whole city, then at least each a significant part of the city under control, and the army has managed to maintain the substantial army bases and civilian as well as military airports in all provinces under their control.
However, the anti-government forces have succeeded, coming from neighbouring states, to push beyond the borders and to conquer border crossings and areas near the borders as well as to have de facto control of the ground in many villages, some smaller towns and neighbourhoods of large cities, but nowhere was the control of the anti-government forces strong enough to establish somewhere in Syria a location for an alternative “government”, which then, according to the model of Benghazi, would have asked the NATO states (from within Syria) for military aid in order to carry out a military campaign on Damascus.
With wide attacks, organized out of neighbouring countries, the anti-government forces admittedly succeeded to conquer further villages and smaller town, to make the roads impassable for the supply of the army and also to force the Syrian army to abandon small posts and military bases, but the Syrian army managed to keep the major military bases and airports as well as its presence in the major cities in all provinces, so that the situation, that the anti-government forces had no territory in Syria strong enough under their control in order to establish a government in exile, nothing has fundamentally changed.
Given the conquests of increasingly more territory by the anti-government forces, their supporters were euphoric and encouraged to carry out their offensives until the victory and to reject any negotiations with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad about a peaceful plan for the transitional period up to the democratic elections.
But the superficial image of an increasing territory, which is controlled by the anti-government forces, has deceived them. Driven from their foreign sponsors and cheered on by the permanent propaganda about the imminent fall of the Syrian president, the anti-government forces made mistakes in their impetuous offensives, which now lead to their inevitable defeat.
The most serious mistake of the foreign-backed anti-government forces was, apart from the mistake that they have disdains the democratic path and rejected their participations in elections that would have conferred legitimacy, that they have behaved as a bunch of robber bands and they have carried out endless rows of serious crimes almost everywhere in Syria where they won something or where they occupied it.
The regularly committed crimes by the anti-government forces, everywhere where they have the power, range from kidnapping, highway robbery, looting, and robberies in order to get money up to the establishment of a tyranny, the persecution of members of religious minorities as well as the desecration of sacred religious sites, drug use, spontaneous violence, rapes, senseless vandalism, and the brutal suppression, torture, and killing of arrested government forces and other, somehow not acceptable, persons.
The anti-government forces have perpetrated several bombings, murders and kidnappings in the areas that are controlled by government supporters. The serious crimes of the anti-government forces on their military campaigns were far too numerous and also directly to experience by the population, who supposedly has to be liberated from the yoke of dictatorship in Syria, as it would have been still possible to blame the crimes of the anti-government forces successfully onto the government forces with the help of the propaganda campaign, or to downplay such crimes, carried out by the anti-government forces, as regrettable exceptions.
Generally detested crimes are not carried out by all armed opponents of the government in Syria, but are those among them who commit such crimes in series, and by this, their crimes are correctly blamed on the anti-government forces, which has an effect on the public opinion. With their countless crimes, the anti-government forces have scared away their followers, supported, and the undecided in large numbers, while they encouraged the government forces and supporters in their cohesion and their steadfastness. Of course, the alienation from the people is for a force, which claims about itself to represent a people’s revolution, just devastating.
The criminal behaviour of the anti-government forces ultimately resulted in the situation that the conquests and territorial gains of the anti-government forces at the first sight ended in the result that it became a huge bloody advertising campaign for their opponents, and thus, for the Syrian government and its supporters
Another strategic mistake of the anti-government forces in their military campaign to obtain the power in Syria was to completely bet on a full offense, maximum territorial gains, and on a quick victory with the use of foreign support.
Although the offensive strategy produced many euphoric headlines about the gains on ground by the always victorious rebels, but finally brought the anti-government forces in militarily hopeless positions.
The population fled immediately from many places, where the foreign anti-government forces have appeared on their conquest, whereby it is anyone’s guess whether the population fled from the anti-government forces or from the battles.
The anti-government forces have thus lost in the places where this has happen, at least the possibility to hide themselves as guerrilla fighters between the population and they had instead to fight like an army; and this against an army that has the air supremacy in its operations and that has been trained, equipped and also prepared over decades exactly for such a scenario – namely, to fight against invading armies. In addition, the large-scale conquest campaigns of the anti-government forces had the inevitable result for them that the ways for the supplies from abroad became longer.
The military situation has literally changed into its opposite by the withdrawal of the army in large bases, big cities, and small towns with people who are more likely to be supporters of the army.
Were the military achievements of the anti-government forces based on the situation that they have attacked small military bases and supply lines of the Syrian army by the use of ambushes and with a certain surprise effect in the early days, and thus, they inflicted heavy losses at the army with a kind of “needle stick tactics” on the principle of “hit and run”, so it is now the Syrian army that started to attack the long supply lines of the anti-government forces, leading through many small bases, from the air and by the use of unexpected ambushes, and this has led to the situation that the Syrian army constantly inflicted heavy losses on the anti-government forces.
The soldiers of the army were thereby generally in front of modest but solvable problems, so as to hide in large bases and in areas where the population is likely to support them, and if it is possible, to protect essential infrastructure such as stockpiles for food, power plants, and communication nodes, and to provide transports on ground or by air between the military bases and the population centres that are protected by the Syrian army, while the army units weakened the anti-government forces, depending on the strength and capacity, by surprise attacks and targeted “needle sticks” on their supply routes and bases – and, whenever the army leaders thought it is possible and useful, they have begun with troop concentrations in preferable less populated areas to encircle the anti-government forces – also by the use of the local established material superiority as well as the personnel superiority in order to defeat the groups of the anti-government forces.
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| Aleppo Souk – Once beautiful and peaceful. |
Solvable tasks provide reserves. Those government forces, to which these tasks were insufficiently challenging, and which had the intention to particularly stand out in the defence of the home land against the terrorist war, carried out by foreign powers, were able to do so; for example, by accepting dangerous military operations or missions such as the infiltration of anti-government groups.
The anti-government forces, for which retreats, talks, and ceasefires were and are no options, stood and stand often in front of unsolvable tasks with their long supply routes, the distribution of their fighters on numerous small bases for the securing of conquered territory and the dysfunctional friend-or-foe detection due to their indiscipline and by the infighting.
The failure to solve their duties were often only recognized by the anti-government forces, when they were arrested or were killed; not least because of the relentless propaganda of GCC and NATO countries from the imminent and inevitable “victory” of the anti-government forces.
While the anti-Syrian propaganda rambled nonstop about the imminent victory of the NATO and GCC-supported robbers and terrorist gangs against the supposedly fundamental evil Syrian government forces, and pushed the anti-government forces by this from one devastating offensive operation to the next devastating operation, the defensive strategy of the Syrian governance actually had unique successes on the ground, which were usually overlooked and deliberately concealed by the anti-Syrian propaganda of the West and regional powers.
The success of the Syrian governance, based on a patience defensive strategy, is probably most clearly to see in the central megacity of Homs, which is located in the west of Syria. The finally besieged centre of the city of Homs by Syrian troops was previously called the “centre of resistance” and the “capital of the Syrian revolution” by the BBC and other opponents of Syria in autumn 2011.
The anti-Syrian TV channel “Sky News” reported from Homs after the successful February army offensive in Homs in May 2012, so at the time of a ceasefire, which was overlooked by the UN observers, and as the armed anti-government forces still had the control about “large areas of the city”.
In those days when the anti-government forces controlled areas of the city of Homs, despite some territorial gains of the army in the south of the city centre, they still practically controlled the whole northern city centre of Homs and also some northern and south-western districts, including large parts of the countryside of Homs, for example, the areas of Talbiseh and Rastan in the north and Houla and Husn in the north west, but also the town of Qusair and its surroundings in the south west of Homs.
How it has been proven by many Western journalists, who travelled illegally from Lebanon to the Syrian city of Homs, the anti-government forces also possessed functional smuggling routes for the supply of weapons and ammunition from Lebanese territories under control of the March 14 Alliance to the Syrian city of Homs. Since some months, the anti-government forces and their supporters have stopped to publish maps, in which they have bragged about how much control they would have in the areas of Homs.
In December 2012, the British newspaper “The Independent” confirmed the Syrian reports that the city of Homs is again relatively peaceful and safe and for the most part also under control of the government. Shortly afterwards, the Western media confirmed Syrian reports that the existing neighbourhood security groups, consisting of Syrian men and women, are upgraded to a paramilitary force by the Syrian government with the name “National Defense Force”, whose job it is, in cooperation with the Syrian army and other government security groups, to secure their neighbourhoods against the attacks of the anti-government forces.
Meanwhile the situation in Homs has slowly and steadily improved. While the life in most areas of Homs is already almost back to normal, the remaining anti-government forces in Homs are encircled in a very low populated area in the northern centre of the Syrian city of Homs. And on 3 May 2013, the Lebanese newspaper “Daily Star”, sympathizing with anti-government forces in Syria, reported that the Syrian Arab army managed it to gain more ground after clashes against the armed anti-government forces in Homs and that the already small areas, which are still occupied by the anti-government forces, were divided into two small parts by the successful operations of the Syrian army.
Thus, the city of Homs, a half year ago still referred to by Western media as the “centre of resistance” and “Capital of the Revolution”, has become within one and a half year a stronghold of the government, protected by the “National Defense Force” – and thus, protected by Syrian men and women against the attacks of the US-backed anti-government forces.
In parallel, the Syrian army and the forces of the “National Defense Forces” – how the neighbourhood watch that is cooperating with the army is officially called – have in the south-western region of Homs secured Qusair (Qusayr) and its countryside in recent weeks, and thus, they have cut off the smuggling routes for the supply of weapons across the border to Lebanon.
The situation of the last persevering armed opponents of the Syrian government in the enclaves in the city of Homs is so completely hopeless.
The anti-government forces have mainly failed in Homs because they had overestimated their temporarily acquired position of power by the foreign support in the form of propaganda, money, and weapons, and they have used this temporary position of power in the areas for almost nothing else than to commit heinous crimes, and thus, they made themselves permanently unpopular within the majority of the population of the Syrian city of Homs. Because of this, it is also not unlikely that the current Syrian government in the former “opposition stronghold” Homs will also receive a lot of voices in the forthcoming free and fair elections.
In the suburbs of Damascus, Aleppo, and other cities, which are controlled by the anti-government forces, similar psychological and military processes are taking place currently like in Homs, where they are almost as good as finished.
The anti-government forces, which themselves see them as the “revolutionists of the people”, penetrate into these areas, where an oppositional attitude towards the Syrian government is existent within the population. Afterwards, they behave like hordes of bandits and bloodthirsty extremists. They force the population to flee by their reckless behaviour or they change the stance of the parts of the population who have previously supported them by their heinous crimes in the occupied areas until a clear majority of the population sees the government at least finally as the lesser evil of both sides and starts to actively support the Syrian army in order to get rid of the so-called “revolutionists of the people”.
In Daraya, the hundreds of thousands inhabitants stronghold of the opposition, which is located in the south of Damascus, the anti-government forces have virtually lost the complete support of the population in the time when they started to invite all kinds of anti-government fighters to Daraya in order to storm the centre of Damascus at the end of November 2012.
To encircle several thousand militiamen in a deserted town, even if the militia are very well equipped, is for a large and well equipped army like the Syrian army a tedious but not unsolvable task, especially when they has the air superiority. The task would be unequal more difficult for the army when the armed opponents would be able to hide between a sympathizing population, what is, for example, the main reason for the remarkable stability of the weak Hamas against the strong Israeli army in Gaza.
The support of the population decides in a guerrilla war between a victory and a defeat. A people’s revolution is impossible without the support of the population.
The situation in the rural areas of Syria is slightly different than in the big cities and urban centres of Syria, where the villages have developed based on religious communities over the centuries.
While the neighbourly relations and the circles of friends of the Syrians, despite the emergence of local denominational priorities, are practically interdenominational in all areas of the major cities in Syria, a one-dimensional denominational stance of the population has remained in the many villages and small cities despite the secular ideology of the Syrian state.
This one-dimensional denominational stance of the population of small villages and towns in Syria is still often organized around a house of worship within the community and thus, the importance of religious preference remained stronger than in the major cities of Syria (a good and also sad example is Syria’s Idlib). When a second house of prayer eventually has been built in a village, then it sometimes has been the situation that two faiths live together without problems, but in small villages with only one house of prayer, there is practical often only one denomination.
Whoever relocates into this small village, or marries into a family in this village, or converted (in terms of his religious stance), remains in some ways an outsider. It is possibly that a different denomination (sect) is the dominant denomination in the neighbouring village – this has, over time, established a carpet of villages, and in which is often a different denomination (sect) dominant.
The juxtaposition of villages, each with different denominations, makes communities vulnerable to the sowing of distrust and sectarian incitement up to religious violence (just search for “Salvador option”).
When a crime takes place in a heated atmosphere or something else is destroyed, then it is very convenient to collectively accept that this was not been done by one of the own brothers, sons, or fathers – but that somebody from the neighbouring villages, where the people are mainly strangers because they have a different religion, bears the responsibility for the crime or destruction or whatever..
Well, so it is not surprising at all that the incitement to sectarian hate and rage by the TV preachers from the GCC states and the massacres under false-flag as well as by the use of propaganda against the government and the religious minorities, especially Alawites (Alawis), has shown to be even more effective in numerous Sunni-dominated villages and small towns in rural areas of Syria, than in the large cities, where the religious affiliation of the population has virtually played no important role in recent decades.
Unlike in the major cities in Syria, the local armed anti-government forces have not alienated so much from the population in the villages and small cities than this happened in the larger cities because they did not commit their crimes regularly in their local town but against the residents of other neighbouring villages and cities – and if crimes were committed in their “home towns”, then the residents of other neighbouring cities were blamed for the crimes, and these often had a different faith than the residents of the village, where the crimes were committed by the armed anti-government forces.
The incitement to sectarian hatred has led to the situation that the men of numerous Sunni towns have joined the anti-government forces with the approval of their local communities in order to fight against the government and the believers of a different religion. The motivation by sectarian hatred has so far worked to the result, that many rural anti-government forces have started the fight against the Syrian soldiers.
At the same time, however, they have just committed countless horrible massacres and other crimes of all kinds against people of other faiths, such as against Alawites and Shiites, but also against Christians and Ismailis, in other villages because of their sectarian hatred.
They have spread a founded fear of their sectarian madness of the anti-government forces, due to all of their crimes, in the ranks of people with a different faith, which has led to the situation that the people of other beliefs are working hand in hand with the Syrian army and even with the utmost determination against the anti-government forces.
Wherever it has been possible, mainly in villages inhabited by Alawites, Shiites and Christians, these villages were jointly transformed into areas with heavily armed forces, including the residents, and even into something like fortresses – due to the fear of the sectarian madness of the anti-government forces. The mass executions in villages inhabited by other faiths, also carried out by the anti-government forces, ultimately only lead to the fact that the determination of the other faiths continued to grow to defend themselves against the violence of the anti-government forces, driven by a racist madness.
The war strategy, built on sectarian hatred, is finally only defeating itself. Instead to fetch more and more government supporters on their side in order to strengthen the anti-government forces with each victory, the anti-government forces have only strengthen, with every victory (and the following crimes), the unity of the government supporters and their determination to defend themselves.
Given the fact that virtually all rural areas are a patchwork of villages with different denominations in all provinces of Syria, the anti-government forces had almost nowhere success to completely expel the Syrian from the rural areas in Syria. Everywhere in Syria, there are towns and villages of government supporters and religious minorities, whose inhabitants protect themselves together with the Syrian army against the murderous hatred of the anti-government forces.
With their heavy weapons as well as their better organization and better training, the Syrian army is able to counter all the attacks of the anti-government forces. The villages of other faiths can serve as bases for the army to fight against the armed gangs in the area who are driven by racial hatred. If the anti-government forces carry out assaults on persons or things outside of their villages or areas, the Syrian army eliminates the anti-government forces in this town and if there is no other possibility, they do it by the use of heavy weapons or even by the use of the Syrian air force. In case if there are many anti-government forces in one place, then there will be inevitably many dead by the battles of the Syrian army against the anti-government forces, and usually, much will be destroyed in this place – and this even more, the more aggressive the anti-government forces do represent themselves in the area and the better they are armed. This ultimately leads to the situation that even in the small towns similar painful psychological processes are triggered like in the cities.
The euphoria of the early days of the attempt of an armed overthrow of the government in Syria has long gone. The realization that the armed struggle against the government and its supporters is hopeless and just leads to nothing but more and more death, suffering, and destruction in their own towns, gains more and more space.
The offers of the Syrian government about an amnesty for the ending of the armed struggle is winning, over time, increasingly more acceptance even in smaller villages, although some of the anti-government forces are driven by sectarian hatred and thoughts of revenge for the suffered defeats, and thus, they only agree grudgingly to local peace treaties.
The declining enthusiasm of the parts of the population who supported the anti-government forces initially, is currently also limiting the effects of the outside-led invasion of Syria by the use of irregular forces, which are trained by the anti-Syrian war coalition in the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan, while they are recruited from prisons and slums in the Arab world.
While the irregular fighting units, were coming from Turkey, from Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, over the Syrian borders in their violent campaigns of conquest, and were able to still find some areas in Syria were at least some significant parts of the population have greeted them as liberators, the population in Syria now regularly quite closed seeks the escape in case if the foreign anti-government fighters arrive in order to invade their town or their district.
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| Massacre in Khan al-Assal (Source: SANA) |
Were the previous offensives of the anti-government forces still to considerable conquests such like the conquest of about half of Aleppo and the larger suburbs of Damascus, the current major offensives of the anti-government forces usually have no more success while faced with the bullets of the army. The current major offensives of the anti-government forces lead to nothing else but heavy losses among the attackers.
Not least, this creates the increasing disillusionment of the opponents of the government in regards of their chances of success, which means currently that the anti-Syrian war coalition, despite continuous promises of more and better weapons, has less and less the chance to make use of reserves of “partisan” and mercenaries from the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan for the war against Syria. Only government forces are currently able to regularly achieve their goals. Virtually no one has changed the side and left the Syrian army / government forces in order to join the ranks of the anti-government forces in recent months, and their combat power and strength through an increasing number of volunteers of all denominations for the neighbourhood militias is also constantly increasing.
Sooner or later, this shift of popularity of the anti-government forces will result in their complete defeat. The anti-government forces have made themselves simply thoroughly unpopular with their criminal behaviour in the Syrian population in the last year.
The rising popularity of the government since the start of the open attack by the anti-government forces in contrast to the sinking popularity leads, via the associated continuous strengthening of the neighbourhood guards, to the fact that the anti-government forces are finally no more able to win this war. The incitement of anti-government forces to sectarian hatred and its associated incitement to atrocious crimes are finally just counterproductive tactics. Without the support of significant parts of the Syrian population, this unconventional warfare, by which the Wahhabi-Zionist war coalition wanted to conquer Syria, just does not work.
The only theoretical option, which remains available for the anti-Syrian war coalition in order to achieve their war goal, the establishment of an anti-Iranian puppet regime in Syria, is an open war of aggression by the use of U.S. units. However, the problem with this direct U.S. military option is still that this option is incalculably expensive. But the costs of about a billion dollars a month, which were recently made available for an open U.S. attack military operations against Syria by the U.S. military chief, are not so much the reason why the United States still have not started to use this option. It is rather the view that, in case of an open war of aggression by the United States against Syria, the Iran will be in its treaty obligations and finally enter the war against the US-led anti-Syrian war coalition and this is a situation, which the U.S. government wants to still avoid.
In this case, a continuous war zone would arise from the Mediterranean up to the Hindu Kush. To wage a war against all U.S. enemies from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush at the same time, could become a much more expensive and a more protracted situation than the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan for the United States. Of course, there is still the possibility that the insane warmongers in Washington and Tel Aviv “envisage” such an (horrible) option, despite the high risks. However, they could be hit between the eyes, because such a war could easily become much larger and more expensive.
In case if Russia gives military aid for the protection of Syria against the US-led war of aggression, and China will lock the loan for the United States as a response of their war of aggression against Syria and instead start to provide economic aid for Syria and Iran, a war from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush could (in the end) significantly exceed the economic and military possibilities of the so-called “Western community of values”.
This is the reason that the U.S. military aid has not yet happened for their Syrian lackeys, and, as the situation of the U.S. lackeys in Syria deteriorated continuously for months, it is not to expect that something will change in the near future.
This means for the anti-government forces in Syria, that they have no chance to win this war and the main reason for this situation are their own carried out crimes on Syrian soil.
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