India's Indigenous Attack Helicopter HAL LCH Prototype

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HAL LCA Tejas Vs. French Dassault Rafale | MMRCA Deal Analysis

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To Counter Pakista's Nasr SRBM India Successfully Test Fires Prithvi-II Tactical SRBM (with video)

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Prithvi-I was a short-range class surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a maximum warhead capacity of 1,000 kg, ranges 150 km. It's CEP is 10-50 metres and can be launched from Transporter erector launchers. This class of Prithvi missile was inducted into the Indian Army in 1994.

Prithvi-II is also a single stage liquid-fuelled SRBM having a maximum warhead mounting capability of 500 kg, but it's range extended to 250 kilometres. It was developed with the Indian Air Force being the primary user. It was first test-fired on January 27, 1996 and the development stages were completed in 2004. This variant has been inducted in to the Army as well. In a recent test, the Missile tested with an extended range of 350 kilometres and improved Aided Inertial Navigation system. 

After a failed test on 24 September 2010 two more missiles were launched on December 22, 2010 which proved to be partially successful. A test firing on 9 June 2011 at the Interim Test Range in Chandipur was successful with the missile reaching an accuracy of better than 10 meters.

Prithvi-III (codenamed Dhanush meaning Bow) is a two-stage ship-to-surface missile. The first stage is solid fuelled with a 16 metric ton force (157 kN) thrust motor. The second stage is liquid fuelled. The missile can carry a 1,000 kg warhead to a distance of 350 km and a 500 kg warhead to a distance of 600 kilometres and a 250 kilogram warhead up to a distance of 750 kilometres. Dhanush is a system consisting of a stabilization platform (Bow) and the Missile (Arrow). 

Supposedly it is a customised version of the Prithvi and that the additional customizations in missile configuration is to certify it for sea worthiness. Dhanush has to be launched from a hydraulically stabilized launch pad. Its low range acts against it and thus it is seen a weapons either to be used to destroy an aircraft carrier or an enemy port. The missile has been tested from the surface ships many times.

Prithvi III was first tested in 2000 from INS Subhadra, 

a Sukanya class patrol craft. The missile was launched from an updated, reinforced helicopter deck of the vessel. The first flight test of the 250 km variant was 

only partially successful. The full operational testing was completed in 2004. The following year in December an enhanced 350 km version of the missile was tested from the INS Rajput and successfully hit a land based target. The missile was again successfully tested-fired from INS Subhadra anchored about 35 km offshore from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur on December 13, 2009. It was the sixth test of the missile. Up to now this missile has not been deployed largely for logistical deficiencies. 

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Analysis: End of year surge for Chengdu J-20 fighter programme

In November and December 2014 two additional prototypes of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation's (CAC) J-20 fifth-generation fighter emerged, advancing its development towards a possible initial operational capability (IOC) of 2017-18.

A view of the latest J-20 prototype, 2015, which made its maiden flight from the CAC airfield on 18 December. (Chinese internet).

The J-20 programme currently features six known prototypes. Two are early technology development articles (serial numbers 2001 and 2002) that emerged in 2009 and 2010, while four are modified versions closer to operational prototypes (serial numbers 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015) that all emerged in 2014.

No prototype numbered 2014 has yet to appear and may not, given the traditional Chinese view that four is an unlucky number.

Chinese aircraft spotters responsible for early internet photos report that the latest J-20 prototype, 2015, made its maiden flight from the CAC airfield on 18 December.

hinese aircraft spotters responsible for early internet photos report that the latest prototypes, 2013 and 2015, made their maiden flights from the CAC airfield on 29 November and 18 December 2014 respectively.

Both have most of the refinements seen on aircraft 2011, which emerged in February 2014: cropped canards and vertical stabilisers, a modified air intake, modified wing leading-edge extensions, and a new electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) under the nose.

However, 2013 and 2015 lack the nose-mounted pitot tubes that featured on the earlier prototypes. In addition, number 2015 has longer and sharper-shaped rear-fuselage horizontal strakes. Although this aft surface does not appear to be movable, it may contribute to aircraft stability, as a similar - though movable - surface did for the Grumman X-29 technology demonstrator.

A detail of the strakes on the latest J-20 prototype, 2015. (Chinese internet).

Early internet-sourced images have also emerged of the J-20's retractable refuelling probe, placed on the upper starboard of the nose. The development status of an indigenous Chinese turbofan for the J-20, often referred to as the WS-15, remains unknown. There is speculation that early J-20 examples may use a version of the Russian Saturn AL-31 turbofan.

In April 2014 an Asian government source told IHS Jane's that China would have 24 J-20s by 2020, which if realised, could constitute a first operational regiment. This would indicate that IOC may occur in the 2017-18 timeframe.

Source: Janes

Updated LCA Tejas Mk.2: Infographics

A schematic info-graphs of Tejas, here, shows what features will be includes in the upgraded version Mark-II. First flight target 2017:

India Has No Plan To Join Or Buy The US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Programme

India has no plans as of now to either join the US-led joint strike fighter (JSF) programme or buy the F-35 `Lightning-II' fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) when it finally becomes operational. "We cannot have two types of FGFA. We have already launched preliminary work for our FGFA after inking the $295 million preliminary design contract (PDC) with Russia last month,'' said a top defence ministry official on Friday. 

This comes in the wake of comments made by a top Pentagon official, undersecretary of defence for acquisition, technology and logistics Ashton Carter, in Washington that the US was open to Indian participation in its JSF project. Interestingly, the comments came during a function where an aggressive sales pitch was made for India to select either the American F/A-18 `Super Hornet' ( Boeing) or F-16 `Falcon' ( Lockheed Martin) over their European rivals in the ongoing IAF's medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contest. 

The other 4.5-generation fighters in the hotly-contested race to bag the $10.4 billion MMRCA project, under which 18 jets will be bought off-the-shelf and another 108 will be manufactured in India under transfer of technology, are Eurofighter Typhoon, Swedish Gripen (Saab), French Rafale (Dassault) and Russian MiG-35 (United Aircraft Corporation). The IAF force matrix for the coming years revolves around the 270 Sukhoi-30MKIs contracted from Russia for around $12 billion, the 126 MMRCA and 120 indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, apart from upgraded MiG-29s and Mirage-2000s. In the decades ahead, the advanced stealth FGFA to be developed with Russia will be the mainstay of India's combat fleet. "Our FGFA will be cheaper than the F-35. Moreover, the intellectual property rights of the FGFA will equally and jointly vest on both India and Russia, with full access to the source code and the like,'' said another senior official. 

With a potent mix of super-manoeuvrability and supersonic cruising ability, the "swing-role'' FGFA will of course not come cheap. The cost of designing, infrastructure build-up, prototype development and flight testing has been pegged at around $11 billion, with India and Russia chipping in with $5.5 billion each. Over and above this, each of the 250-300 FGFA India hopes to begin inducting from 2020 onwards will cost around $100 million each. In all, India will spend upwards of $35 billion over the next two decades in its biggest-ever defence project till now. 

The Indian FGFA will primarily be based on the single-seater Sukhoi T-50, the prototype of which is already flying in Russia, but will include a twin-seater version and a more powerful engine with greater thrust. "Its complete design will be frozen by the end of the 18-month PDC. Six to seven of its prototypes should be flying by 2017. After that, there will be 2,500 hours of flight-testing over 25 months before the series production begins in 2019,'' he said.

Countering IAFs 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft

In the next decade all Air Forces are focusing on the Stealth Technology available in the 5th Gen aircraft. The IAF burnt by colossal failures with reference to indigenous aircraft and engine manufacturing was left with a huge gap. It has tried to fill the void which was left by the inability of the IAF to produce the LCA. That void is being filled by three level of purchases, the MCRC, the purchase of Russian PAKFA (called FGFA in Bharat) and possible direct purchase of aircraft from the US.

Within the next quarter century, the IAF is projected to have many 5th generation fighter aircraft. The Chinese Ari Force is Light Years ahead and faces no threat from Delhi. The PAF has taken note of the IAF numbers and is taking appropriate measures to deal with the situation.

 

The IAF in 2025 will have the PAKFA in service, provided the Russians can produce the aircraft and provided that they are not another generation of Flying Coffins.

The PAF Countermeasures are as follows:

1. Begin the slow progress of mastering the technology so that it can be inculcated into existing Aircraft.
2. Jointly design and build Aircraft with China with approach 5th generation and beyond.
3. Purchase US aircraft with a bit older technology, and then upgrade those aircraft at lesser cost.
4. Work with Indonesia, and Turkey in developing local military technologies to counter the threats.
5. Use less expensive ways to deal with the incoming threat.
6. Bank on Missiles to counter the threat.
7. Bring incremental improvement to the JF-17 Thunder in Blcoks of fifty. This will keep the JF-17 thunder infused the latest technology for the next fifty years.
8. Start production of the FC-20s based on the J-10B and work with the Chinese on the production of the J-11s.
9. Enhance the UAV technology to the next level and design and produce Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs),
10. One expensive option is to build X-47 Pegasus class, to counter India’s military aviation threat to Pakistan.
11. Work with the Chinese to jontly build the WS-13 engine so that it can be used on the UCAV’s.
12. Continue development of the Babur Cruise missile and use to to build UCAV’s.
13. This mixture of response will not only be a potent defense against the IAF, but it will be eliminate the attempt of the IAF to intimidate Pakistan.

The first UCAV’s were autonomous cruise missiles, something that the U.S. and Germany have been fielding since the 1940′s. In Europe, several UCAV’s are known as robotic warplanes ( the Neuron, the Barrakuda and the Corax) are under development. These UACV concepts had their origins in the US,  and Europe wants to remain competitive with the American Aviation industry. All the programs have stealth features playing in the same league as the American J-UCAS (Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System). The US  program includes the Boeing X45C and the Northrop Grumman X47B Pegasus . These European projects are the first foreign competitors for the American UCAV.

 

These major UCAV’ systems are in play:

1. The six nation $480 million European effort has a produced a flying prototype.
2. The joint German-Spanish, Swiss, Barrakuda conducted its first taxi tests on the 26 January 2006.
3. The British Corax UACV. The UK perceives the Joint Strike Fighter as the last manned platform for its Air Force, which will eventually replaced by an UCAV. The Corax, which undertook its maiden flight already in 2004.
4. China is making UCAV by adopting the old F-7 designs. China is using the J-6 and J-7 into target drones. Pakistan which already has the old F-7s can to this cheaply.

The UACVs have the following advantage:

• Greater maneuverability – in modern day fighter aircraft human tolerance is the limiting factor for the number of g forces the plane can pool during rapid manoeuvres, with UACV this bottleneck is eliminated so they can be very manoeuvrable indeed.
• Less weight – this can affect many things like endurance time, acceleration, payload and so on. One or two pilots and all the stuff you put in the cockpit can weight quite a bit.
• Better aerodynamics – you don’t need the cockpit canopy.
  Situational awareness – as Clerik said you can create very good virtual cockpit on ground that is superior to anything you can fit in an aircraft. SA is most important for air superiority missions, I think, and as air-to-air battles are pushed to BWR there is no benefit of having your Mark I eyeball on the actual aircraft.
  No crew fatigue – on the ground pilots can control their UACVs in greater comfort and rotate during mission.
• Lower price – often the flying unit can be made cheaper. All that fancy plane-human interface gear, life support, ejection seats and whatnot costs big $, but in case of UACV you only need the plane-human interface part and with that it is one for many planes and can bee cheaper as it doesn’t have to endure all the stresses and such. You need gear for communicating with UACVs instead, but some means of communication are already in place, so no big change there.
• Pilots are out of harms way – UACVs will save pilots lives. Pilot is very expensive to train and hard to replace quickly.
• Long Range Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Combat
• Short Range within Visual Range Combat:
• Low Costs:
• Quantity versus Quality:
• Kamikaze possibilities

The Disadvantages of UCAVs

• Tackling the Problem of Jamming:
• Human Element
• Lag – radio communications can travel only so quickly but reaction time is critical for air engagements.
  Single point of failure – if the enemy takes out the command centre, all the UCAV’ are neutralized too.

Those who espouse following the C-47 route for the PAF are living in a fools paradise. The US will not share that technology with Pakistan and it will be too expensive for the PAF. The best route for the PAF will be to work with the Chinese and the Europeans to develop these unmanned systems.

LCA Tejas: An Indian Fighter – With Foreign Help

India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens an opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.

A Glimpse of LCA Tejas (Some informative Views)