LEAKED Clips Of US Military SECRET WEAPONS

DEADLY FUTURE ATTACK Helicopter of US Military Boeing Sikorsky SB-1 Defiant

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FUTURE WEAPONS Program Concepts of US Military | Full HD

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FUTURE WEAPONS - How & Why Military Combat Robots Are The Future of Battle

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Phalanx Close-in Weapon System Neutralizes Incoming Threats!!

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American Silent Killer | Ohio Class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarines

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Look What Can A Cluster Bomb Do | U.S. Air Force SFW™ CBU-105 Cluster Bomb

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The SFW CBU-105

Textron Systems’ Sensor Fuzed Weapon, SFW™, is a highly effective air-delivered area weapon designed to defeat a wide range of moving and fixed targets on land, at sea and in littoral environments. One SFW can neutralize many targets and do so nearly real time, leaving no evasion time for the adversary. It’s been integrated onto a number of United States and Allied Forces fighter and bomber platforms.

The SFW CBU-105 D/B system exceeds very tight U.S. Department of Defense policy on munitions systems by regulating unexploded ordnance (UXO) to less than one percent. SFW has demonstrated greater than 99 percent reliability by the verified performance in operational testing. Features of this weapon system, combined with self-destruct and self-neutralization, ensure virtually no UXO.

BLU-108 SUBMUNITION

The SFW composed of 10 BLU-108 Submunitions that each carry four Skeet projectile warheads, while every smart Skeets are equipped with dual-mode passive infrareds (IR) and active laser sensors. The BLU-108 Submunitions is capable of integration into other weapons systems for precise engagements of multiple targets.

Once deployed, each smart Skeet warheads sweeps for targets using the IR sensor to identify a thermal signature, while the laser sensor validates the target profile for improved aim point and lethality. When a valid target is detected, the warhead explodes which is a copper explosive.

                                     
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U.S. Navy X-47B UCAS-D Successful Aerial Refuelling Test: Video Compilation

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Under United States Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveilance and Strike system or UCLASS program, the X-47B of Navy had acomplished the tests. Navy's UCAS-D's carrier flight tests and aerial refuelling tests from the USS Theodore Roosevelt which is known also as CVN-71 was very successful. This aircraft and the ground control systems along with all other systems developed by the Northrop Grummen. Through the extensive flight tests Navy expecting the system's operational induction during 2020 time frame.

Aerial refueling tests of X-47B enhances the opportunities of the Navy to reduce manned aircrafts in the battle field. X-47B conducts it's Autonomous Aerial Refuelling from an Omega Tanker! 

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U.S. Navy X-47B UCAS-D First Touch & Go Landing Tests On USS George H.W. Bush CVN-77 (Video)

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On Friday May 17, the US Navy's X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator took another historic step as it conducted its first touch-and-go landings on the nuclear aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush off the coast of Virginia. This maneuver is a critical achievement in the Navy’s program to develop an autonomous, unmanned, jet-powered combat aircraft capable for operating from a carrier.

A touch-and-go landing is where an aircraft touches its wheels to a runway or flight deck, but does not come to a full stop. Instead, it throttles up and takes off again. Several high end take-off and laning tests were took for the full evaluation of X-47B's carrier operations. These experimental tests helps to improve set up UCS-D's future operational guidelines to elevate proper mission planing.

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U S Navy X 47B UCAV's Land Based Flight Test Before Carrier Test Flight

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The Northrop Grumman X-47B  is a technology demonstrator unmanned combat air vehicle designed for aircraft carrier-based operations. Its been developed by the Northrop Grumman. The X-47 program began as part of DARPA's J-UCAS program, and U.S. Navy integrated it as it's Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration program. 

The X-47B is a fyling-wing body aircraft powered by 1 Pratt & Whitney F100-220U turbofan engine capable of semi-autonomous operation & aerial refuelling.

In 2011 X-47B first flew, and then in 2015. There are two active demonstrators have undergone extensive flight & operational integration testing. This prestigious bird successfully performed a series of land & carrier-based flight demonstrations In August 2014. US Navy had integrated the X-47B into carrier operations alongside manned aircraft and by May 2015 the aircraft's primary test program was declared complete, had been announced by the Navy.

Northrop Grumman intends to develop the prototype X-47B into a battlefield-ready aircraft, the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system or UCLASS, which will enter service in the 2020s.

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The Navy's Yellow Submarine is About to Sail — But No One Lives There

The Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, an experimental sub built by the Office of Naval Research, is set for a sea voyage in 2016 from San Francisco to San Diego.

ARLINGTON, Va. (April 7, 2015): First publicly released photo of ONR's Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle - Innovative Naval Prototype (LDUUV-INP). The LDUUV-INP technologies will develop enhanced capabilities in endurance, energy, and autonomy. (Photo credit Office of Naval Research/Released).

The drone sub is ONR's attempt to crack a persistent problem in the development of underwater drones: the ability to operate autonomously underwater for a long time, using its sensors, while navigating safely. The head of ONR, Rear Adm. Mat Winter, told a crowd on the exhibition floor at the Sea-Air-Space Expo that the drone, which the Navy will start acquiring this year, can already operate for up to 30 days, but the goals are much loftier.

"I'm talking power generation, fuel and battery technology, that can approach months and years of underwater domain activity," Winter said.

The Navy eventually wants to use the Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle for a range of missions, from underwater reconnaissance and mine countermeasures to launching aerial drones for surface reconnaissance.

But that's something the Navy is still figuring out. The test platform on display at Sea-Air-Space is being run on a number of types of fuel cells and power generation constructs as they work up extending the underwater time, he said.

Winter said getting the LDUUV's longevity up — along with keeping it from bumping into underwater obstacles, from submerged mountains to fishing nets — are the goals for the program.

"We're doing various [test] runs to understand the best configuration, best chemical reaction configuration, and fuel cell technology ... ONR scientists are really making some groundbreaking headway on that."

Those capabilities will be put to a big test next summer, Winter said.

The Navy has a grandiose vision for the LDUUV. According to recent requirements documents posted on the federal contracting database FedBizOps, the Navy ultimately wants to use the LDUUV for a range of missions from underwater reconnaissance and mine countermeasures to launching aerial drones for surface reconnaissance.

The LDUUV is being designed to launch from a Virginia-class submarine's torpedo tube, a littoral combat ship or a dry dock shelter, according to the requirements.

The LDUUV would help backfill demands from combatant commanders for attack submarine intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, said a retired submarine captain and UUV expert who spoke on background.

"When [Adm. Gary] Roughead was CNO he tasked ONR with creating a UUV that could do 'real misions,' " the source said. "An SSN can go out for 45 to 60 days at a time, so that's what ONR is trying to do."

The source said the Navy needs to have realistic expectations of what these drones can accomplish, given the complexities of navigating underwater autonomously, the severe limitation on data transmission between the sub and its controllers while submerged, and the difficulty of creating enough power from either fuel cells or batteries to keep the sub operating over long periods of time.

One option the Navy is exploring, the source said, is creating a network of underwater data transmission stations, like telephone booths, that the sub could navigate to and upload data from its sensors at a high data transmission rate.

But all of that comes later, the source said, because right now the focus is just getting LDUUV to operate without bumping into things.

"Right now they are trying to just build the truck," the source said. "What they load onto it, that comes later."

US Navy: More Can Be Done If Risks Are Accepted

The effort to put more weapons on more ships and find more ways to attack an enemy — and get it done in a timely manner — is key to “distributed lethality,” a concept being championed by Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, the US Navy’s commander of surface forces.

A Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile was fired from a US Navy littoral combat ship in September 2014. The Norweigan-built missile, along with the US-made Harpoon, is being fitted to LCSs without first going through a rigorous testing program.

But an ancient obstacle remains: bureaucracy. And it’s no secret that Navy officials have chafed under competing requirements to identify and field new capabilities faster while complying with layers of evaluation and testing authorities that often slow things up.

“How do we deliver the capabilities going forward, what does it take to do that?” John Burrow, the Navy’s top civilian official for research, test and evaluation, asked a professional audience in Washington on Tuesday. “It takes investment, a willingness to take on risk, a willingness to fail.”

Efforts that fail in their immediate goals can still provide information, Burrow noted.

“I’ve never seen a project that we pushed forward that even if we didn’t deliver a capability, that we learned a lot from,” he said to an audience at an American Society of Naval Engineers symposium. “From an engineering point of view — a science point of view — if we don’t push the envelope, take it to the outer edge, we’re not going to achieve the capabilities we need.”

Without pointing to specific entities, Burrow decried critics who focus on defects.

“We need to be willing to go off road, to change direction,” he said, noting that it’s not always apparent at the beginning of a program what eventually will be needed.

“I don’t think we can get a group of people to deliver a requirements package that’s perfect,” he said, “and then at the end we have trouble with cost and schedule. I submit that with that linear process, we shouldn’t be surprised that we have problems at the end.”

A recent demonstration by the Russians in launching cruise missiles from small warships in the Caspian Sea to strike targets about 1,000 miles away in Syria is widely seen as an example of distributed lethality.

Rear Adm. Pete Fanta, the director of surface warfare at the Pentagon, was blunt in responding to a question about why the US can’t seem to field similar capabilities in a timely manner.

“We can get there, but get the hell out of my way,” Fanta declared, speaking to the bureaucratic obstacles. “I can get there fast, I can get with the same capability, I can get it on the ships, but I can’t do it in a risk-averse, fear-centric organization.

“That’s not you folks,” he said to the civilians in the room, “that’s us wearing the uniform. I’m willing to go be the chew toy for Congress if I fail. You let me go try it, I’ll go do it. You let me bolt it on, I’ll take the risk. I’ll find a [commanding officer] out there that’s willing to point it in a direction and fire it” and understand the risks.

“I can’t do it in an organization that spends three times as much on proving it might or might not work perfectly every single time, as I can if I just go do it. Every success we’ve had we just went and did. Every major failure we’ve had has been an opinion on the level of failure by someone else.

That may be a little too blunt, but it’s the truth,” Fanta said. “We need to get out of this risk-averse culture.”

Fanta was asked if the Navy is developing a new long-range anti-ship missile.

“We still have a requirement for a Tomahawk cruise missile to attack surface ships sitting on the books. In fact it’s been reiterated for the past 15 years,” Fanta noted.

The Navy in the 1980s developed an active radar-homing anti-ship version of the Tomahawk land-attack weapon, but dropped it in the 1990s.

“We know what Tomahawk is capable of,” Fanta said. “The reason we got rid of it was because our sensors were not long-range enough to keep up with the range of Tomahawk.

Now, he noted, “our sensors have evolved to where we can track and target things out to the range of Tomahawk. So now we have a need for something Tomahawk-esque to reach out that far.”

“We’re talking about evolving the capabilities that we have,” he said. “I got a great truck” — the Tomahawk. “It’s a big missile, it’s sitting inside my [vertical launch system] cells right now. What other things can we put on it or make it do, whether with a seeker, without a seeker, dumb seekers, smart sensors? We’re looking at all of that.

“This missile is going to be around until the mid-2040s,” Fanta noted. “I think I better figure out more things to do with it than just hit a spot on the beach.”

Submarines: Underwater Game Changers

The United States builds, arguably, the world’s most capable submarines. But at about $2 billion apiece, there are only so many subs the US Navy will acquire, and it’s widely recognized the supply will never meet the demand.

Meanwhile, building and acquiring modern submarines is a worldwide growth industry. Russia, China and even India are designing and building multiple new classes of subs, armed and fit with a growing variety of weapons and sensors — and a number of nations are building or purchasing foreign-designed undersea craft.

Retired Vice Adm. Michael Connor, a former commander of the US Navy’s submarine forces, explained this activity in a recent hearing on Capitol Hill.

“The undersea arena is the most opaque of all warfighting domains,” Connor said during an Oct. 27 hearingat the House Seapower subcommittee. “It is easier to track a small object in space than it is to track a large submarine, with tremendous fire power under the water. That is why countries with the technical wherewithal to operate in this domain are pursuing advanced capability. The two countries that present the biggest challenge in the undersea are Russia and China, with Russia being the more capable of the two.”

Rather than simply building more submarines, Connor and others are urging more sustained development of weapons and sensors to increase the power of US undersea forces. Among Connor’s top recommendations is the desire to extend the striking range of submarine-launched weapons.

“This multiplies the impact of each submarine and multiplies the search challenge that each submarine presents to a potential foe,” he said.

Connor specifically wants torpedoes with ranges of more than 100 miles.

“This is definitely doable with chemical-based propulsion systems and will likely soon be achievable with battery systems,” he said. Such a range also will need better command-and-control systems, including the ability to communicate with the torpedo, perhaps via manned or unmanned aircraft or by satellite, he said.

“The torpedo will come to be considered along the line of a slow-moving missile,” he said, “with the advantage that it is more difficult to detect, carries a much larger explosive charge and strikes the enemy beneath the waterline, where the impact is most severe.”

Connor also wants the US “to get back into the business of submarine-launched anti-ship missiles” with the ability to “confidently attack a specific target at sea at a range of about 1,000 miles. We should be pursuing this more aggressively than we are.”

Connor also wants better and more-capable undersea vehicles.

“We need to improve the endurance of the vehicles, expand the payload set, and get to the point where any submarine can recover the mission data, if not the vehicle. We need to do this while keeping the cost of the vehicle down. The cost should be low enough such that, while we would always like to get the vehicles back, it is not a crisis if we don’t. The value is in the data, not the vehicle.”

Bryan Clark, a naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, appeared alongside Connor and urged greater development in undersea sensors — onboard submarines, unmanned vehicles and weapons, as well as deployed in the water and fixed on the seabed.

To coordinate the development and fielding of underwater systems, Clark said the Navy should “make its undersea warfare resource sponsor and acquisition organizations responsible for all undersea vehicles and systems once they transition out of research and development.”

Clark urged continued development in a wide range of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), including looking at ways to arm some. He pointed to the compact, very lightweight torpedo — now under development — as having potential not only as a defensive, anti-torpedo weapon but also as a weapon that could be carried and launched by larger UUVs.

Connor and Clark said Congress could aid these efforts by providing funding not tied to specific programs of record. “Programs should be defined broadly so that they can incorporate innovation without recreating the program,” Connor said.

The failure of some efforts, he said, should not necessarily be taken as a negative thing. He said Silicon Valley failure rates sometimes approach 90 percent.

“If we are innovating aggressively enough, perhaps half of our initiatives will fail,” he said.

Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., chairman of the subcommittee, agreed with many of the recommendations.

“There’s a recognition that if we’re going to keep up with undersea dominance, it’s not just about creating more platforms, but we have to create relatively sophisticated systems of systems with the ability to multiply capability but not just adding a platform,” he said in a post-hearing interview.

“We can create a platform to last 20, 30, 40 years,” he said, noting that many systems will be developed over that time. “So it’s important to find the process or architecture to create innovation and put it out in three to four year cycles.

“What I’m excited about,” he said, “is we’ve got people in the Pentagon, the private sector and in policy sectors who understand this and can create partnerships to actually get them done.”

USAF, US Navy Seeks for Joint Development of Sixth-Generation Unmanned Fighter

Navy and Air Force developers are immersed in early conceptual work on a new, sixth-generation fighter aircraft designed with breakthrough technologies and an ability to perform for both manned and unmanned missions.

Few details are available about the new aircraft, called F/A-XX by the Navy, because the early work is at this point purely conceptual, said Rear Adm. Michael Manazir, Director of Air Warfare.

"There is an opportunity to field an unmanned system in the F/A XX program. We are collaborating with the Air Force on the technologies that would be required to operate an air system that gives us enhanced capabilities in the future," Manazir told reporters June 15.

Air Force senior leaders tell Military.com they are working closely with the Navy on future technologies but do not yet have a platform identified.

"We are actively engaged with the Navy on the capabilities required to achieve air superiority to 2030 and beyond. As always, we’ll need the capability to sense and characterize the battlespace, then command and control platforms and weapons, all while surviving. As of right now, that does not translate to a next-gen fighter," Maj. Gen. Paul Johnson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Requirements, Air Force said in a statement.

The new aircraft will, at least in part, replace the existing inventory ofF/A-18 Super Hornets which will start to retire by 2035, Manazir said.

The Navy vision for a future carrier air wing in 2040 and beyond is comprised of the carrier-launched variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C, as the legacy aircraft alongside the EA-18G Growler electronic jamming aircraft and the yet-to-be built Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike platform, or UCLASS, a carrier-launched drone slated to arrive by 2025. 

Also, around this time is when Navy planners envision its F/A-XX aircraft to be ready, an aircraft which will likely be engineered for both manned and unmanned missions.

"Technologies are rapidly advancing in coatings, electromagnetic spectrum issues, maneuvering, superiority in sensing the battlespace, communications and data links. We are looking at the way in which you integrate these into platforms into the future. Lots of things are starting to come to the fore, but it is as amorphous as it sounds," Manazir added. 

Manazir also added that the Navy is likely to develop new carrier-launched unmanned air vehicles other than UCLASS in coming years as well.

Analysts have speculated that as Navy F/A-XX developers seek to engineer a sixth-generation aircraft, they will likely explore a range of next-generation technologies such as maximum sensor connectivity, super cruise ability and an aircraft with electronically configured "smart skins."

Maximum connectivity would mean massively increased communications and sensor technology such as having an ability to achieve real-time connectivity with satellites, other aircraft and anything that could provide relevant battlefield information, said Richard Aboulafia, vice-president of analysis at the Teal Group, a Va.-based consultancy.

Hypersonic Scramjets

The new aircraft might also seek to develop the ability to fire hypersonic weapons, however such a development would hinge upon successful progress with yet-to-be-proven technologies such as scramjets, Aboulafia added.

Super cruise technology would enable the new fighter jet to cruise at supersonic speeds without needing afterburner, he explained.

Smart aircraft skins would involve dispersing certain technologies or sensors across the fuselage and further integrating them into the aircraft itself, Aboulafia said.

"Smart skins with distributed electronics means that instead of having systems mounted on the aircraft, you would have apertures integrated on the skin of the aircraft," he said.

This could reduce drag, increase speed and maneuverability while increasing the technological ability of the sensors.

Source: Military.com

Is it possible to fly 4 helicopters anywhere in a country without official knowledge?

If a helicopter is flying low, and not "squawking", there is no way that any civilian radar will pick it up. Especially in a mountainous region such as Pakistan. Simple mechanics of radar as illustrated by this picture from Answers.com. Note that mountains between the radar site and aircraft will further block the ability of the radar to detect an aircraft.

 

Keep in mind that if they can't be seen, they can't get shot at either. And these are some of the best helicopter pilots on the planet. Most radars are unable to detect anything flying contours, but I would wager that for part of this they were flying nap of the earth. The below image is taken from the Global Security Website (the exact image is from Figure 28 on this page) where they discuss many modes of flight for helicopter safety from enemy fire.

Even larger aircraft like the FB-111 would use this technique to avoid detection without the need for stealth technology.

So even though the airspace is monitored, if they can't be seen, it doesn't matter. Also, I don't think this was "allowed" or "disallowed" by the Pakistani government. Some covert operations are carried out, and then back-briefed if the target (such as Osama bin Laden) is important enough.

ADDED INFO:

Now, several folks have asked about the helicopters used, and some of their performance characteristics. The most likely aircraft (as reported in a couple of other answers as well) is the MH-60 Pave Hawk (a Blackhawk variant modified for special operations). Again, to quote Global Security, the performance characteristics are:

Primary Function Infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces in day, night or marginal weather conditions.

Power Plant Two General Electric T700-GE-01C engines

Thrust 1,630 shaft horsepower, each engine

Length 64 feet, 8 inches (17.1 meters)

Height 16 feet, 8 inches (4.4 meters)

Rotary Diameter 53 feet, 7 inches (14.1 meters)

Speed 184 mph (294.4 kph)

Maximum Takeoff Weight 22,000 pounds (9,900 kilograms)

Range 445 nautical miles; 504 statute miles (unlimited with air refueling)

Armament Two 7.62mm mini-guns

Crew Two pilots, one flight engineer and one gunner

In particular, note that these aircraft are mid-air refulable from a KC-130 (NOT KC-135), thus they have a nearly unlimited range. I highly doubt that they took off from anywhere inside Pakistan (i.e. Ghazi) but rather originated in Afghanistan. I cannot say where exactly though, but no matter where they took off from, if they received refueling prior to entering Pakistan, the range is more than adequate to get to Abbottabad and back on one tank of gas (looking at google maps, it appears that the distance is less than 350 KM from Kabul, or about 200 miles). So a little less than 400 mile round trip, at about 200 MPH would be about 2 hours total (add in the actual assault and there you have your timeline). These figures are approximate though because things change with load-out and other configurations. These aircraft would probably have flown in a formation that would probably helped to disguise their true numbers.

Someone mentioned that ATC must have a squawk to paint these aircraft. That is overstated, however as previously mentioned, they were probably well below the radar, and aided by the mountainous terrain. Add in they were most likely using EMCON 4 procedures, and then it would be even more difficult to pick them up by any means. As the cited article also mentioned, the noise reduction and additional radar absorbent paint just added to the stealthiness of these aircraft (as if SPEC OPS flight patterns were not enough).

And thanks to Kit Sunde, we have further info: Here's Pakistan denying having known about the raid http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13268517 which also states: "US helicopters entered Pakistani airspace making use of blind spots in the radar coverage due to hilly terrain."

Source: skeptics.stackexchange.com

RIMPAC 2014 group photos, this time PLAN was there!

Can you spot the PLAN boats in those photos?

Comparing Type 056 to LCS

This is a comparative analytical article from Chinese Internet Source:

With the recent induction of 056, a lot of comparison has been made between 056 and LCS. The comparisons are understandable. Both are just entering services. Both are expected to be built in large numbers and are also considered to be the lower end ships of their respective navy. 

Type056 and Type 054A Comparison

In many ways, their comparison stops there, because Type 054A would be more comparable to LCS just based on the size and dimensions of the ships. 

PLAN Type 054A+ Jiangkai Class AAW Frigate

I want to break this down to two sections: 

The differences in capabilities/cost between the two classes of ships and what that tells us about the two navies.

General Dynamics LCS's Cutaway

First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters. 056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters. 

For ASW role, Type 056 carries one Harbin Z-9C Helo

It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy. With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters. On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters. USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters. For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect. 

 Current Core Mission and Combat System

At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighboring country. While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen. You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.

LCS Corrosion Protection

As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship. Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip. That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A. Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller. 

Main Gun of Type 056

My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each). The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time. If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships. Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.

Systems & Sub-Systems of Type 056:

The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies. I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053). Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships. I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN. Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor. Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056.

It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS. As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out. The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.

Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships. LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages. I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind. Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW. At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy. It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not. LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system. Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system. I think this shows the background of both navies. 

Focusing Features of USN LCS:

USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays. In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding. So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next. Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet. As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM. PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization. It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.