Naval Weapons - Anti-Ship Missiles - The Kowsar, Noor and Raad

Anti-Ship Missiles

Kowsar ASM

The Kowsar is the lightest of the 3 main ASM’s in the Iranian arsenal, being able to be launched from either land on mobile platforms, or from sea from the missile version of the IPS-16 fast attack craft (FAC). It comes in two main variants with a third in development. 

Kowsar ASM

The first model is the Kowsar-1 and is identical to the Chinese C-701. Being the lightest of the missiles, it is not intended to engage targets with displacements greater then 180 tons of displacement meaning that the targets in theory would be limited to amphibious landing craft and auxiliary support craft.(1) However, in 2006, Hezbollah was able to deploy a C-701 successfully against the INS Hanit, a corvette with roughly 10000 tons of displacement, in other words, a craft 5 times as large as the acceptable target. The warhead is fairly conventional, with 29 kg of armor piercing high explosive. Guidance during the boost stage consists of inertial navigation which consists of calculating the approximate position of the target. Unlike other ASM’s, the Kowsar-1 does not climb to enter a cruise phase after launch, but rather remains at a fairly constant height of about 15 meters. Once it enters the immediate vicinity of the target, it switches over to TV guidance which would then have to be manually guided onto the correct target. The TV guidance can be replaced with an infrared seeker.
 

Kowsar 1

• Range: 25 km
• Length: 2.5 m
• Missile Weight: 100 kg
• Warhead: 29 kg
• Speed: Mach .8
• Guidance:
o Cruise Phase: INS
o Terminal Guidance: TV Imaging, IR

The second model, the Kowsar-2 is physically identical to the Kowsar-1, however the difference comes in the terminal guidance. The limiting factor of the Kowsar-1 was the TV or IR seeker which meant that the operator would have to stay with the missile the whole way until the target, which in turn meant that its usability on anything else besides a stationary launcher would be unfeasible. This meant that the operators were increasingly vulnerable to counterattacks from all angles. The solution to that was to replace the TV/IR seeker with a ‘millimetre-wave radar’ which is a type of active homing radar that is activated in the terminal phase and automatically scans for the target, allowing the operator to leave the area once the missile is fired, this then allows the missile to be fired from platforms like the upgraded IPS-16.

Kowsar 2

• Range: 25 km
• Length: 2.5 m
• Missile Weigh: 100 kg
• Warhead: 29 kg
• Speed: Mach .8
• Guidance:
o Cruise Phase: INS
o Terminal Guidance: Millimetre-wave radar
• Alterations
o Replacement of terminal guidance with active radar

Noor ASM

The Noor is the bigger brother to the Kowsar. It is the most common missile in the IRGCN’s arsenal and is found on land based launchers, the Thondar and Kaman class missile boats as well as most larger IRIN vessels such as the Alvand and Mowj. 

Noor missile in Holly Defence Exhibition

 It comes in sets of 4 on each of the respective ships, while two can be fired from the Mi-17 and the F-4, while 4 can be allegedly carried on the Su-24, although no pictures of the latter have been unearthed. Like, the Kowsar, it also comes in two main variants, with a third in development. It is in the same class as the more famous Excocet missile.

The Noor-1, is copy of the C-801, the precursor to the C-802. The larger 165 kg warhead as compared to the Kowsar, means that it is most useful against frigates, cruisers and destroyers such as the ‘Oliver Hazard Perry’ and ‘Ticonderoga’ class of ships found in the USN 5th fleet that patrols the Persian Gulf. The largest ship sunk ever successfully sunk, albeit a test, has 10,000 tons of displacement, which is 2000 pounds greater then the Ticonderoga cruiser, the most formidable of the US destroyers. In the early ‘90’s, Iran received 200 C-801’s along with 8 launchers, at that point Iran began to reverse engineer them under the name “Tondar”, eventually it morphed into the Noor-1 project. In the late ‘90’s, Iran adapted them to fire from an F-4. The guidance and flight profile is presumably the same as the C-802. After cruising speed of mach .9 is achieved through a boost motor, it flies at 20-30 meters cruising altitude. Inertial guidance, as with the Kowsar, guides the missile to the target. When entering terminal phase, the two seeker systems activate, the first is the monopulse active radar much like the radar in the Kowsar, the second is an IR seeker that was originally squeezed into the large housing of the original missile as an after market addition, however its usefulness soon led it to become standard equipment. A sharp drop then happens, from 20-30 metres to 5-7 meters above the sea level, maintained by the radio or laser altimeter. This has the advantage of making it near invisible to the target ship because it is below the detection range, especially combined with the integrated jamming capabilities and low radar signature. The missile is driven with kinetic energy through the hull where a delayed fuze allowing the missile to explode within the target vessel.

Noor 1

• Range: 40 km
• Length: 6.5 m
• Missile Weight: 715+ kg
• Warhead: 165 kg
• Speed: .9 mach
• Guidance: Inertial in cruise with monopulse active radar and IR Seeker in terminal

The Noor-2 replaced the original solid fuel rocket of the Noor-1 with a much more powerful turbojet. However the actual range gained is somewhat contentious, some use set figure of 120 km found on the C-802(on which the Noor-2 is a loose copy of). However some cite the domestic modifications to the Microturbo TRI 60-2 powerplant as evidence that the range was extended, and in 2006, during the ‘Blow of Zolfaqar’ wargames, commanders were quoted as saying it was 200 km. However the latter number is cast into doubt when the rest of the article mentions that the missile was only ever fired from warships, whereas in 1997, the Noor-1 was tested from an F-4.  The most likely range is somewhere around 170 km as it fits in line with the upgrades and domestic production of the turbojet, under the name of Tolloue 4 and 5.(8) Although the missile is overall lighter then the Noor-1 due to reduction in the solid fuel, the warhead remains the same packing the same punch, as do the targeting mechanisms remain unchanged. There are several key changes however. First, in the terminal phase, an upgraded altimeter allows the missile to hug the water closer, staying 3-5 meters above the surface. Second, the option of having a ‘pop-up’ attack pattern was also introduced by Chinese partners in 2006. A ‘pop-up’ pattern involves an immediate jump by the missile in the last few seconds allowing the missile to dive deep into the deck of the target. Third is the introduction of manoeuvring algorithms to make it harder for active ship defences to stop the missile. 

Noor 2

• Range: 170 km (140-200 km possible)
• Length: 6.5 m
• Missile Weight: 715+ kg
• Warhead: 165 kg
• Speed: .9 mach
• Guidance
o Cruise: Inertial
o Terminal: DM-3BMonopulse active radar and IR Seeker
• Alterations
o Turbojet engine
o Lower altitude in terminal phase
o Introduction of manoeuvring and ‘pop-up’ attack options

Raad ASM

The largest of Iran’s anti ship missiles, the Raad also has the longest range. It can be fired from a multitude of platforms including static defences, self-propelled tracked vehicles, presumably delivered from North Korea, or from a truck, much like the ones seen launching Kowsars. Developed from the body of the Chinese HY-2 Silkworm, the Raad, however, has seen many improvements most prominently in the seeker and propulsion. The first of the changes include replacing the conical scanning radar and IR imaging with the "brains” of the Noor missile (DM-3B radar) with the end result that the missile becomes of skimming the sea at about 3-5 meters, compared to 8 of the HY-2, a substantial amount when considering a targets countermeasures. It also means that it will be capable of last minute evasive maneuvers and execute a ‘pop-up’ attack on the deck of the target. 

Raad ASM

 Although, they will be notably harder with a missile with the aerodynamics of the 3,000 kg missile compared to the 715 kg Noor. It undoubtedly presents other difficulties of meshing the two systems, but they have presumably been fixed due to successful tests. The second main alteration is engine. Public perception is that the Raad is powered by the Tolou-4, the same powerplant as in the Noor. However this is intuitively unlikely given that the Tolou-4 was designed to propel a much smaller (715 kg) missile. Another indicator is looking at the extremely prominent ducts on the Raad compared to the extremely recessed ducts on the Noor. Rather, the more likely candidate is the Tolou-5 upgrade which is described as being much more powerful then its predecessor, although it was only in the prototype stage in 2005, meaning it would have had to of progressed extremely fast for them to appear in the 2007 wargames.

Other then the above modifications, the Raad acts very much like the HY-2 from which it was derived, it is fired with the help of a solid rocket booster, quickly climbing to 1,000 meters, then descending to slightly less then 20 meters for cruising under inertial guidance. When, in terminal phase the active radar is switched on, and the missile descends to about 4 meters to skim the surface of the water and eventually strike the target. Packed with over 300 kg of high explosive in a shaped charge, it is designed for use against the massive destroyers of western fleets. (13) Meanwhile, the 360 km range would literally leaving no part of the gulf untouched.

• Range: 360 km
• Length: 7.48 m
• Missile Weight: 2,998 kg
• Warhead: 315 kg
• Speed: .8 mach
o Guidance: Inertial in cruise, DM-3BMonopulse active radar and possibly IR seeker in terminal.

Other missiles

Navigating Irans inventory of equipment is metaphorical minefield of what exists and what only exists as prototypes, and what is rhetoric. Consequently there are a few missiles which may or may not exist depending on whom you talk to. The biggest example of this is the anti-ship missile which was recently announced this month. It was announced by “experts from the Iranian Armed Forces in charge of the project” as an air-to-ship missile weighing 500 kg (presumably the whole missile, not just the warhead) and having a range of 110 km, and being radar guided. Whatever this missile is, its roughly in the same class as the Noor, although having shorter range. Some think it is just another test or variation of the Noor missile, but if this were true it would have to definitely another version due to the dramatic reduction in weight (change of 200 kg) with a similar reduction in range(change of 60 km). Logically it could just be the Noor with a smaller fuel load, leading to both a reduction in weight and range. The only purpose though would be more efficient transportation by the weapons carrying platform, most likely and F-4 or Su-24, although it could have been specifically designed for an F-5 as a normal Noor may have been thought to be too large.

Iran's Indigenous Self-Propelled Howitzer Unveiled

 

Iran has unveiled its indigenous wheeled 155-mm self-propelled howitzer developed by Defense Industries Organization.

“The 155-mm self-propelled howitzer has been designed and manufactured by the Defense Industries Organization’s creative and innovative experts with the aim of increasing the mobility of artillery units of the Iranian armed forces,” Tehran Times quoted Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi as saying.

The new weapon has increased mobility, enhanced maneuverability, longer firing range, a higher rate of fire, and lower production costs in comparison with the tracked self-propelled howitzers, the Minister said.

In the near future the artillery gun will be mass-produced and delivered to the artillery units of the Iranian armed forces, the report quoting the Minister added.

Iran Seeks to Deploy Special Forces to Yemen

Iran is seeking to deploy Iranian Special Forces in Yemen to protect its diplomats in the country, BBC Monitoring is reporting, citing a July 25 report in Baraqish, which it characterizes as a privately-owned Yemen newspaper (presumably located in the northwestern Yemen city of the same name).

According to the BBC Monitoring report, diplomatic sources (presumably from Yemen) told Baraqish that Murteza Abedi, Iran’s charge d'affaires in the Yemeni capital Sana’a, asked Yemen’s Foreign Ministry to allow it to recruit Iranian Special Forces to protect its diplomats inside the country. 

The Diplomat could not independently verify the report, which doesn’t appear to have been reported by other media outlets.

If accurate, the request came days after an administrative staff member at Iran’s embassy in Sana’a was kidnapped by armed gunmen in the Hadda neighborhood in the southwestern part of the city, near where the Iranian embassy is located.

According to Global Post, it was the first time that an Iranian had been kidnaped in Yemen, although foreigners are often kidnapped in the country by groups seeking to use them as bargaining chips with the Yemeni government.

On Friday, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, said Iran would soon send a team into Yemen to investigate the kidnapping of the staff member, whose name is Nour Ahmad Nikbakht. Similar to earlier protests by Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, Amir-Abdollahian slammed Yemen for failing to protect the Iranian embassy employee, which Salehi previously underscored is the responsibility of the host nation, according to international law.

A photo appearing on Press TV, Iran’s English-language news outlet purportedly showed a Yemen solider standing guard outside Iran’s embassy in Sana’a, although no date was given for when the photo was taken.

The BBC Monitoring report said that in making the request for Iranian Special Forces to be allowed to protect its diplomats in the country, Abedi had cited Yemen’s willingness to allow U.S. Marines to protect American diplomats as precedent.

The request, if accurate, is unlikely to be granted. Yemen and Iran have clashed over Tehran’s widely suspected support for separatist movements in the southern part of Yemen, as well as for the Houthi movement in the northern part of the country.

Iran’s alleged support for the northern-based Houthi movement is said to date back some time but has reportedly intensified greatly in recent years. The Houthis are Zayid Shi’a, the second largest Shi’a sect, which differs on significant and fundamental points from Twelver Shi’ism, the largest branch of the religion and the one most Iranians practice.

Since about 2004, the Houthis have alternated between being a legitimate political faction and being an armed insurgency fighting the government. Notably, they are located directly across the border from Saudi Arabia, prompting concern that Iran is seeking to establish a foothold alongside its regional rival by supporting the Houthis.

Despite frequent accusations that Iran is supporting the Houthis from the Saudi press and Yemen officials, it has long been disputed whether Iran is actually active in supporting the Houthis and, if so, to what extent. That being said, American intelligence officials that long dismissed the Saudi and Yemeni accusations now say that Iran does provide support for the group, according to the New York Times.

For years north and south Yemen were separate countries but they unified in 1990. Lingering hostilities have continued to simmer, however, and provoked a two-month civil war back in 1994.

In the south Iran is said to be working with Hiraaki [Southern Separatist Movement], one of the more outspoken proponents of southern secession from the Republic of Yemen.

For years north and south Yemen were separate countries but they united in 1990. Still, hostilities have continued to linger and provoked a two-month civil war back in 1994. They have intensified in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Hiraaki’s powerbase is near the Bab-al Mandab strait, a strategic chokepoint in the Persian Gulf, prompting fears that Iran hopes to use support for Hiraaki— which is a Sunni group— to gain control over Bab-al Mandab.

A June report in the Wall Street Journal quoted Qassem Askar, Hiraaki's secretary-general, as saying the group had been fracturing as of late, and that various elements deciding to seek arms and military and media training from Iran and Hezbollah, although he said senior Hiraaki officials demanded they stop doing so.

In January, Yemen’s Coast Guard intercepted a ship carrying sophisticated weapons on board, including 122 mm Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft Strella 1 and 2 missiles (Manpads), Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers, materials to make explosives and night vision goggles. Yemen officials, all the way up to the president, said the weapons had originated from Iran and accused the government in Tehran of trying to arm the Houthis and Hiraaki groups. Iran denied any involvement in the shipment.

Is Iran’s Military Visiting Pyongyang Right Now?

North Korean media is reporting that, on Thursday, Minister of North Korea’s Armed Forces Col. Gen. Jang Jong Nam met with an Iranian military delegation that was in in town to commemorate the 60-year anniversary of the armistice that ended active fighting in the Korean War. The report says that the Iranian military delegation was led by Sayed Hamidreza Tabatabaei, Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Up until very recently Tabatabaei was a Parliamentarian who served as vice-chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Furthermore, when Iran’s media reported on the trip a week ago, it said that the Iran-North Korea Parliamentary Group would be visiting Pyongyang. Finally, Kim Yong-Nam, the Chairman of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) will reportedly lead the North Korean delegation who will attend Iran’s president-elect, Hassan Rouhani’s swearing in next week. 

 

Thus, it seems that North Korea is misreporting who the delegation really is. Then again, there's that KCNA picture above that suggests differently.

Also on Thursday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began a three-day trip to Southeast Asia. In his third trip to the region since reassuming the Premiership, Abe will visit Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. “I hope I can take in the energy of the ASEAN region to achieve the economic recovery of Japan,” The Japan Times quoted Abe as saying before he leaving the airport.

In Singapore, Abe’s path seems to have crossed with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, whose wrapping up a weeklong trip to India and Singapore.

Australia’s Foreign Minister, Bob Carr began a 10-day trip to China on Thursday. “Mr. Carr will have a series of high-level meetings in China, including in Hong Kong, Sichuan, Chongqing and Fujian,” China’s People’s Online Daily reported.

According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian and Iranian media outlets are reporting that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to visit Iran in mid-August to meet with incoming President Hassan Rouhani, who takes office on August 3.

Their talks will reportedly focus on solving Iran’s standoff with the international community over its nuclear program. Some believe the S-300 air defense system Russia was supposed to sell Iran may be discussed as well. It’s possible that Putin will be the first head-of-state Rouhani hosts after his inauguration.

Outgoing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met with Putin at the beginning of this month when he was in Russia for a forum of gas-exporting nations.

Meanwhile, Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to establish a comprehensive partnership during a meeting at the White House on Thursday. The “U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership” will “provide an overarching framework for advancing the relationship,” a joint statement released after their meeting said. It also said the partnership would be based on their shared respect for the “UN Charter, international law, and each other’s political systems, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”

The U.S. and South Korea failed to bridge the gap on funding the U.S. Forces-Korea for 2013-2017 during two days of meetings in Seoul this week. They may meet again next month, according to Yonhap News Agency.