Future Force | U.S. Navy Laser Weapon System LaWS

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Stealth Destroyer U.S. Navy 'USS Zumwalt DDG-1000'

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China's Island Reclaimation In The South China Sea (Video)

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Russian Fighter Manuevers Dangerously To Scar U.S. Navy Ship USS Donald Cook In Baltic Sea

Russian Air Force's two fighter jets made too close maneuvering near of the USS Donald Cook, sailing in the Baltic Sea.

The Cook “encountered multiple, aggressive flight overflights the by Russian aircrafts that were performed within close proximity of the ship,” according to a statement by EuroCom.

“We have deep concerns about the unsafe and unprofessional Russian flight maneuvers,” the statement said.

One of the Russian jets flew within 75 feet of the Cook’s ship superstructure.

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Iran Captured Two U.S. Navy Riverine Patrol Boat Near It's Farsi Island, Detained 10 USN Sailors

Two US Navy riverine patrol boats captured by Iranian Navy (IRGC) and Ten sailors were detained. Though Iranian authority had originally told the US that the sailors would be returned promptly, but later soldiers had to spent a night in Iran, media reports. Iran say to return the sailors to the Navy today (Wednesday) morning, a US defense official told to the media.

This type of U.S. Navy Riverine Command Patrol Boats were captured by Iranian Navy near Farsi Island in Parsian Gulf.

A senior administration official confirmed earlier they lost contact with two small US naval craft en route from Kuwait to Bahrain and claimed the drift of those two boats into Iranian waters as a mechanical defect. The official further said "We subsequently have been in communication with Iranian authorities, who have informed us of the safety and well-being of our personnel. We have received assurances the sailors will promptly be allowed to continue their journey." Another senior US administration official told CNN that there's nothing to indicate anything hostile on the part of Iran. Administration officials also reportedly said that releasing the sailors at night would be "unsafe."

Though, later, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the 10 American sailors, who are now being held at an IRGC naval base on Farsi Island in the Persian Gulf. The semiofficial Fars news agency in Iran said that members of the elite IRGC had confiscated GPS equipment from the boats for the due check whether this drift of US Navy boats were a unintentional technical fault or deliberate sneak-peak. And as per news agency IRGC officials iterates that the data from the equipment would "prove that the American ships [were] 'snooping' around in Iranian waters."

Satellite map

Ben Rhodes, the White House's deputy national security adviser, told reporters that the US is "working to resolve the situation such that any US personnel are returned to their normal deployment." According to a senior US official told the media that US Secretary of State John Kerry immediately called Iran's minister of foreign affairs, Javad Zarif, upon learning of the incident at around 12:30 p.m. EST. Kerry "personally engaged with Zarif on this issue to try to get to this outcome," the official said.

The latest incident comes on the heels of Iran's rocket test in late December near US warships and boats passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The incident also comes hours before US President Barack Obama is due to give his final State of the Union address before Congress. This is not the first time Iran has detained Western navy sailors operating in or near Iranian waters. In 2004, 15 British Royal Navy personnel from a training team based in southern Iraq were detained while delivering a boat from Umm Qsar to Basra, then The Telegraph reported.

Class overview and general characteristics of the "Type 055 Advanced Destroyer" of PLAN!

 

Source: Wikipedia

The Type 055 Destroyer: A True Multi-Role Surface Combatant For Peoples Liberation Army Navy

The Type 055 destroyer is a class of guided missile destroyers being developed in China for the People's Liberation Army Navy Surface Force. There have been two versions of the Type 055, the first one was a much earlier proposed destroyer design that was eventually cancelled, and the other is a modern design using the same "Type 055" designation according to many internet claims, which has yet to be verified by official or independent sources.

Computer Generated Graphics of Type 055 destroyer.

The Type 055 was originally a proposed project in the late 1960s order titled “Recommendations on Building Oceanic Escort Ships”, but its progress was seriously delayed due to political turmoil in China at the time, namely, the Cultural Revolution. It was not until more than half a decade later in 1976, the year the Cultural Revolution ended, was the requirement of the ship finally completed and issued. At the time of its appearance until its final cancellation, the Type 055 was the second air defence ship of PLAN, after the Type 053K Jiangdong class frigate. The standard displacement of Type 055 design was in excess of 8000 tons.

Even as the requirement was completed, it was flawed with unrealistic standards that were way beyond the scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities of China at the time due to the influence of the Cultural Revolution. For example, the sea-keeping requirement mandated that the ship should be able to navigate anywhere in the world except polar regions, but this conflicted with combat requirement: China lacked the capability to develop any multifunctional radar, so separate radars were needed for different tasks. The Type 518 radar was needed for long range early warning / surveillance, the Type 381 radar was needed for 3-D air search / track, and each gun and missile needed its own fire control radars. In addition, there was need for navigation, surface search, and helicopter control radars as well. The Type 518 radar itself would effectively negate any possibility of meeting the sea-keeping requirement because its antenna of 8.5 meter diameter weighed 4.5 ton, and must be installed on a mast of at least 25 meters, thus severely restricting wind scale and sea state allowed for safe navigation of the ship. However, reducing the weight of radar antenna would lead to the great decrease in performance, thus not meeting the combat effectiveness requirement.

The problem is further exasperated by the problem of the ship being top heavy: due to the fact each electronic system was single function only, numerous of them were needed to meet the original requirement, resulting in a total of 22 radars and 33 communication gears, which in addition to heavy weight, also generated the problem of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) problem, so bad was the EMC problem that the missile control system could not function properly when everything was turned on, potentially causing missiles to be accidentally launched.

After the Cultural Revolution ended, the strenuous design requirements of the Type 055 that was settled during the Cultural Revolution went through re-evaluation, as with most projects of that period, and difficulties revealed in the design requirement review caused the criteria to be drastically revised and scaled back. There was later a modernisation plan to adopt British subsystems including combat data system, Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and Rolls-Royce Olympus TM3B high-speed gas turbines propulsion system used on the Type 42 destroyer. However efforts to incorporate British systems did not materialize, and just like the Type 051S destroyer, the Type 055 project was finally cancelled in the early 1980s, under the order of then commander of PLAN Liu Huaqing.

Since late 2012, Chinese internet websites circulated discussion of a new class of PLAN destroyers was being designed as the successor of the highly successful Type 052D destroyer, using the same "Type 055" designation as the cancelled project from the 1960s.

Photos appearing on Chinese websites in 2014, revealed that a Type 055 shore integration facility was being constructed at the Ship Design and Research Center (701 Institute) of CSIC at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology. The mock-up facility has been extensively used for testing of electronics and systems for the destroyer program, and shown to be integrated with a Type 346/348 series radar and an enclosed mast similar to Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor on European ships. There is speculation that the Type 055 may also have an L-band radar installed on the aft section of the ship similar to the SMART-L system. The class is expected to be armed with 112 to 128 vertical launch missile cells that can fire antiship missiles, ASW missiles, land-attack cruise missiles or SAMs.

In late December 2014, a photograph appeared on the internet indicated the first cut of steel ceremony at a Chinese shipyard. If the image is accurate, construction of the first unit has begun.

U.S. media sources have speculated that the Type 055's power and strength could make it on-par with the latest U.S. Navy Aegis warships. Some U.S. sources predict the Type 055 could carry 128 missiles, be able to carry out in-depth strikes through cruise missiles to protect its task force's airspace, and might be equipped with electromagnetic railguns and laser weapons in the future. The semi-official PLA Daily, published an article however stating the class is not a "game changing" vessel as it's not much larger than contemporary Russian, Japanese, or American destroyers, and will only be equivalent to the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer or Japanese Atago-class destroyer.

 

Source: Wikipedia

Did USA provocating a war with China regarding Soth China Sea disputes?

The Pentagon in the third week of May sent a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane near Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea — called the East Sea by Vietnam. The Fiery Reef is in the archipelago called the Spratly Islands by the U.S., the Nanchan Islands by China and the Truong Sa Islands by the Vietnamese.

 As the U.S. surveillance plane approached the area of the reef, a Chinese radio dispatcher warned: “Foreign military aircraft, this is the Chinese Navy. You are approaching our military alert zone. Leave immediately!” (Los Angeles Times, May 21)

The U.S. military replied that the plane was over international waters, even though it was close to 12 miles from the reef. “I am a military aircraft conducting lawful activities,” added the U.S. plane. The Chinese warned the spy plane off eight times, to no avail.

The U.S. surveillance flight came less than a week after the USS Fort Worth, a Navy littoral combat ship designed for near-shore operations, passed close to the islands, where the Chinese are dredging sand and building up five reefs.

Provocation part of planned campaign

These were deliberate provocations staged by the Pentagon as part of a planned campaign to escalate Washington’s military pressure on the People’s Republic of China. It is the implementation of the so-called “Asian pivot” announced by President Barack Obama.

According to a May 12 article in the British paper The Guardian, “Ash Carter, the defense secretary, had requested options that included sending ships and aircraft within 12 nautical miles of reefs that China has been building up in the disputed Spratly Islands. …

“‘We are considering how to demonstrate freedom of navigation in an area that is critical to world trade,’ [a] U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity, adding that any options would need to be approved by the White House.”

To unfold such a plan under the banner of defending “freedom of the seas” is ludicrous. For one thing, the U.S. is one of the few countries that has not signed the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, although it participated in drafting much of the language.

This is a reflection of the imperialist arrogance and presumptuous, great-power chauvinism of Washington. The Pentagon regards the Pacific as a “U.S. lake.” What else could explain the military challenging China’s right to build up islands a few hundred miles from its shore, when California is more than 6,000 miles away? What right has the U.S. ruling class to have its Navy conduct patrols in the Pacific region to “ensure freedom of the seas,” but not allow China to promote its interests in the region?

The answer is that it has no right, except the right based on military force by a power that has devastated Asia, beginning with the U.S. intervention in China during the Boxer Rebellion of 1898-1900 followed by the slaughter in the Philippines in 1898-1902 and colonization of that country — to say nothing of the atomic bombing of Japan in World War II, the brutal Korean War, the genocidal Vietnam war, the bombing of Laos and Cambodia, and the CIA-backed massacre of a million people in Indonesia in 1965-66.

Council on Foreign Relations unveils new strategy

The Council on Foreign Relations is the think tank of a major section of the U.S. ruling class. Its members include former Defense secretaries, former heads of the State Department, generals, admirals, ruling-class military intellectuals, strategists, etc.

In April the CFR released a report titled “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” written by Robert D. Blackwill; Henry Kissinger, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy; and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The core of the report is summarized as follows:

Strengthen the U.S. military. “Congress should remove sequestration caps and substantially increase the U.S. defense budget. … Washington should intensify a consistent U.S. naval and air presence in the South and East China Seas” and “accelerate the U.S. ballistic-missile defense posture” in the Pacific.

Expand Asian trade networks. “U.S. grand strategy toward China will be seriously weakened without delivering on the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement]. A major push by the White House for ratification should therefore begin immediately in the new Congress, including seeking trade promotion authority.”

Create a technology-control regime. “Washington should pay increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weaponry and military critical technologies.” The United States should encourage its allies “to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s access to all technologies, including dual use.”

Implement effective cyber policies. Washington should “impose costs on China that are in excess of the benefits it receives from its violations in cyberspace … increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities … continue improving U.S. cyber defenses” and “pass relevant legislation in Congress, such as the Cyber Information Security Protection Act.”

Reinforce Indo-Pacific partnerships. “The United States cannot defend its interests in Asia without support from its allies” and “should build up the power-political capabilities of its friends and allies on China’s periphery.”

The report has the earmarks of the campaign that was devised to bring down the USSR. It is formulated by former Cold Warriors. It aims to promote military encirclement, which would divert economic resources and disrupt national economic planning. During the time of the USSR, the U.S. set up a wide blockade on technology transfer, with the aim of depriving the Soviet Union of modern economic tools for national development. And, of course, Washington fashioned global alliances such as NATO directed at the USSR. What is being proposed by the CFR is a milder version of the Cold War full-court press. But the goal is clearly to undermine the People’s Republic.

The problem for the imperialists is that China already has the technological and industrial capability to withstand such a campaign, should it be implemented. But the important point is to be aware of the aggressive thinking in the highest imperialist circles concerning China. And to note that the recent provocations are not just arbitrary or momentary. They are part of a longer-range plan.

U.S. views Russia and China differently

Washington regards China as a hostile class power — unlike Russia, which is a fully capitalist country with imperialist investments and an upstart oligarchic ruling class. Created on the ruins of the nationalized economy of the Soviet Union, it is looking for its place in the sun of imperialism. Wall Street and the Pentagon have a different idea. They want to take Russia over. Thus Russia is in conflict with the U.S. imperialists on many fronts, and the oppressed countries can and should take full advantage of this.

But China is more or less a compromise of socialism with capitalism. The socialist foundation must be defended against counterrevolution. The planning principle and state-owned enterprises dominate the economy, although it is riddled with capitalism and corruption. The Communist Party of China, the state banks and big state industries are combatting the current economic slowdown and trying to advance employment.

China is managing this slowdown while economic stagnation and recession are plaguing the capitalist world. This includes Russia, which is in the grip of an economic crisis, with its gross domestic product, sales and wages falling — unlike China, where wages are rising.

The goal of U.S. and European capitalism is to destroy the state enterprises in China, privatize them, undermine the Chinese Communist Party and politically enthrone the capitalist class.

Both China and Russia must be defended against imperialism when they are under attack. But no one should overlook the difference between a distorted socialist country with capitalist inroads and a state fully in the hands of an exploiting class.

China ignores Vietnam’s sovereignty in island dispute

While the overriding threat in the Pacific right now is the provocation by U.S. imperialism against China, the fact that China is expanding into territory long claimed by Vietnam and within Vietnamese territorial waters must not be lost sight of.

China may have legitimate commercial and defense interests in building up the Spratly Islands/Truong Sa Islands. But it is incumbent upon China, both as a great power and as a country with claims to socialism, to defer to Vietnam and to work out territorial relations under conditions that are mutually acceptable and agreed upon.

It is one thing to expand military and commercial positions to be better able to protect against imperialist incursions. It is another thing to expand territorial claims far beyond any legally recognized boundaries and disregard the territorial claims of Vietnam, or the other nations that have claims on the islands, including the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

Acting in a high-handed manner with respect to small nations, especially with respect to a sister socialist country like Vietnam, both demeans China and increases the space for U.S. imperialism to create divisions and conflict.

Washington is fishing in troubled waters by sending its military into a contested region. It has no business in these waters. Its aggressive military and political maneuvers that foster division are meant to serve imperialist purposes and should be shunned by China first of all.

First Image Of F-35C Carrying Full Load Of Weapons (Externally)

On Jan. 13, RAF Squadron Ldr. Andy Edgell flew first F-35C, the U.S. Navy’s carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter,with external GBU-12s, AIM-9Xs air-to-air missiles and the centerline gun pod.

Obviously, a radar-evading plane loses some of its stealthiness with such an external payload…

Image credit: Andy Wolfe via Lockheed Martin

Zhonghuashendun: Chinese "Aegis" Destroyers

 All 12 hulls of the Type 052Ds are intended to induct in the PLAN Fleets are as below listed:

Ships of Class (Type 052D)

Chinese media informally designate the Type 052D as "Zhonghuashendun / 中华神盾" which means "Chinese Aegis". The new destroyer is equipped with a flat-array AESA radar, a 64-cell VLS and modern long-range anti-air missiles. The destroyer is expected to have capabilities similar to those of a U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. 

There is speculation that the radar systems on Type 052D destroyers are able to detect stealth fighter aircraft, particularly the American F-35 Lightning II. Russian sources claim the ship's AESA radar can detect, track, and launch weapons against the F-35 at a range of 350 km (220 mi; 190 nmi). The range may be exaggerated, given the ship's HQ-9B SAMs have an estimated effective range of only 200 km (120 mi; 110 nmi), but it may be capable of detecting the F-35 if the Type 346 radar is an S-band radar like the American SPY-1 radar. 

Tactical stealth fighters are optimized to be undetectable from higher-frequency radar bands such the C, X, and Ku, but features like the tail-fin may make it susceptible to lower S or L-band frequencies. Even so, much depends on the distance between the ship and aircraft and the strength of the return of the omni-directional signal, meaning a target may not be picked up at a tactically significant distance. L-band and most S-bands have resolution cells that cannot generate quality targets for weapons tracking, even if it is detected. 

However, the SPY-1 and Air and Missile Defense Radar operate in higher frequency portions of the S-band and are able to generate weapons quality tracks, so Chinese systems could be similar. China is also suspected to be reducing the size of the large radar resolution cells by connecting multiple low-frequency radars through high-speed data-networks, which has the potential to refine resolution enough for tracking a missile to the target

Taking to The Catapult

 

Sailors and Marines guide an EA-18G Growler assigned to the Zappers of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 130 onto a catapult on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). Harry S. Truman, flagship for the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, supporting theater security cooperation efforts and supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Largest Submarine in The U.S. Navy

Boeing unveils updated F/A-XX sixth-gen fighter concept

Boeing is unveiling an updated version of its F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter concept at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space Exposition in Washington DC this week. 

The tail-less twin-engine stealth fighter design comes in "manned and unmanned options as possibilities per the US Navy," Boeing says. The design features diverterless supersonic inlets reminiscent of those found on the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Boeing sixth-gen fighter concept

The Boeing concept also features canards, which is somewhat of a surprise because the motion of those forward mounted control surfaces is generally assumed to compromise a stealth aircraft's frontal radar cross-section. But the lack of vertical tail surfaces suggests the aircraft would be optimized for all-aspect broadband stealth, which would be needed for operations in the most challenging anti-access/area denial environments.

Also of note in the manned version of the company's F/A-XX concept is the placement of the cockpit-rearward visibility appears to be restricted without the aid of a sensor apparatus similar to the F-35's distributed aperture system of six infrared cameras.

The Boeing F/A-XX concept is a response to a USN request for information (RFI) from April 2012 soliciting data for a replacement for the service's Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler fleets in the 2030s. The Super Hornet fleet is expected to start reaching the end of the jet's 9000h useful lifespan during that time period. 

"The intent of this research is to solicit industry inputs on candidate solutions for CVN [nuclear-powered aircraft carrier] based aircraft to provide air supremacy with a multi-role strike capability in an anti-access/area denied (A2AD) operational environment," the navy RFI stated. "Primary missions include, but are not limited to, air warfare (AW), strike warfare (STW), surface warfare (SUW), and close air support (CAS)."

Navy leaders had said at the time that they expect any new F/A-XX design to have greatly increased range and offer far superior kinematic performance compared to existing tactical aircraft.

The Master 'PLAN': China's New Guided Missile Destroyer

China’s navy appears on the verge of creating a new class of warship. It could eventually alter the balance of naval power in the region.

Chinese Type 052D Luyang II Guided Missile Destroyer

We are loyal followers of baseball philosopher Yogi Berra, who reportedly proclaimed that “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Like the great Yogi, we seldom venture prophecies. But we did hazard one in The Diplomat late in 2010, namely that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would defy those Western experts who opined that Beijing had slowed or halted its naval buildup.

For evidence, such experts claimed that the PLAN had stopped building guided-missile destroyers, or DDGs. If so, Beijing had made a conscious choice to limit its navy’s offensive punch. Not so, said we. Having experimented with various DDG designs, the PLAN was simply settling on a model that incorporated the best of each test platform. And indeed, DDG serial production has recommenced in earnest, judging from pictures of the new Type 052D Luyang II-class DDG that have surfaced on the Internet.

Until recently it was fashionable for Western PLA-watchers to contend that Chinese shipyards had slowed or stopped construction of major surface warships like DDGs in favor of smaller, shorter-range, seemingly more defensive-minded vessels like guided-missile frigates and fast-attack boats. They cited the dearth of clear-cut proof of DDG-building since 2005 as evidence of this supposed trend. From this they inferred that Chinese naval development had taken a less menacing turn.

This was counterintuitive at best. And indeed, a series of photos on Chinese and Western military websites over the past few years dispels such sanguine prognoses. The images indicate that Chinese shipyards had already resumed DDG construction by 2010, when we essayed our prediction about Chinese shipbuilding.

The latest reports suggest that Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai launched its sixth Type 052C DDG and is laying down an average of two hulls per year. The new combatant under construction within a nearby hangar appears to be the Type 052D, the 052C’s successor. Indeed, a well-known China-watcher confirms that one of the new vessels was launched last week. By no means does this mean the ship is ready for sea. An enormous amount of work doubtless remains to be done on it alongside the pier, per shipyards’ usual practice. Still, putting the first of its kind in the water represents an important milestone toward sending a new ship class to sea.

The PLAN may have found its premier surface combatant.

According to the Taipei Times, this shadowy new vessel is an improved variant of the Type 052C, itself a man-of-war touted by Chinese naval enthusiasts as “China Aegis,” an equal to state-of-the-art U.S. Navy vessels. (We remain unconvinced by these claims.) The Type 052D is a stealthy, 6,000-ton, gas-turbine-driven ship boasting 64 vertical launch cells (VLS in Western parlance). A VLS cell is essentially a canister embedded in a ship’s hull. Each can disgorge one to four missiles, depending on the missile load. VLS allows for quick firing of anti-air, anti-ship, or land-attack missiles without the bother, delay, and technical headaches associated with uploading munitions onto launchers from magazines deep within the ship.

On paper, at least, the Type 052D appears to be a more modest version of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDGs and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers. The PLAN DDG displaces less than the American vessels, which displace 11,000 tons and 9,600 tons respectively. This indicates that it has smaller fuel capacity and thus shorter cruising range. On the other hand,its dimensions are more than adequate for the types of regional missions it will likely be assigned in the “near seas” or the Indian Ocean. Its armament is smaller than that of the Burkes or Ticonderogas, which carry 96 and 122 VLS cells, respectively. But again, this Chinese destroyer packs a punch for localized conflicts in Asian waters. It will also operate under shore fire support in most cases, evening the firepower balance.

Since commencing its naval buildup in earnest in the late 1990s, Beijing has taken an eminently sensible approach to fleet development. So long as China’s strategic surroundings remained hospitable and the United States was content guaranteeing safe passage through international waters and skies, the PLAN could pursue leisurely “fleet experimentation.” Shipwrights built small classes of ships, kept the best features of each, and discarded the rest. This risk-averse approach made technological sense while the Chinese were attempting a qualitative leap in naval engineering.

The Chinese surface fleet, which consists of five relatively new destroyer classes of no more than two hulls apiece, bears out this go-slow approach. These ships need not remain close to home. The PLAN can extract real value from them, dispatching experimental vessels to distant waters to fine-tune crews’ skills, develop doctrine, and smooth out technical kinks. It has doubtlessly done so during counter-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean.

Ultimately, however, the PLAN had to settle on a single design for mass production. The timing appears auspicious for drawing this phase of Chinese fleet experimentation to a close. The PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, the refitted Soviet-built flattop Varyag, has undergone a series of sea trials. Recent reports indicate that the PLAN has been flight testing the J-15, a reverse-engineered derivative of the Russian Su-33 fighter plane that can operate from the Varyag’s decks. The chief element missing from an initial PLAN carrier group is a versatile picket ship to defend the capital ship against air and missile threats. The Type 052D could be it.

Admittedly,a new DDG will only complete the strictly material dimension of China’s carrier ambitions. Forming a Chinese carrier battle group on par with its American counterparts will remain a formidable challenge.Chinese planners will need to combine the carrier, its air wing, surface combatants, and possibly a nuclear attack submarine screen into a seamless, mutually supporting team.This is no easy feat.

But the destroyer’s usefulness will not hinge entirely on the fate of China’s carrier program. These are workhorse ships. A multirole DDG could be put to many other uses while the PLAN methodically masters the art of carrier operations. Notably, the Type 052D could join a surface action group (SAG) or amphibious task force to support and defend high-value ships other than carriers. It could also act as the centerpiece of such a group depending on the mission.

And it could do so throughout broad sea areas. Over the past five years numerous surface action groups, numbering up to eleven ships, have transited the international straits separating the Ryukyu island chain to reach the open Western Pacific. Four such groups voyaged to the high seas in the first six months of 2012 alone. Such naval activism strongly suggests that the surface action group will be a key organizing principle around which surface combatants will be deployed, with the Type 052D leading the way.

What will they do? Specifically, improved Luyangs could fend off air attacks against China’s Soviet-built Sovremenny-class destroyers, which specialize in ship-killing engagements. They could also accompany the small but growing numbers of amphibious assault ships Beijing has constructed to project power ashore. Such expeditionary strike groups easily outmatch those deployed by Southeast Asian navies. They would be particularly well-suited to seize islands in the South China Sea. The Type 052D, furthermore, could extend its protective air-defense umbrella over the nimble and stealthy Type 022 Houbei catamarans. These craft belie their diminutive size,sporting long-range anti-ship cruise missiles that allow them to assert or deny control of the seas vis-à-vis superior fleets.

In a Taiwan contingency, moreover, cutting-edge DDGs would offer Beijing a sea-based air-defense option that would further threaten the survivability of the embattled Taiwan Air Force.With its long detection and engagement horizon, a single Type 052D could cover wide swathes of airspace near or over the island, beyond the effective firingrange of shore-based surface-to-air missile units emplaced on the Chinese mainland. Type 052Ds cruising east of Taiwan could in effect surround the island’s air defenders, mounting a threat from all points of the compass when pilots take to the air.

Finally, the PLAN could dispatch such imposing frontline warships overseas, showcasing China’s military prowess to foreign audiences while advancing naval diplomacy. The bottom line is that more—and more capable—large-displacement destroyers will allow China to imaginatively combine different elements of its naval power for a wider range of missions.

In closing, it is worth speculating whether the regional naval balance of power will shift as a result of China’s DDG buildup. The short answer: yes. A casual calculation based on the IISS Military Balance is telling. If the PLAN puts ten Type 052Ds to sea, as the Taipei Times forecasts, then China will boast a fleet of six teen Aegis-equivalent warships—even in the unlikely case that it builds no more combatant ships of this type. By comparison, Japan and South Korea, the only Asian powers with similar naval heavyweights in their inventories,currently possess six and three Aegis-equipped destroyers, respectively.

On paper, at least, this officially makes China’s the leading indigenous Asian navy. Once the 052D contingent joins the fleet, the PLAN can expect to take on any regional fleet—excluding the U.S. Navy, of course—with better-than-average prospects of success. It will command a 16:6 advantage over the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, 16:3 over the South Korean Navy, and 16:9 over the combined Japanese and South Korean fleets. That’s significant.

Will the prospect of a tilt in China’s favor spur a new round of naval construction across the region in the coming years? Much depends on the United States’ staying power in the region, and on Asian countries’ capacity and willingness to bear the costs of an arms race. Now that the debate about the PLAN’s supposed building pause is over, it is time to ponder this troubling prospect.

IRGC Navy Commander: US Can Well Imagine How Its Warships Sink if It Attacks Iran

TEHRAN (FNA)- The United States is afraid of attacking Iran since it knows that its aircraft carrier with thousands of sailors and crews will easily sink in the Persian Gulf in case it dares to launch a military attack against Iran, Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi said Sunday.

 “The Americans can sense by all means how their warships will be sunk with 5,000 crews and forces in combat against Iran and how they should find its hulk in the depths of the sea,” Fadavi said, explaining why Washington's war rhetoric against Iran is nothing but empty boastful words.

He said since the very first day that the US warships entered the Persian Gulf, the IRGC Navy has formed and evolved all its capabilities, trainings, structures, organizations and weapons on the basis of Washington’s threats, and added that the IRGC vessels in the region are monitoring the slightest moves made by the Americans.

Fadavi said the Americans might be able to hide themselves in their bases in certain Muslim countries of the region if they are faced with Iran’s crushing response, “but they cannot hide themselves in the sea since the entire Middle-East region, the western Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz are monitored by us and there is no place for them to hide”.

In relevant remarks in January, Lieutenant Commander of the IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Salami underlined Iran’s capability to display different initiatives in the battlefield, and said the enemies cannot assess the country’s operational and tactical power.

Salami described the tactics used by the Iranian commanders and soldiers during the 8-year Iraqi-imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) as a proper role model for the new generation, and said during the war Iran used different initiatives and tactics to defeat the enemy despite being faced with an acute shortage of weapons and equipment.

“Therefore, the enemies will never be able to assess our operational and tactical power,” he stressed.

The IRGC is responsible for the security of the Persian Gulf. In 2008, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, former commander of the IRGC and the current military advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, declared that the responsibility for defending the Persian Gulf had been handed over to the IRGC.

He warned that the IRGC would seal the strategic Strait of Hormuz in case the US launches any attack on Iran's nuclear installations.

Iran's naval power has even been acknowledged by foes. In a Sep. 11, 2008 report, the Washington Institute for the Near East Policy said that in the two decades since the Iraqi imposed war on Iran, the IRGC has excelled in naval capabilities and is able to wage unique asymmetric warfare against larger naval forces.

According to the report, the IRGC Navy has been transformed into a highly motivated, well-equipped, and well-financed force and is effectively in control of the world's oil lifeline, the Strait of Hormuz.

The study says that if Washington takes military action against the Islamic Republic, the scale of Iran's response would likely be proportional to the scale of the damage inflicted on Iranian assets.

REMEMBER THAT SUMATRA QUAKE TSUNAMI CAUSED BY USS SAN FRANCISCO SUBMARINE EXPERIMENT THAT KILLED FEW HUNDRED THOUSANDS.. (Part-III)

A comic crew first time at sea could have made the purported ridiculous mistake of charting errors. If an experienced crew with a commander of 19 years of exemplary service, could make such a silly mistake, there would be such a silly accident every month of the year. So why is this accident the only exception?

On one hand, the crew and commanding officer were guilty of stupidity. Yet the same crew were also commended for the post grounding response and their exceptional effort in steaming the beleaguered near-fatal submarine back to Guam unaided without any external repairs and outside assistance. Hard to believe the same crew and captain could have morphed from incompetence to brilliance in a matter of minutes.

Equally hard to believe was the recognition of “actions of the crewmen who saved the ship after the accident, including nine men who received the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal”. Where were these men before the submarine dived blindly at full speed kamikaze style into a problem (seen or unseen).

http://www.maritimequest.com/in_the_news_pages/uss_sanfrancisco_ssn_711_grounding.htm

The captain was found guilty of putting the ship in danger at an admiral's mast last month, and relieved of command. Last week, six more crewmen were cited for putting the ship into danger or dereliction of duty, and received punishments that included demotions and letters of reprimand.

 

 

The findings however did find misconduct with the leadership of the submarine.
The report stated about the commanding officer of the San Francisco, "He [Commander Kevin Mooney] chose to operate the USS San Francisco at maximum speed with no navigation risk mitigation measures in effect, despite several islands, atolls and rapidly shoaling areas in the vicinity of the ship's intended track. Further, he chose not to take precautions such as stationing additional navigation watch standards, establishing limits on speed and depth, and reducing the navigational sounding interval. Had the commanding officer instituted specified operational procedures and exercised prudent navigation practices, the grounding, even if not avoid altogether, would have been significantly less severe."
The report stated neither the commanding officer nor his navigation team exercised due care. As for why the seamount did not appear on the chart the navigation team was using, according to the report, they failed to examine all charts that were available and on board the submarine. Said the report, "Charts and supporting documentation products aboard the USS San Francisco were sufficient to identify navigation hazards along, and adjacent to the ship's intended track. Continuous and complete reliance on the accuracy and fidelity of a single navigation chart, when other charts with critical information were readily available, led to this grounding."

"Although the grounding incident compelled me to punish (him) and remove him from command, in my opinion it does not negate 19 years of exemplary service," the admiral wrote. "Prior to the grounding incident, USS San Francisco demonstrated a trend of continuing improvement and compiled an impressive record of achievement under (Mooney's) leadership. Moreover, the crew's post-grounding response under his direct leadership was commendable and enabled (the sub's) recovery and safe return to port."
Greenert also criticized the executive officer and navigation team for their share of the responsibility, saying their "failure to adequately and critically review applicable publications and available charts led to submission of an ill-advised voyage plan and hindered the commanding officer's ability to make fully informed safety-of-ship decisions."
The maths do not add up either.

Let's look into the micro scale of things. A diagrammatic illustration is always a great help to check on the maths. Several eye-witness accounts stated the submarine dived for 4 minutes at full speed (assume a max speed of 30 knots) before collision. Using the same facts as the tri-university case study; ie the starting depth before diving 2000m (6562 ft) and crash depth of 160m (525 ft); maximum average seabed gradient is 26 deg. From the depths and distances picked off Google Earth, the average seabed gradient is 17 deg. Now these are pretty steep terrain. The slopes on the low Macondo escarpment in the Gulf of Mexico range from 3 to 7 degrees while most seabed terrain slopes are less than 1 degree.
pppp
Consider first the crash location #1 with the average slope of 17 deg. It would be too far at 17,000ft from the dive point. At crash point #2, it would have been too near by 1260 ft. The two slopes hence serve as the max and min limit. The discrepancies get larger (obviously) at lower speeds, say at 20 knots or at higher dive angles. For example at 10 deg dive the depth of collision had to be at least 1300ft (as compared to the reported 525 ft) or even faster than 30 knots or the seabed gradient steeper than 26 deg.

So assuming the time of 4 minutes was in error (ie less than 4 minutes), the angle of collision (#2) would have been an obtuse angle of at least 150 deg. Any physic student or crash analyst would tell you, the submarine (or any crash object) could not decelerate from 30 knots to 4 knots in a split second as reported. Further the submarine would not bounced off (as implied in the reports) but would have continued tangentially with the submarine hull scrapping the seafloor bottom until the speed ran out.

We have had many unfortunate crash grounding at speeds of 10 knots in the Arabian Gulf. The Indian Captain was later found to be unqualified and subsequently sacked. Most of the times, it happened during our dinner when the skipper was rushing back to port and could not see the below-surface shoals ahead. Those 2nd world war flat-bottom landing craft were sure tough. Other than flying plates and some concussions, we suffered no serious damage but had to wait for the next high tide to be able to float and back out.

No I am not suggesting the submarine collision to be the same but at those obtuse angles, the submarine would have landed on the atoll surface on its belly rather than a large “punch out” hole at its bow. How come there was no trailing indentation on the belly of the submarine? If the submarine had been diving as it hit the “unsuspected” shoal, the underside of the bow would have sustained the most damage while the top would not have been affected at all (unless it is collision #4 type).

Even if there is a head-on collision with a vertical pinnacle (collision type #4), the submarine would have sustained a “punch-in” rather than a “punch-out” damage. See illustration of the submarine toppling over the solitary pinnacle model in figure 164c. The speeding submarine might even punch through the reef (if the pinnacle column was not too big) and again landed on top of the atoll. Alternatively, at such high speed, inclination and water resistance & buoyancy, the submarine might actually somersault over the pinnacle. We too have a lot of experience with our underwater tow-fishes hitting coral pinnacles.

If the USS San Francisco was north of the uncharted it had to head south-westerly to hit the port side of the bow. But it was reported the submarine was heading in the easterly direction (away from its Brisbane destination). Not only is the port side damage inconsistent with the sailing direction, the claim that the crew and commander were unaware of the uncharted atoll had to be totally absurd. In the south-east straight line projection from Guam to the purported crash site, the submarine had to cross the long E-W West Fayu to Pikelot atolls chain. Either that or the submarine had to detour by 20-40 nautical miles to circumvent the island ridge. Either way, the crew had to be aware of shallow terrain or would have crashed earlier.

So even if the submarine had detoured, it would still be in the south-easterly direction. So the collision would be on the starboard side not the port side. To hit it on the port side, the submarine had to make a greater than 90 deg turn, to sail back the course it had came from. Even though it was on a leisure cruise, the commander had no right to waste tax-payers' money on making round-about courses that led no where. Again we have to invoke the Law of Stupidity or Physics of Impossibility to explain the absurd. Would it not be easier to admit the head-on collision did not happen? The fakers did their calculations alright but all on the assumptions of surface linear distances read off from the charts. In my training courses, my first caution is always:

To fool humans is easy but to fabricate survey data to fit the facts of life is impossible. Even leading survey contractors routinely fake data, to cut costs, to skim on operation time or simply to cheat simply because they could; with impunity. There is no one to stop this industry-wide unscrupulous practices. QC consultants are normally bought to keep their eyes shut and to concentrate on frivolous safety issues with the crew; like not wearing their safety helmet or goggles.

Evidence of a blast from inside the submarine rather than an impact collision.

Figure 164-1 shows one of the first publicised photos of the damaged USS San Francisco at dry dock. Even though the damaged bow was partly covered in blue tarp (the Pentagon said was necessary to conceal "classified equipment" which it had been carrying at the time of the shipwreck), the circular outline of the damage suggests a powerful blast from inside the submarine rather than a head on collision. The damages speak for itself.

A head-on collision would have indented the nose of the submarine backwards or curved into the inside of the hull (punch-in). Even a port side only collision, would have shown indentation consistent with a collision. The jagged edges of the inner hull could not have protruded forward of the outer hull armor, unless an inside explosion had torn off the outer hull (punch-out).

Never mind the discrepancies in minor details. A dive of 4 minutes means the submarine could not have travelled more than 2 miles at 30 knots (less at lower speed); a distance within visual sighting of shoals beneath water level. Submariners are known to be cautious seamen. Is it not reckless to dive at full speed in shoal area especially when there had been charted atolls around?

At the very least, it would have dived at slow speed. But then a grounding at low speed could not have caused such an intense damage. See the inconsistency? So they had to fake the incident at high speed.

If the submarine had collided with the undersea terrain on the port side of the bow, the extent of damage could not have terminated so abruptly in a circular outline. Even a low speed collision would have shown some trailing indentations or drag/scratch marks on the port side of the hull. A vessel in water cannot bounce off in an acute angle change of direction, to escape such indentations or at the very minimum drag or scratch marks.  

 

Only an idiot would dive at full speed into an “uncharted sea mount” when there are islands all around. But Commander Moore and the crew were not idiots. How could he be, with 19 years of exemplary service? All mariners know that nautical charts have accuracy limitations, according to their respective scales. Hence when surrounded by islands and ridges, you always approach or dive with caution. If the submarine did dive blindly at full speed, the commander and crew would have been charged with more than just “reckless driving”. Running aground a multi-billion nuclear submarine at full speed with intend to cause massive destruction is high treason punishable by death. Irrespective of the lame excuses (“deficiency in the chart review process”...give me a break), the punishment must be more than just relief of command and demotion. But could the navy mete out a much heavier punishment for a crime Commander Moore and the crew did not commit? No. The fact that he was willing to take the rap and public humiliation is already a huge sacrifice to cover a more sinister agenda.

Navy Petty Officers Robert Hutson (left) and Andrew Tillman are the only two crewmen who have remained with the submarine San Francisco since its 2005 crash. (Eduardo Contreras / Union-Tribune) - Petty Officer 2nd Class Joseph "Joey" Ashley, 24, was killed in the 2005 submarine accident.

Continue …...Part 3 – Mysterious delay in the Medivac Emergency Response to the USS San Francisco accident
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Fukushima was much cleaner job.
IZAKOVIC
http://www.deepspace4.com

REMEMBER THAT SUMATRA QUAKE TSUNAMI CAUSED BY USS SAN FRANCISCO SUBMARINE EXPERIMENT THAT KILLED FEW HUNDRED THOUSANDS.. (Part-II)

The liberty port visit to Brisbane that never was

In the case study by Dawn Wright (Oregon State University), David Dibase (Penn State University) and Francis Harvey (University of Minnesota) dated 17 June 2008, under the GIS Professional Ethics Project (www.gisprofessionalethics.org) and supported by the National Science Foundation grant#GEO-0734888, the official story is given as follows:
Case (for presentation to students)
 

On January 8, 2005, the nuclear submarine USS San Francisco ran aground enroute from Guam to Brisbane, Australia in one of the worst submarine accidents in U.S. naval history. This was a terrible accident made more bizarre by the fact that the submarine crashed into a large seamount (an underwater volcano), rising 2000 m from the surrounding ocean floor. This was definitely a feature that should have appeared on the submarine’s navigational charts so that it could have been avoided. Four minutes before the crash the submarine’s sonar measured a false depth of 2000 m. The crash actually occurred at a depth of ~160 m, while traveling at a speed of 33 knots or ~38 mph (by comparison the average cruising speed of most oceanographic research vessels is 10-12 knots).

 

January 27, 2005 Damage to the bow of the USS San Francisco SSN-711

 
The impact of the collision punched huge holes in the forward ballast tanks of the sub (Figure 1), which in turn shut down the throttles, and caused the sub to drift listlessly, its bow pointing down. Luckily, the sub’s nuclear reactor and the crew’s quarters were not compromised. However, one crewman was killed in the accident and 115 were injured. The rest of the crew managed to keep the sub from sinking during a harrowing 30-hour, 360-mile transit back to Guam.

Why are we so sure the tale of USS San Francisco grounding on 8 Jan 2005 is a huge lie and never happened? As with all the geohazards and survey frauds investigated and proven beyond doubt, fake incident reports always focused narrowly on the “prop stage”. Most of the discrepancies and illusions become apparent once you look from the backstage; not the frontal audience view the fakers want you to see. So if you are interested in the truth, you must look beyond the circle of lies and distorted truths. Fakers always take great pains to fabricate around the facts and do not stray too far from the truth to appear credible. So we should expand beyond the location of the crash site as shown in figure 164 of part 1.

 

Figure 164a shows the straight 360 nautical miles (measured from google earth) course from Guam to the purported crash location. Despite conflicting details, some basic “data” can be tested to “verify” the facts. The USS San Francisco departed from Guam at 8am 7 Jan (local Guam time). At 11:38 the submarine was in a location with about 6,000 ft of water depth.
They joined a boat that had suffered a troubled reputation because of subpar inspections before Cmdr. Kevin Mooney took over as skipper in December 2003. “He came in and kind of turned the boat around,” said Tillman, 29, of Augusta, Ga. “It really put us on the map.” As a reward, the crew earned a liberty cruise to Brisbane, Australia. The vessel departed Jan. 7, 2005, and headed full speed toward the Caroline Islands southeast of Guam. At 11:42 a.m. the following day, some of the sailors had begun to line up outside the mess deck for a lunch of hamburgers, french fries and baked beans.

~~~~~~
 

San Francisco left Guam just before 8 a.m. Jan. 7, headed for a liberty port call in Brisbane, Australia, according to the report, prepared by a team led by Capt. Kenneth D. Walker, commander of the Pacific Naval Submarine Training Center, in the weeks immediately after the accident. At 1:53 a.m. the morning of Jan. 8, the navigation team shifted to chart E2203, which generally showed water depths of 7,200 to 7,800 feet along its intended path. But less than five hours later, the ship's fathometer recorded a depth of 5,610 feet.
From 6 to 7 a.m., the soundings were all about 1,200 feet shallower than what was shown on the charts. At 7:30 a.m., the ship went to periscope depth to use the global positioning system to fix its position on the charts accurately, and submerged again at 9:48 a.m. At 11 a.m. the fathometer reported 8,652 feet of water; at 11:15, 5,988 feet; at 11:30, just under 6,588 feet. At 11:43:21 a.m., the San Francisco ran into an underwater mountain at a speed greater than 25 knots, just as the crew was finishing lunch.

 

 

http://www.ssbn611.org/uss_san_francisco.htm
 

In late morning, the ship was at periscope depth, checking to make sure it was on course. Everything checked out; the ship was just over 400 miles southeast of Guam, near the Caroline Islands ridge, but the charts showed that there was no water less than about 6,000 feet deep for at least seven miles around the boat, more than enough of a safety margin for submariners, who are known to be cautious.

Some time about 11:30, after running through a safety checklist to make sure the boat was ready to submerge, the officer of the deck gave the order to dive. The San Francisco used the dive to pick up speed, and was soon running at flank speed, something in excess of 30 knots.
Although its destination was to the southwest, it was headed in an easterly direction, probably because it had “cleared its baffles,” or changed direction to check to make sure there were no submarines trailing it in the spot directly behind the ship, where its normal sonar sensors cannot “hear.”

At 11:42 a.m. Guam time, about four minutes after diving, the San Francisco crashed head-on into a nearly vertical wall of stone, a seamount that was not on the charts. In an instant, the submarine's speed dropped from almost 33 knots horizontal to 4 knots almost straight up as the bow whipped up and the ship tried to go over the obstacle — without success.

Let us do a bit of calculation. At an average speed of 13 knots it would have taken the USS San Francisco 27.69 hrs to travel 360 nautical miles and be at around the crash location at 11:41 am on 8 Jan. That is assuming a straight line course and constant depth without stopping (none was reported). So far the story appears to fit the facts based on surface linear distances.

Now if 13 knots was the average cruise speed in deep waters of the wide ocean, why did the Commander decide to speed up to 25 knots or even 33 knots (according to different versions) in a known uneven underwater terrain surrounded by atolls? If the USS San Francisco was in the habit of cruising at flank speed ie >30 knots (even for a leisure cruise) it would have taken a mere 5.3 hours to the crash location. So what happened to the “missing” 22 odd hours? You see the fakers did not anticipate this type of questioning outside their circle of lies and distorted truth. They could use the average speed of 13 knots in the collision but it would not be credible enough to account for the intense damage.

Atolls imply very steeply rising islands due to coral formation. Better still, the investigation by a team led by Capt. Kenneth D. Walker, commander of the Pacific Naval Submarine Training Center, found that the soundings on the chart were all in error by about 1,200 ft (shallower). These are not small errors by any standard. Yet 4 minutes before the dive, the commander gave the order to dive at full speed. If this was not a suicidal Kamikaze dive, then I do not know what is.

Could a commander with 19 years exemplary service and someone who had turned a troubled vessel around to earn a liberty cruise to Brisbane, be so “stupid or suicidal”? No I do not think so and neither would you. Otherwise how could the US navy have defeated the mighty Germany and Japanese navies in the 2nd world war?

13 knots was certainly not full speed and the purported crash site was more than 170 nautical miles from the Caroline Islands. If the USS San Francisco had headed towards the Caroline Islands (136 deg) or direct towards Brisbane (168 deg) there would have been no underwater collision. No, the Commander had to chose a heading of 156 deg straight to the crash location. But wait a minute. Was there not an island chain stretching from from West Fayu Atoll to Pikelot across the straight line course?

 

So the USS San Francisco could not have headed straight to the crash site. If it did, it would have hit the island chain first. See figure 164a. If the commander had been made aware of the islands (as if he did not already, being the most experienced officer on board) the USS San Francisco would have to make a 20-40 nautical miles detour to the west of West Fayu Atoll. This makes the story even more ludicrous. Why detoured to the crash location when it is not even in the destination? It was a liberty port visit, remember?

Even if a detour had been made, would the crew not have awoken up to the fact that they were in uneven, unpredictable shoal-atoll terrain? The reason why so many of these small shoals within areas surrounded by island chains are not charted accurately is because they do not present a hazard to normal international traffic routes. If any vessel or submarine do accidentally venture into the uncharted waters, they do not (as any seamen even novices will tell you) blindly crash into any islands at high speed. If they did, the captain and bridge crew would have been prosecuted more heavily than just “demotion”. As the punishment meted out is not consistent with the purported incompetence and perceived “stupidity”, the only logical conclusion is; “it never happened”. Period!