Analysis: End of year surge for Chengdu J-20 fighter programme

In November and December 2014 two additional prototypes of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation's (CAC) J-20 fifth-generation fighter emerged, advancing its development towards a possible initial operational capability (IOC) of 2017-18.

A view of the latest J-20 prototype, 2015, which made its maiden flight from the CAC airfield on 18 December. (Chinese internet).

The J-20 programme currently features six known prototypes. Two are early technology development articles (serial numbers 2001 and 2002) that emerged in 2009 and 2010, while four are modified versions closer to operational prototypes (serial numbers 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015) that all emerged in 2014.

No prototype numbered 2014 has yet to appear and may not, given the traditional Chinese view that four is an unlucky number.

Chinese aircraft spotters responsible for early internet photos report that the latest J-20 prototype, 2015, made its maiden flight from the CAC airfield on 18 December.

hinese aircraft spotters responsible for early internet photos report that the latest prototypes, 2013 and 2015, made their maiden flights from the CAC airfield on 29 November and 18 December 2014 respectively.

Both have most of the refinements seen on aircraft 2011, which emerged in February 2014: cropped canards and vertical stabilisers, a modified air intake, modified wing leading-edge extensions, and a new electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) under the nose.

However, 2013 and 2015 lack the nose-mounted pitot tubes that featured on the earlier prototypes. In addition, number 2015 has longer and sharper-shaped rear-fuselage horizontal strakes. Although this aft surface does not appear to be movable, it may contribute to aircraft stability, as a similar - though movable - surface did for the Grumman X-29 technology demonstrator.

A detail of the strakes on the latest J-20 prototype, 2015. (Chinese internet).

Early internet-sourced images have also emerged of the J-20's retractable refuelling probe, placed on the upper starboard of the nose. The development status of an indigenous Chinese turbofan for the J-20, often referred to as the WS-15, remains unknown. There is speculation that early J-20 examples may use a version of the Russian Saturn AL-31 turbofan.

In April 2014 an Asian government source told IHS Jane's that China would have 24 J-20s by 2020, which if realised, could constitute a first operational regiment. This would indicate that IOC may occur in the 2017-18 timeframe.

Source: Janes

Former Chinese General Says Force An Option in 'Taiwan Problem'

BEIJING — An army general has warned that China will not leave the Taiwan problem “unresolved for a long time,” after the island’s Beijing-friendly ruling party suffered a bruising election defeat, a state-run newspaper said.

 

Taipei, Taiwan. (Getty Images).

Liu Jingsong told the annual conference of the Global Times newspaper that the Chinese government would not be afraid to use force to resolve “the Taiwan issue,” the Chinese-language paper reported Saturday on its website without specifying further.

“The Taiwan issue will not remain unresolved for a long time. We will not abandon the possibility of using force; according to the law, it is also an option to resolve the issue by military means if necessary,” said Liu, a former president of the influential Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.

He retired from active service with the People’s Liberation Army in 1997.

“Whoever has political power in Taiwan, the only path (for the island) is to preserve the development of peaceful relations between the two sides of the strait, and eventually to bring about reunification,” the general said.

Taiwan and China split in 1949 at the end of a civil war, but Beijing still claims the island as part of its territory awaiting reunification — by force if necessary.

Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) was dealt a crushing blow in local polls in late November when it lost five out of six large municipalities on the island, prompting Premier Jiang Yi-huah to resign and President Ma Ying-jeou to step down as KMT chairman.

The KMT’s move to forge warmer ties with Beijing, and its perceived secrecy in forging deals with the mainland, was one of the core issues at stake in polls seen as foreshadowing the 2016 presidential race.

In face of the recent shakeup in Taiwan’s political landscape, China “should not fear the storm” and has formed “new judgments and countermeasures,” the Global Times paraphrased Liu as saying.

In March and April this year Taiwanese students staged a mass three-week sit-in in the parliament building in Taipei in protest at a proposed trade pact with the mainland.

Tense relations with China have warmed since Ma was elected in 2008 on a platform of improving cross-strait ties and reviving the slowing economy.

But with rising public anxiety over China’s influence on the island, sentiment has turned against the Beijing-friendly approach. Voters say trade deals have been agreed in secret and not benefited ordinary Taiwanese people.

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has traditionally been skeptical over closer ties with Beijing and has criticized the KMT for lack of transparency over trade deals with China.

The KMT denies any secrecy over deals with China.

3 In A Row, New Chinese 052D Destroyers

After commissioning the first Type 052D earlier this year, three more 052D destroyers have been launched, awaiting their final electronics fitting and eventual commissioning.  

 

Three Type 052D Luyang III guided missile destroyer (DDG), seen here in various stages of construction, are lined together at the Jiangnan Changxingdao Shipyard. The first Type 052D DDG, the Kunming, has already entered into PLAN service in March 2014. The second 052D, on the left, may enter service in the second half of 2014, while the two less completed destroyers to its right, will be commissioned in 2015. In service, the 052D destroyers’ likely missions could range from anti-piracy patrols to aircraft carrier escort to air defense for Chinese civilian activities like oil drilling rigs. 

 

In the past decade, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has built up a formidable area air defense capability, with an eye on deterring attack by enemy carrier groups and anti-ship missiles. While the ship’s powerful Type 346A radars provides for an air defense role, the 052D's modular vertical launch systems also gives it powerful land attack and anti-submarine capabilities. In addition, the Type 0346A radar and other sensors give the 052D vast intelligence gathering capabilities, which is vital for anti-access/area denial operations. 

The first 052D destroyer, Kunming, sails in the waters of Qingdao, China. The 052D is distinguished by the powerful Type 346A radars located under the bridge, and 64 vertical launch system cells located forward of the bridge and in the middle of the hull. 

 

It is expected that at least 12 052D destroyers will be built before production shifts to the projected Type 055D multi-role cruiser. The rapid production of the 052D is indicative of China's commitment to building a modern “blue water” navy. What is even more illustrative about China's determination is that the mass production of the 052D overlapped with the production run of the 6 less advanced 052C destroyers. The fact that the PLAN has chosen to rapidly produce both the 052C and 052D DDGs instead of waiting and concentrating on only one class of advanced warships demonstrates Chinese confidence in both its warship technology and the urgency to quickly develop multirole surface warships in the context of an Asian arms race.

Three 052D, from the air. Seen here are three 052D destroyers in the shipyard, as viewed from a commercial airliner. 

 

Source: www.hobbyshanghai.net & remono via 1t.cdjby.net

Arms Sales and the Future of U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations

The outgoing Bush Administration made an 11th hour decision to notify the U.S. Congress on October 3—a day before Congress went into recess ahead of the groundbreaking November presidential election in the United States—that a raft of arms and weapons systems, which have been effectively frozen since December 2007, will be released for Taiwan. The passage of the arms package provided a temporary reprieve for Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, whose approval rating since assuming office in May has plummeted to 23.6 percent in October (Global View, November 2008). The items released by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, at the value of $6.4 billion, includes: 182 Javelin anti-tank missile; 30 Apache helicopters; four PAC-3 anti-missile batteries; 32 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles; and four E-2T radar plane upgrades. But more noticeable than the items released is the absence of the first phase of 8 diesel-powered submarines, Black Hawk helicopters, and two additional PAC-3 batteries that had been originally sought (United Daily News [Taiwan], October 5, 2008; Defense News, October 6). Taipei also requested 66 F-16 C/D jet fighters to add to its current inventory, but the Bush Administration has not received the letter of request for the reason that it would only process the above-mentioned package at the current stage.

The passage of the arms package was received with a sigh of relief in Taipei, which is concerned about the island's strained relations with the United States,and, had a decision lapsed to the next U.S. president, weary that the package would be approved at all. As expected, Beijing complained bitterly and suspended unspecified military exchange programs with the United States (United Daily News, October 8, 2008), but overall the sale did not upset Sino-U.S. relations, nor did it interrupt the momentum of reconciliatory gestures between the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party on Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, the scaling-down of the arms package signifies subtle changes in the geopolitical landscape in East Asia, where the shifting center of gravity may affect the long-term interests of the United States and its relations with the nations in the region.

Arms Sale and Taiwan’s Defense

Although the items approved only represent a fraction of Taiwan's request and the value is half of what was originally sought, the package nonetheless improves Taiwan’s defense capability and reduces Taiwan’s widening military disparity vis-à-vis China. However, China’s military is rapidly modernizing, with its military defense budget has increased by double digit for more than 15 years while Taiwan's defense budget has remained low. Therefore, the arms package will be unable to offset the strategic changes in the depth projection of China’s military in the region and encirclement of Taiwan's sovereignty. Among Taiwan’s most cited threats is the People's Liberation Army’s (PLA) deployment of more than 1,000-1,400 short-ranged ballistic missiles (SRBM), which have increased at the rate of 100 per year since 2001. These missiles have been aimed at Taiwan from six missile bases in Lepin, Santow, Fuzhou, Longtien, Huian, and Zhangzhou, spanning three southeastern coastal provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian [1] (Liberty Times [Taiwan], March 30, 2008). In addition, China has also acquired an estimated 50 advanced submarines, which is more than what military analysts state the PLA needs to blockade the Taiwan Strait. The PLA has also engaged in military exercises and deployments designed to sharpen its defensive capabilities so that even with limited offensive capabilities, China would be able to subdue Taiwan’s defenses in a limited amount of time by denying the access of other maritime powers that may come to Taiwan’s defense [2]. Furthermore, China has—in recent years—ratcheted up its computer-hacking activities against the Taiwanese government's national security-related agencies and has stolen countless sensitive materials (United Daily News, April 8, 2007), so much so that some Taiwanese security officials describe that a "silent war" has already begun. 

Friction between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the CCP in the Taiwan Strait was to be expected for two parties whose visions for Taiwan and its relationship with China are diametrically opposed. That the result of Taiwan’s presidential election on March 22 was embraced by the embattled U.S. leadership came as no surprise. The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou appears more conciliatory toward China than his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP. Chen stoked tensions in cross-Strait relations prior to the election by advocating that Taiwan join the United Nations as a new member, promoted a national referendum on the issue during the recent presidential election. These tensions have since eased following President Ma's inauguration. Bush Administration officials—in pubic and in private—conveyed satisfaction to see Taiwan’s KMT government and the CCP re-engaged in cross-Strait dialogue, particularly the resumption of the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) – Association for the Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) channel, severed by the CCP after former President Lee Teng-hui stated in a major policy speech in 1999 that Taiwan-China relations are “special state-to-state relations.”

Cross-Strait Politics and China’s Legal Warfare against Taiwan

From November 3 to 7, the head of ARATS, Chen Yunlin, serving as China’s special envoy to Taiwan, participated in an unprecedented visit to Taiwan to negotiate cross-Strait aviation, shipping, and food safety agreements. Chen Yunlin’s visit has attracted international attention on the warming relations between a democratic Taiwan and an authoritarian China, and also on a deepening divide in Taiwanese society.

A closer examination of ongoing cross-Strait shuttle diplomacy between the KMT and CCP, and public announcements made by President Ma raises legitimate questions about whether the current trend is in Taiwan’s national interest or for that matter U.S. long-term security interest. 

The issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty has always been the focal point of cross-Strait tension, since the PRC claims that Taiwan is a part of China under its interpretation of the “one-China principle.” The Chinese government has engaged in what some analysts call a diplomatic “full-court press,” using a carrot and stick strategy in the form of financial and monetary incentives, to legalize the “one-China principle” in major international organizations and thereby legitimize its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan (Javno, November 16, 2007). 

The first such step came in May 2005, when the Chinese government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the World Health Organization (WHO) Secretariat requiring the WHO to seek Chinese approval before Taiwan, under the name “Taiwan, China,” could participate in any WHO-related activities. The second came in the United Nations, which in March 28, 2007, issued a letter from the Secretariat to Nauru stating that, in compliance with the 1972 UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, “the United Nations considers Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.” The third incident was with the OIE (World Organization of Animal Health). In May 2007, Beijing attempted to pass a resolution “recognizing that there is only one China in the world and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China which includes Taiwan,” changing Taiwan’s membership into “non-sovereign regional member,” and using “Taiwan, China” or “Taipei, China” as Taiwan’s official title in this organization. 

As these three examples demonstrate, the “one-China principle” has been used by the PRC as a means of waging its “legal warfare” to incorporate Taiwan and to accomplish its bottom-line goal of de jure unification, as explicitly stated by its declared intent to use military force if necessary under the "anti-secession law" of 2005 to “reunify” Taiwan. The examples also illustrate how, if Taipei agrees to the "one-China principle," it may be interpreted as accepting China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Under such pretexts, the government under the DPP had to avoid and even repel the "one-China principle" as the precondition for the resumption of cross-Strait talks. The DPP did this by seeking international support for its counter-position, which led to the standoff in cross-Strait negotiations and showed the world that the "one-China principle" effectively became a non-starter. 

These efforts notwithstanding, Ma Ying-jeou in his inaugural address reversed the previous administration's position and accepted the so-called “1992 consensus” as the foundation for cross-Strait reconciliation in spite of the fact that the PRC officially stated that the “1992 consensus” was a consensus realizing (ti-xien) the “one-China principle.” In several private meetings with foreign visitors, Ma even went on to say that he accepted the one-China principle with or without any elaboration on what he meant by it. In addition, Ma stated in September during an interview with a Mexican journal that the relations between Taiwan and China are “non-state to state special relations,” and his spokesperson Wang Yuchi further qualified that statement of policy by saying that relations should be characterized as “region to region” (diqu dui diqu) relations (September 3, 2008, news release, www.president.gov.tw). In the effort to participate in international organizations, Ma announced that there is no better title for Taiwan other than “Chinese Taipei” (United Daily News, April 5, 2008). During the August/September effort to participate in the United Nations, the KMT government gave up on the membership drive and pursued only "meaningful participation" in UN-affiliated organizations. Even so, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guang-yia, stated that Taiwan was not qualified to participate in major international organizations, and Taiwan’s participation in the WHO had to follow the MOU signed between the Chinese government and the WHO Secretariat (Liberty Times, August 28, 2008). The Ma administration made no attempt to repudiate the Chinese claim, and Ma’s spokesperson stated that it was not a "non-goodwill" (Liberty Times, August 29, 2008). In addition, when in the negotiations for cross-Strait chartered flights the Ma administration decided to open up six domestic airports in addition to two international airports, the decision apparently fell into the Chinese claim that the cross-Strait flights are domestic flights. In short, the official statements and policy actions by the KMT government on relations between the two sides of the Strait thus put Taiwan within the description of the “one-China principle,” with Taiwan being part of China. 

Inner Politics and Arms Sales

In another interview by India and Global Affairs, Ma stated that he wanted to pursue full economic normalization with China, and that he also wanted to reach a peace agreement within his term (Liberty Times, October 18, 2008). If Ma’s concept on the relations between Taiwan and China falls within the description of the “one-China principle,” a full economic normalization will mean an arrangement similar to the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Hong Kong and China. A peace agreement between Taiwan and China within the timetable of his four-year term may necessitate that the United States prepare for an eventual termination of arms sales to and security cooperation with Taiwan. Ma’s statements may be welcomed by the international community as gestures toward peace, but it is actually putting Taiwan's security in jeopardy. If Taiwan were to sign a peace agreement under the KMT where the conditions are defined by the KMT and CCP, the resulting equation, influenced by a much more powerful China at the other end of the negotiating table, may forfeit Taiwan’s freedom to repudiate China’s claim over Taiwan. Taiwan may be moving dangerously too close to the PRC and may not be able to maintain its current de facto independent status any longer.

The United States has for decades held a policy of refuting the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, as stated in the “six assurances” provided by President Ronald Reagan in 1982 and other private communications with Taiwan (Fredrick Chien Memoir, vol. 2, 2005, 215-6). When China manipulated the UN Secretariat to issue a letter in March 2007, which stated that Taiwan is considered by the UN an integral part of the PRC, the United States protested to the UN Secretariat, arguing that such a declaration is against U.S. policy (Liberty Times, September 6, 2007). But if Taiwan itself accepts one-China principle, the foundation for this U.S. policy may be jeopardized. In other words, Ma’s effort of reconciliation is a short-term relief for the United States at a time when it is not capable of addressing simultaneous international conflicts. However, such efforts may prove to be against U.S. long-term interests, especially if the United States continues to view China’s rapid military modernization with suspicion.

Taiwan's domestic politics are severely divided over the course of the government's ongoing rapprochement with China. President Ma has not made any efforts to seek domestic reconciliation or attempt to communicate with the opposition over his intentions on cross-Strait policy. In fact, Ma’s statements and actions angered many people who believe that Taiwan should keep China at arm’s length. Taiwan appears to be more divided than before in the months since Ma’s inauguration, as evidenced by several large-scale, anti-government/anti-China demonstrations. Consequently, Taiwan's status has been relatively weakened in facing the subtle and not so subtle threats from authoritarian China. A divided and weakened Taiwan severely threatens Taiwan’s national security, and is, by extension, not in the interests of the United States or Japan, its key ally in East Asia. All interested parties should therefore encourage the KMT to engage the opposition DPP in formulating its policy across the Taiwan Strait. 

Conclusion

The changes occurring within the strategic landscape of East Asia are quite subtle indeed. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are one of the most important means for the United States to demonstrate its security commitment to its key allies and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In order for the United States to continue to maintain peace and stability in the region, the United States has long held the position, as prescribed by the Taiwan Relations Act, that arms sales to Taiwan are evaluated on the merit of Taiwan’s defense needs, not political judgments or as a result of consultations with the PRC. However, the U.S. decision to scale down the volume of weapons that had already been promised may make Taiwan feel uncomfortable about the U.S. commitment at a time when Taiwan needs a strong defense in order to ward off China’s possible aggression. A continued U.S. commitment is also integral in permitting Taiwan to resist China’s political pressure, however remote it may seem, and most importantly enable Taiwan to negotiate with China from a position of strength. The unfinished issue of arms sales to Taiwan thus becomes another pressing matter for the new U.S. administration to address in order to safeguard American interests in reinforcing peace and stability in East Asia.

Taiwan's first Hsun Hai-class corvette: ' the aircraft carrier killer'?

Photos of Taiwan's first Hsun Hai-class corvette (# 618 ) dubbed ' the aircraft carrier killer' delivered to Taiwan Navy:

 

PLA Navy amphibious task force reaches Malaysia 'to defend South China sea'

A fully equipped PLA amphibious task force has reached China's southernmost claimed possession in the South China Sea in an unprecedented show of force that is raising eyebrows across the region. The four-ship flotilla headed by the landing ship Jinggangshan visited James Shoal - some 80 kilometres from Malaysia, less than 200 kilometres from Brunei and 1,800 kilometres from the mainland coast - close to the outer limits of China's "nine-dash line", by which it lays claim to virtually the entire South China Sea.

Chinese Navy's amphibious landing ship Jinggangshan is seen during a training with a hovercraft in waters near Hainan Province on March 20, 2013. Photo: Xinhua

A Xinhua report yesterday described marines and crew gathering on the deck of the Jinggangshan - one of the PLA Navy's three 200-metre landing ships - to pledge to "defend the South China Sea, maintain national sovereignty and strive towards the dream of a strong China".

"It was a surprisingly strong message in sending out this task force, on such a new operational role from previous PLAN [PLA Navy] patrols in the region," said Gary Li, a senior analyst with IHS Fairplay in London.

"It is not just a few ships here and there, but a crack amphibious landing ship carrying marines and hovercraft and backed by some of the best escort ships in the PLAN fleet," he said, adding that jet fighters had also been used to cover the task force.

"We've never seen anything like this that far south in terms of quantity or quality ... it is hard to know whether it is just coincidence, but it does seem to reflect [President] Xi Jinping's desire for more practical operationally based exercises."

The landing ships are considered some of the most sophisticated vessels in the PLA and are thought to be key to any strategy to invade Taiwan. Their deployments are closely watched by regional rivals. The first of the landing ships, Kunlunshan, has been used in anti-piracy work off the Horn of Africa. Photos circulating on mainland websites show marines storming beaches, backed by hovercrafts and helicopters dispatched from the Jinggangshan during several days of exercises that saw them visit all of China's holdings in the Spratly Islands.

The PLA took six Spratlys reefs and shoals from Vietnam in a sea battle 25 years ago this month. The ships are due to head back north, crossing into the western Pacific for further drills via the Bashi channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, Xinhua said. News of the Jinggangshan's appearance off James Shoal last night sparked chatter among military officials in the region.

"That is quite a show of sovereignty - an amphibious task force," said one military attaché monitoring developments. "It has got everyone talking.

"The Spratlys is one thing, but turning up at James Shoal is quite another. Once again, China is showing it is quite unafraid to send a message to the region - and in a year when Asean is chaired by Brunei, turning up down there in such a fashion is pretty strong symbolism."

PLA deployments into the South China Sea in 2009 and 2010 sparked fears across the region of a new assertiveness by Beijing. Those concerns in turn prompted fresh moves by several Southeast Asian nations to force the long-simmering South China Sea dispute back on to the regional agenda - and forge closer ties with the US.

 

Source: South China Morning Post

IN FOCUS: Advanced Chinese fighters: upping the ante_ Greg Waldron

J-10s were displayed during the army's 85th anniversary celebrations

Chinese fighter prototypes leave little doubt about Beijing's airpower ambitions, but further development will prove increasingly challenging.

The weekend of 15-16 September was the perfect time for a new Chinese fighter to emerge. US defense secretary Leon Panetta was about to visit Beijing, and an East China Sea territorial dispute with Japan had antagonised Chinese protestors into destroying Japanese-owned shops and Japanese cars in the streets of several major cities. The emergence of the yet-to-be designated aircraft at the Shenyang Aircraft factory was reminiscent of the Chengdu J-20's first flight, which occurred during a visit by Panetta's predecessor, Robert Gates.

Then again, the timing of the J-21's appearance - which Chinese bloggers have variously designated J-31 and F-60 - may well have had nothing to do with Panetta's visit or tensions with Japan. With China it is impossible to tell. Apparently Chinese president Hu Jintao, with whom Gates was meeting, was unaware of the J-20's first flight until Gates mentioned it.

In the case of the J-21, the fuselage of an aircraft closely resembling the new fighter was spotted in late June aboard the back of a truck, draped in camouflage netting. The only thing certain about the J-21 is that it is yet another indication of China's commitment to modernising the Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

As with the Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35, the J-21 features canted twin tails, a key design feature of low observable aircraft. A single grainy head-on shot shows widely-spaced intakes, similar to the F-35. One clear difference from the F-35 is the presence of two engines. China observers speculate that these are Klimov RD-93s, the powerplant used in the Chengdu/Pakistan Aeronautical Complex JF-17 fighter.

MONEY TALKS

Based on early images, the J-21 would appear to be a more nimble aircraft than the J-20, suggesting that it is optimised for the air superiority mission. Some experts have suggested that the large J-20 is not intended as a fighter, but as a long-range attack aircraft. Despite the clear differences between the two aircraft in size and layout, some western observers speculate that the J-20 and J-21 are competitors, similar to the Lockheed Martin YF-22 and Northrop YF-23 in the early 1990s.

"China's big strength is that there is a lot of money," says Richard Bitzinger, senior fellow of the Military Transformations Programme at Singapore's Rajaratnam School of International Studies. "As long as the defence budget goes up, this will pay dividends in terms of procurement numbers and research and development. In the last 10 years, they have bought upwards of 400-500 fourth generation fighters such as the Chengdu J-10 and Sukhoi Su-30."

He estimates that China possesses the world's largest defence R&D budget after the USA. He says that while it is uncertain that aircraft such as the J-20 and J-21 will be fully developed and eventually deployed, he is certain that they serve a useful role as technology demonstrators to learn about advanced technologies such as stealth, advanced engines and the internal carriage of weapons. 

 

The WS-10 powers one of the J-20 prototypes

In early March, China said it would raise its defence budget by 11.2% year on year to CNY670 billion ($107 billion), but provided no details of how this would affect aircraft procurement and R&D. Bitzinger believes that about 10% of China's overall budget for 2012 will be spent in these two areas. He notes that in defence white papers, China has indicated that its budget is divided roughly between three main areas: personnel, operations, and procurement (which also includes R&D).

As for the J-20, Chinese media reports suggest that the aircraft's two prototypes have flown over 50 flights. The US Pentagon takes it seriously. In a May 2012 assessment, it said the aircraft could be operational by early 2018. The J-20 is "still in a prototype phase", says David Helvey, the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia for the US Department of Defense.

"We'd like to be able to continue to monitor developments to understand exactly what China may intend to use it for, and I wouldn't want to speculate at this point for what those specific missions would be," he adds. "We expect the J-20 to achieve an effective operational capability no sooner than 2018. That reflects our judgment and interpretation of how far they are along in doing the research and development and flight testing of the prototypes."

Japan is also concerned. In August, Tokyo released its annual Defence of Japan white paper. Although it did not mention the J-20 by name, it made a clear allusion to the type, noting "the emergence of high-performance fighter aircraft with excellent stealth capability and situation awareness capabilities".

The obstacles in China's path to developing advanced fighters are formidable. While the airframes of the J-20 and J-21 have clear low observable characteristics, Chinese capabilities in the crucial area of radar absorbent materials are difficult to gauge. The Northrop B-2 bomber, F-22 and F-35 require constant support to ensure their highly confidential coatings remain effective. The nature of these coatings is among the USA's most closely guarded secrets. Indeed, the USA was so intent to preserve its lead in stealth that it steadfastly declined to sell the F-22 even to its closest allies.

China's struggles with aircraft engines are well known. Even the relatively basic JF-17 Thunder uses the Russian Klimov RD-93 for the time being, the same engine believed to power the new J-21. One of the J-20 prototypes is believed to be fitted with a pair of Russian Saturn AL-31 engines, the powerplant for the Su-27 and J-10. The second is believed to use the Chinese-made Shenyang Liming WS-10 powerplant. Most experts believe China's lack of an indigenous high-­performance engine is a major obstacle for its advanced fighter aircraft. An engine even remotely equivalent to the F-22's super-­cruising Pratt & Whitney F119 is years, if not decades, away from reality for China.

To fill these gaps, China has three options, according to report by the Washington DC-based Institute for National Strategic Studies entitled Buy, Build, or Steal: China's Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies. The report asserts that while China's fighter capability is still roughly 15-20 years behind the West's, Beijing is increasingly self-reliant in fighter development and production.

The report concludes that China will find it increasingly difficult to develop ultra high-end aerospace technologies, and its traditional partner Russia is ever more wary of sharing technology owing to fear of intellectual property theft. This will force China to rely increasingly on espionage to obtain advanced capabilities.

TECHNOLOGY FRONTIER

"The Chinese government is pursuing a range of 'indigenous innovation' and technology development programmes, but mastering advanced technologies becomes more difficult and expensive as a country moves closer to the technology frontier," write the report's authors.

"This leads to a second related conclusion: China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own."

Aside from the technologies involved in the platforms themselves, integrating them into a comprehensive joint force is essential given the sophisticated foes China could face in any conflict over Taiwan or in the East China Sea.

The J-20 is expected to be operational by 2018

"Weaknesses of the PLAAF include the air force's comparative lack of ability to operate effectively as part of a joint force," says Douglas Barrie, an air warfare analyst with the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Furthermore, it has no recent combat experience. The introduction of advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons is also comparatively recent."

He adds that the PLAAF is weak in other key areas such as air-to-air refuelling and transport aircraft: "Its long-range bomber aircraft - the Xian H-6 - is obsolescent, though this is partly offset by the integration of long-range cruise missiles. In terms of rectifying shortcomings, the air force does appear to be trying to carry out joint training in conjunction with other arms of the military, and to introduce more demanding training scenarios."

While China appears to be making advances in its fighter fleet - as exemplified by the J-20, J-21 and the hundreds of advanced types it has inducted in the last decade - it still has some distance to go before transforming its improving technical strength into a true combat capability. In addition, the strains of developing a single advanced fighter such as the F-22 or F-35 are vast even for the world's greatest aerospace powers. Attempting to develop both the J-20 and J-21 simultaneously could test even China's determination to join the world's airpower greats. 

 

Source: Flight Global

Taiwan could hold out against China for at least a month: minister

Taiwan would be able put up a defense against a large-scale Chinese military invasion for "at least a month," the country's defense minister, Yen Ming, said Thursday.

 

Female Soldiers of Taiwanese Armed Forces

Yen made the comment when answering questions before the Legislative Yuan's Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, citing the results of the military's annual Han Kuang exercises.

Hsueh Ling, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party legislator who posed the question, praised Yen for having "guts," saying that Lee Jye, who was defense minister from 2004 to 2007, had said Taiwan could maintain its own defense for just two weeks.

The exchanges at the Legislative Yuan came a day after China announced that it will increase its military budget for 2014 to almost US$132 billion, a 12.2% rise over last year.

Although no match for the fast-growing Chinese war machine, Taiwan's military is believed to have adopted a strategy that includes holding out on its own for as long as possible while the government seeks diplomatic as well as military assistance from other countries, particularly the United States.

Beijing's imposition of an air defense identification zone is only one part of the struggle over the future of Northeast Asia. 

Vice President Biden at a press conference with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo. (Toru Hanai/Reuters)

So far, much of the discussion of China's air-defense identification zone (ADIZ), a new law requiring foreign aircraft to notify China when they fly over a designated region in the East China Sea, has centered on Beijing's motivations: What is China trying to accomplish by instituting the zone? And, considering that it triggered immediate opposition from the United States and Japan, was this decision a mistake?

These are important questions, but it's worth zooming out and considering the more fundamental causes for tension in Northeast Asia. Here, the issues become more complex. Is China's aggression caused by a new president trying to establish his legitimacy? Or is it, instead, an attempt to capitalize on domestic anti-Japanese sentiment? Does the conflict reflect how pre-World War II history continues to shape contemporary East Asian relations? Or is it a scramble for the rich energy resources that supposedly lie inside the disputed waters?

The answer to each of these questions is, unhelpfully, yes. And that's what makes the present conflict in Northeast Asia so difficult to resolve.

 

The territorial dispute between China and Japan, concerning a group of islands called the Senkakus in Japanese (and the Diaoyu in Chinese), is hardly unusual in a crowded region with many competing interests. Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China has resolved border disagreements with nearly all of its neighbors, but still has outstanding disputes with India (over Arunachal Pradesh) and several Southeast Asian countries (over the Spratly and Paracel Islands). Japan, too, is engaged in an ongoing spat with South Korea over the Takeshima Islands, known as Dokdo in Korean.

 

The disagreement over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands began in 1971, when, after sovereignty reverted from American to Japanese control (a legacy from the postwar Treaty of San Francisco that gave the U.S. jurisdiction over some Japanese territory), both China and Taiwan claimed ownership. But it is only in the last decade that the conflict has escalated beyond a regional issue and has attracted widespread international concern. Why has the island dispute turned into such a problem?

 

China and Japan Need Fossil Fuels—and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Probably) Have Them

 

The Senkaku/Diaoyus are a chain of islands and rocks in the East China Sea that, since Japan's discovery of them in the 1880s, have never been inhabited. In the late 1960s, a geological survey determined that the waters surrounding the islands likely contain vast deposits of oil and natural gas, and, though this energy potential has yet to be realized, Beijing and Tokyo have a strong incentive to claim it for themselves.

 

No countries in the world import more fossil fuels than China and Japan. For the Chinese Communist Party, whose legitimacy depends largely on enabling fast economic growth, oil and natural gas imports are essential in fueling fixed-asset infrastructure and the country's expansion of private car ownership. More domestic resources would allow the country to disengage from potentially unstable oil exporters such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela. (The same logic, of course, explains interest in the U.S. for Alaskan oil drilling and hydraulic fracturing.)

Japan faces a different calculation. Over the last few decades, the country moved away from oil and natural gas imports, but the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster caused the Japanese government to shut down all 50 of its nuclear reactors and rely on fossil fuels to compensate.

But the present military brinkmanship over the ADIZ seems to be an overreaction to a trade issue that, presumably, could be negotiated. According to Shihoko Goto, a Japan expert at the Wilson Center, "For both Japan and China, this has gone far beyond the question of who has access to the blue water, oil and other natural resources. This is about history."

Source: Reuters

Chinese fighters tail U.S. aircraft in disputed airspace

The Want China Times has quoted the Tokyo’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper as saying that Chinese J-7 and J-10 fighters tailed two US aircraft as they reached the airspace close to the border between China and Japan.

The two U.S. aircraft allegedly shadowed by the People’s Loberation Army Air Force were a U.S. Navy P-3C from Misawa and a U.S. Air Force C-130 from Yokota airbase.  According to the Japanese media outlets, the Chinese fighter jets were scrambled to intercept them.

J-10

Image credit: Wiki/Retxham

This incident took place on January 10, the same day when a  Japanese reconnaissance aircraft attached to Japan’s Maritime Self-defence Force were dispatched to monitor Chinese aircraft movements near to the disputed Diaoyutai islands (Senkaku in Japan).

The following day Japanese F-15J Eagle interceptors tailed two Chinese J-10s that were launched to observe Japanese aircraft movements close to the border.

Even if it would appear that both sides are only conducting routine patrols in the area, there is a concrete risk that such close encounters turn into something more serious, escalating tensions into a conflict.

On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3E SIGINT plane was intercepted by a PLA Navy J-8 of the island of Hainan. The two planes went a bit too close each other and collided mid-air.

The collision, caused the death of the Chinese fighter pilot, whereas the American spyplane was forced to perform an emergency landing on Hainan.

The 24 crew members were detained and interrogated by the Chinese authorities until being released on April 21, 2001.

Written with Richard Clements

Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group to Produce 1,200 J-10 Fighters

J-10A

J-10B Fighter Jet In Production

Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group will produce a total of 1,200 J-10 fighters for the PLA Force to counter F-16 fighters over the Taiwan Strait and Western Pacific, according to our sister paper Want Daily.

The Moscow-based Voice of Russia says the J-10A uses the Lyulka-Saturn AL-31FN turbofan engine imported from Russia due to difficulties in the development of China's WS-10 Taihang engine. The newer J-10B variant will be fitted with the Taihang engine.

Geng Ruguang, senior vice president of China Aviation Industry Corporation, said the development of the J-10, Taihang engine and PL-12 air-to-air missile shows China has become the fourth nation in the world to design and produce its own advanced fighter.

Geng said the J-10B's active phased array airborne radar enables the fighter to track six targets and engage four of them simultaneously. Geng also said the J-10's radar system can also lock on to US F-16 and Japanese F-2 fighters without difficulty. Furthermore, the PL-12 air-to-air missile designed for the J-10 boasts similar specs to the US-built AIM-120 air-to-air missile used by the F-16A/B fighters of Taiwan's air force.

Taiwan currently has 388 fighters, of which 145 are F-16A/Bs purchased from the United States. The imbalance in the size of the size of the fighter fleets on opposing sides of the Taiwan Strait is a matter of serious concern for Taiwan's security.

Between 2014 and 2015, 36 J-10B fighters will also be supplied to the Pakistan Air Force under the name FC-20.

 

China's Maritime Disputes

 

 

In light of the recent entry by Galrahn on the issue of China's expanded map, I want to just put my thoughts on this. I was originally thinking of writing a separate entry on the dramatic expansion of China's maritime surveillance agencies of CMS and FLEC, but I want to spend a little time just looking at the non-military part of this.

 

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both land (island) and maritime disputes among seven sovereign states within the region, namely the:

• People's Republic of China (PRC)
• Republic of China (Taiwan)
• Philippines
• Vietnam
• Malaysia
• Brunei
• Indonesia

 

 

 

The main point I want to make here is that China's border dispute with entirely different than its border dispute with India and the countries around South China Sea. We often read about China's recent actions have made neighbouring countries feel uneasy and have pushed them toward America. While I do agree the other countries reactions have been similar, it's important to note that these are different issues for Chinese people.

And this has everything to do with the historical relationship of the two countries. It starts from 1895 when China was badly defeated by Japan, who it had always looked upon as a vassal nation. The unfair treaty which resulted in war reparation in addition to annexation of Taiwan was followed up by the brutal Russo-Japanese war of 1905 which was fought over Chinese soil and resulted in the Japanese control of Lushun (Port Arthur). Of course, all of this was small compared to the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945. The Chinese side has claimed that around 20 million civilians were killed during this conflict. If that's true, it would in effect be the equivalent of 3 holocausts. I do not know how accurate these numbers are, but I did hear a story (growing up) where my friend's ancestor was tortured to death by Japanese soldiers. And my opinion is that most people born in my generation or prior in China probably have heard of such stories from their family or friends. When I visited Nanjing in 2006, I was told by locals that the only place not pillaged during the Nanking massacre was the Sun Yat-Sen memorial. Even by then, Japanese business was not allowed on the city's premise. 

 

There has been a lot of anger within China toward Japan in the past 10 years due to the visits by Koizumi/Abe of the Yasukuni Shrine and the denials of wartime atrocities by some Japanese Nationalists. While I do not think that the Japanese government is denying th war atrocities, I do think a lot of people in China would feel better toward Japanese if the Japanese government adopt the same attitude toward this subject as Germany has adopted toward the Holocaust. When something like the recent Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute came up, it came across as another reminder of Japanese aggression for Chinese people. Back when the two countries normalized relations in 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to not overly press Japan over this issue in exchange of money and technology to help with the Chinese economy. And I think while China was still economically weak and needing Japan, this was something it was willing to do (not overly voicing past grievances). However with China's growing power in the past 10 years, this is no longer the case, so the current generation of Chinese population and officials do not see the need to hold pacifying attitude toward Japan. With the Koizumi/Abe visits, all of these anger/grievances from the past 60 years flared up and it is tough for me to see how relations between China/Japan will get better.

The difference between the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the South China Sea dispute is that the entire Chinese population is invested in this issue. It's not just the PLA or a group of nationalist cranks on the internet forums that are passionate about this, it's the ordinary people. You've seen that with the wide spread boycotting of Japanese business in the past few months due to the outrage in China over the entire Diaoyu/Senkaku issues. This is not just a couple of islands. This is 70 years of grievances. It's also seen in the expansion of civilian maritime patrol fleet. In the past few months, 11 ships from PLAN have been sent to the shipyards to be retrofitted and removed of weaponry so that they can join the CMS fleet and patrol the disputed regions with Japan. And I think that until the Japanese government adopts an attitude toward its World War II crimes toward China (and South Korea) as Germany has toward Israel, there will always be that underlying tension that makes all border disputes even worse. I think that the relationship between the two countries have gotten so bad that it may be more likely a conflict will break out between China and Japan rather than China and Taiwan in the next 10 years. That's really unfortunate, because the two countries have so much to gain in this economically unstable period if they can somehow move past this issue and resolve past grievances.

As a last point, it really bugs me that Japan is often put in the same category as Vietnam/Philippines with regards to needing American help to defend itself against the big bad Chinese. Even with the rise of PLAN, JMSDF is still clearly the stronger force at this time. The Japanese civilian patrol fleet is also a very powerful fleet, so it is not going to be scared away by the presence of a few 1500 ton CMS cutters. In fact, CMS has this huge build up just so that it can get somewhat close to the size of its Japanese counterpart.