China’s Neutron Bomb: An Perspective Analysis Through West Hemisphere's Attitude

Why does China develop weapons systems that it opposes? China criticizes U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, but conducted three BMD tests of its own from 2010 to 2014. China regularly supports a treaty to ban space weapons, but has repeatedly tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) system. It is also unclear how China’s nascent hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), reportedly designated the WU-14, might fit into its military doctrine. In general, China’s rapid military modernization and opaque defense budget only exacerbate concerns over the compatibility between China’s stated views and actual practice in developing strategic weapons.

Mushroom cloud of nuke blast.

One way to answer this puzzle is to look at history, specifically the history of China’s neutron bomb program. From 1977 to 1988 China developed a neutron bomb, more formally known as an enhanced radiation weapon. Neutron bombs are specialized tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) with reduced blast effects and enhanced radiation. Similar to the BMD and ASAT puzzles, this weapon appears incompatible with China’s stated nuclear doctrine. China’s no first use doctrine emphasizes strategic forces and responding only to a nuclear attack, whereas a neutron bomb is tactical and ideal for first use against conventional forces.

The puzzle deepens because there is no evidence that China ever deployed a neutron bomb. Declassified U.S. intelligence and Chinese press reports indicate the PRC developed and tested this capability, but give no indication of deployment. The timing is odd too, as China was impoverished in the 1970s but still chose to develop an expensive weapon like the neutron bomb. It waited until 1988 to test a final design, after relations with the Soviet Union (the presumed adversary during the program) had improved.

My new National Defense University monograph uses primary sources such as biographies of Chinese nuclear weapons scientists, press reports, and technical articles to answer these questions. These sources allow us to reconstruct the neutron bomb program’s history and assess what drove decisions throughout the program. As a case study China’s neutron bomb program contributes to broader discussions about China’s weapons development decision making then and now.

Mushroom cloud of Neutron Bomb blast.

The neutron bomb case study suggests a model of a “technology reserve,” in which China develops a weapons technology to match the capabilities of another state, but defers deployment and keeps them in reserve. The longer report also considers how this model might apply to China’s decision-making on BMD, ASAT, and HGV systems. To assess the drivers behind Chinese decisions, the report uses five variables as an analytical framework:

1.     China’s strategic environment – What security concerns drove China’s decision to build a neutron bomb?

2.     The neutron bomb’s strategic value – How did Chinese leaders perceive the neutron bomb’s strategic value against likely threats?

3.     The neutron bomb’s normative value – Would a neutron bomb enhance China’s international prestige, or lead to opprobrium because of a taboo against the weapon?

4.     Resource demands – What were the political, financial, material, and personnel demands for this weapon?

5.     Technological feasibility – What were the challenges for developing and producing a neutron bomb, and how did Chinese scientists address them?

A final intervening variable is coalition politics. Champions and opponents of any weapons program can greatly affect decisions. In the case of China’s neutron bomb, General Zhang Aiping was a key advocate for the weapon. With these variables in mind, China’s neutron bomb program followed three stages.

1977-1980: Decision and Initial Research

In 1977 Chinese media followed the controversy over the U.S. decision to develop and deploy the neutron bomb in Europe. Soviet media denounced the U.S. neutron bomb as the “perfect capitalist weapon,” and pressed China to also condemn it. Instead Chinese media kept a neutral tone, making the Soviets more alarmed over Beijing’s “silence.” On September 21, 1977 Chinese General Zhang Aiping broke the silence with—of all things—a poem in the state-run newspaper People’s Daily:

Steel alloys are not strong, and

Neutron bombs are not difficult.

When heroes study the sciences intensely,

They can storm all earth’s strategic passes.

At this point Chinese leaders had already ordered initial research into the neutron bomb. Regarding their motivations, one scientist recalled Deng’s statement in 1966 “What others have already done, we also must do; what others have not yet done, we certainly must also do.” The message was clear—if other countries had the neutron bomb so should China. Some scientists initially opposed developing a neutron bomb, because they worried such a program would disrupt higher priority work in miniaturizing nuclear warheads for use on missiles. Ultimately they acquiesced, knowing they no longer held the same political clout they once had, and that Chinese leaders were prioritizing conventional instead of nuclear weapons.

1980-1984: Developing “The Second Generation of Light Boats”

In 1980 General Zhang Aiping told a member of a visiting U.S. delegation that China needed the neutron bomb against the Soviets. Chinese media also followed France’s neutron bomb development and considered it a symbol of the country’s “great power status” (大国地位). On a technical level, the weaponeers decided neutron bombs and miniaturized warheads (which they were already working on) shared enough common principles that they could combine the two programs into one. Doing so, they divided the neutron bomb problem into constituent parts, or “principles,” and solved them individually. From 1982 to 1984, China conducted five tests related to the ERW and warhead miniaturization.  These tests culminated in a successful “principles breakthrough” test on December 19, 1984, which one weaponeer described in a poem as “the second generation of light boats has passed the bridge.” It appears the “second generation” referred to neutron bombs and miniaturized warheads.

1985-1988: Pause and Reevaluation

In 1985 China halted nuclear testing for 30 months. The pause coincided with a Soviet moratorium on testing and a leadership reshuffle that neutralized neutron bomb proponent General Zhang Aiping. At this point France had also decided against deploying a neutron bomb, solidifying a taboo against the weapon. Nuclear weapons scientists were aware of the international and domestic political challenges to continuing their work. In 1986 they warned PRC leaders that the United States and Soviet Union could conclude a nuclear test ban treaty that would prevent China from modernizing its nuclear arsenal. They proposed accelerated testing to complete new warhead designs, effectively making a “now or never” argument. If China did not complete new warheads soon, it would be at a long-term disadvantage.

Chinese leaders approved the report, and on September 29, 1988, China successfully tested a neutron bomb design. Before doing so a senior weapons scientist Liu Huaqiu wrote two interesting reports. Liu argued China did not need a neutron bomb, but should test a design anyway to put in China’s “technology reserve.”           

          

Conclusions and Implications for Today

What produced the neutron bomb’s outcome of development without deployment, and to what extent do these variables apply today? Strategic concerns and PRC leaders’ desire to match capabilities were key to the initial decision. Zhang Aiping’s political rise and scientists’ “principles” approach sustained the program, but later a receding Soviet threat and Zhang’s retirement stalled it. Yet despite these setbacks, scientists’ argument of “now or never” compelled Chinese leaders to test a final design to keep in a “technology reserve.” The case study also helps frame analyses of other states’ nuclear weapons programs. For example, the scientists’ “principles” approach demonstrated how a state with limited resources may approach development of a complex weapon system.

This case study’s framework and final model are useful for discussions of China’s current weapons systems under development, such as its HGV. HGVs glide through the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds and could be more survivable against BMD systems. Possible drivers for developing this system include its strategic value if the PRC believes the system can defeat U.S. missile defense systems and the normative value of being first to develop an advanced system. Future analyses could include assessments of coalitions advocating the weapon and its technological principles. An immediate recommendation is that instead of panicking over such systems, such as Soviet media did in reaction to China’s neutron bomb, calmer assessments are more constructive.

The longer report covers in greater detail the variables, program specifics, personnel, and conclusions. A good final note here concerns methodology on two fronts. First, the analytical framework of variables facilitates the systematic assessment of drivers throughout the program, and is useful for contemporary analysis of other advanced weapons programs. Second, Chinese primary sources ranging from biographies to social media can be incredibly valuable for deciphering China’s decisions on weapons programs. These points should be useful for today’s China hands and nuclear wonks tackling other security puzzles.

By: Jonathan Ray

Will China’s Nuclear weapon Modernization bring more transparency？

 

 A drill of Chinese nuclear forces

 

2014-04-14 (by Nicolas Giacometti and from thediplomat.com) — Recent events in late 2013 and early 2014, including China’s demonstration of its nuclear submarine force, have once again brought the issue of the country’s policy of nuclear opacity to the fore. Among the P5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), China officially communicates the least about the size, status and capabilities of its nuclear forces. Indeed, although some uncertainty remains, the other members of the P5 all give public approximations of the size and characteristics of their deployed arsenal. Beijing’s policy of nuclear opacity or nuclear secrecy is often noted in official reports and mentioned by specialized NGOs as limiting the possibility for strategic dialogue with other great powers (especially the U.S.) and as arousing suspicions and misperceptions about China’s intentions.

Indeed, an absence of information favors the development of alarmist reports about the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, which is depicted by some analysts as dangerous, aggressive and destabilizing. Although some of the concerns of those who increasingly worry about Beijing’s nuclear capabilities are surely legitimate, there is an alternative view: the potential for China’s nuclear modernization to remove some of the incentives driving the opacity policy.

Since the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, opacity has been a strategic tool for Beijing to compensate for the material shortcomings and limitations of its nuclear forces in terms of survivability and destructive power, and thus to increase their overall deterrent effect on would-be aggressors (mainly the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S.).

Until 2006, China’s only ballistic missile able to deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental U.S. was the liquid-fuelled and silo-based DF-5A, which existed only in very limited numbers (20 or so). These characteristics made the Chinese ICBM force highly vulnerable to a disarming first strike, especially in the absence of an efficient early warning system. Indeed, liquid-fuelled missiles take more time to launch than their solid-fuelled counterparts because the missile must be fueled first. This operation takes at least a few hours, during which the missile remains in the silo and is vulnerable to a direct hit. As such, various actions were required to increase the survivability of the missiles to guarantee they wouldn’t be destroyed before launch. If this aim wasn’t achieved, there could be no credible threat of retaliation against an adversary that could have launched a disarming first strike. Thus, among other possibilities that included for example the building of mock silos, secrecy about the numbers and location of ICBMs helped create uncertainty in enemy planning processes that made a disarming first strike more difficult to plan and execute.

Similarly, the very limited number of missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. (especially after a potential destruction of some of them through a U.S. preemptive strike) limited the credibility of the threat China could issue against its rivals. The handful of nuclear warheads Beijing could have launched against the U.S. appeared very limited when compared to the total obliteration that the U.S. could have inflicted upon China. Again, secrecy could act as a palliative to the limitations of China’s arsenal, by introducing ambiguity into the mind of enemy decision-makers about actual Chinese strength. This ambiguity would then have a deterrent effect on any cautious decision-maker who would not easily embark on aggression against China without a thorough knowledge of the intensity of the retaliatory strike he might have to face.

Overall, in broad terms, China’s fundamental nuclear inferiority compared to other great powers created structural pressure on Beijing to adopt a policy of opacity during and after the Cold War.

A Modernized Arsenal

Notwithstanding this observation, it appears from all relevant sources that China has been, is, and will modernize its nuclear arsenal in a way that precisely addresses the shortcomings outlined above. The pace of this modernization is slow and China’s nuclear forces are still the least developed of the P5, but their survivability and destructiveness is growing steadily, slowly enabling China to reach a capacity of assured retaliation it has been seeking for so long. In this process, the introduction of the DF-31A and DF-41 ICBMs and the development of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force have been and will be particularly critical.

Several developments protect China’s nuclear forces from a disarming first strike and give them an assured capacity to retaliate. The increasing size of Beijing’s arsenal makes it statistically harder to destroy entirely in a first strike. Indeed, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the continental U.S. has increased to around 40 today, a number that is expected by the U.S. intelligence community to grow to around 100 in the mid-2020s. Although U.S. intelligence has often exaggerated the Chinese threat, it is clear that the number of threatening missiles will increase in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the replacement of the silo-based and liquid-fueled DF-5A ICBM with the solid-fueled and mobile DF-31A ICBM since 2006 (a process that is still ongoing) critically reduces the preparation time of missiles that could now theoretically be launched immediately if the warheads were already fitted, which means that they are no longer vulnerable during a prolonged preparation process. Moreover, the mobility of the DF-31A makes it much more difficult to attack as its location can be changed quickly. Finally, the DF-31 introduces new countermeasures and capacities that would help it evade a U.S. missile defense shield. This capacity will probably be increased by the hypothetical DF-41, which might include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV). Finally, the slow (and difficult) development of China’s SSBN/SLBM force is a process that is progressively giving the country an assured second strike capability because of the relative undetectability of nuclear submarines.

Similarly, the ongoing modernization and evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal also increases its destructive power. As already explained, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the entirety of the continental U.S. is growing. As such, although China will not catch up with the U.S. or Russia in terms of absolute numbers of warheads (something Beijing is not aiming to do anyway), it would be increasingly capable of inflicting tremendous and unacceptable damage upon the U.S. This in turn would increase the credibility of Chinese nuclear deterrence by establishing what resembles mutual assured vulnerability and destruction.

Overall, China’s ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces is clearly addressing the shortcomings of its deterrent, which provided some of the incentives for the adoption of a policy of nuclear opacity. However, the removal of some of the fundamental drivers behind the adoption of a policy doesn’t necessarily mean this policy will be scrapped anytime soon. The pace of China’s nuclear modernization is slow and so is the removal of the drivers that lie behind the adoption of nuclear opacity. Other reasons for opacity linked to culture or Chinese diplomatic stance might keep in place incentives to retain as much information as possible about the deterrent.

Still, we can hope that China, freed of the fear of a disarming first strike and assured of its capacity to deter other nuclear powers, might feel sufficiently assured about the security of its arsenal to communicate more openly in the medium and long terms about the status, capacities and programmed evolution of its nuclear forces. This would represent a first step towards creating opportunities for clarification and dialogue about China’s capabilities and intentions and thus help reduce misperceptions and maybe suspicion. More openness on China’s side might then open up more space for confidence-building measures and lay the ground for future arms control discussions.

Nicholas Giacometti is a specialist in nuclear issues and missile defense. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institutions he has been affiliated with. The numbers and technical information used in this article are mainly drawn from the publications of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).