Dassault nEUROn - MOST ADVANCED French Military STEALTH Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle [1080p]

Night Flight Operations of Bayraktar TB2 Tactical UCAV -- Part 1/2

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Afghanistan-Pakistan Border War: Afghan Army Shelling on Torkham Border Post

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Look What Can A Cluster Bomb Do | U.S. Air Force SFW™ CBU-105 Cluster Bomb

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The SFW CBU-105

Textron Systems’ Sensor Fuzed Weapon, SFW™, is a highly effective air-delivered area weapon designed to defeat a wide range of moving and fixed targets on land, at sea and in littoral environments. One SFW can neutralize many targets and do so nearly real time, leaving no evasion time for the adversary. It’s been integrated onto a number of United States and Allied Forces fighter and bomber platforms.

The SFW CBU-105 D/B system exceeds very tight U.S. Department of Defense policy on munitions systems by regulating unexploded ordnance (UXO) to less than one percent. SFW has demonstrated greater than 99 percent reliability by the verified performance in operational testing. Features of this weapon system, combined with self-destruct and self-neutralization, ensure virtually no UXO.

BLU-108 SUBMUNITION

The SFW composed of 10 BLU-108 Submunitions that each carry four Skeet projectile warheads, while every smart Skeets are equipped with dual-mode passive infrareds (IR) and active laser sensors. The BLU-108 Submunitions is capable of integration into other weapons systems for precise engagements of multiple targets.

Once deployed, each smart Skeet warheads sweeps for targets using the IR sensor to identify a thermal signature, while the laser sensor validates the target profile for improved aim point and lethality. When a valid target is detected, the warhead explodes which is a copper explosive.

                                     
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Specification Comparison "A-10 Thunderbolt-II" Vs. "Su-25 Frogfoots"

World’s 10 Most Powerful Militaries - A Global Firepower Ranking Biased On Inheritant Ethics

The folks at Global Firepower ranked the world’s 10 most powerful militaries. They examined the defence forces of 68 countries in order to compile the rankings, taking into account manpower, land systems, air power, naval power, resources, logistics, finances and geography covered. They measure 40 different stats about a country, including number of aircraft carriers, available manpower, and labor force, to produce a Power Index, in which lower numbers equal more firepower.

World’s 5th biggest armed force, Pakistan army is not in the ranking. What’s the reason? I don’t know. Anyway, check out the world’s top 10 most powerful militaries, with some accompanying stats.

If anyone wanna examine then please visit folloeing link: http://www.globalfirepower.com/

Boeing has patented a plasma ‘force field’ to protect against shock waves

If it’s ever realised, it could protect military vehicles from energy emitted by nearby blasts. 

 

As weapons get more sophisticated, researchers are trying to build defence systems that can keep pace, and what’s better than a force field?

Aerospace and defence giant Boeing has been awarded a patent to develop a force field-like system that could protect military vehicles from shockwaves following explosions from missiles or improvised explosive devices.

Boeing’s proposed system involves using a combination of lasers, electricity and microwaves to rapidly heat up the air between the vehicle and a blast. This heat creates a plasma shield that's denser than the surrounding air and able to deflect or absorb the energy from the incoming shockwave.

Unlike the impenetrable force fields of science fiction movies, the system is not designed to prevent direct impacts or shrapnel. Instead, Boeing’s system is designed to protect a target - which could be a vehicle carrying troops, or a building such as a command centre or a hospital - from the after-effects of nearby explosions.

The system, which would likely be mounted on a military vehicle, or some other target, would have sensors that can detect the velocity and shape of an incoming threat. The system would also be able to determine the size and force of the resulting explosion.

Its sensors and computers would be able to calculate the time it would take the shock wave from an explosion to reach the target, and from what direction. This is important, as the generated force field would only protect a small region of the target, rather than enveloping the entire thing.

Once it has determined the timing of the shock wave, the system’s objective is to somehow heat the air around the target, generating what Boeing terms a “transient medium” that intercepts the shock wave and reduces the energy density. 

 

As Evan Ackerman from IEEE Spectrum explains:

"The general concept is to use an electromagnetic arc to create this intermediate medium in mid-air on very short notice by using a stupendous amount of energy to heat the air into a plasma.“

The plasma, which is much hotter than the surrounding air, also has a different density and composition. Boeing believes this plasma field is enough to divert, reflect or absorb the energy passing through.

In its application, Boeing outlines several different embodiments of the systems, with different methods for detecting threats, and for rapidly creating the plasma field.

One option uses converging lasers or microwave beams to generate a spherical region of plasma. Alternatively, the force field could be generated by firing lasers that induce plasma channels in the air, which provide a path for an electric discharge to create the plasma shield. These same pathways could be created by launching metal pellets that leave conductive trails as they fly.

However they decide to make it work, it's a pretty cool idea. We'll be waiting for the first the prototype, which may or may not be able to defend against shock waves from this crazy new weapon.

Source: IEEE Spectrum

KSA Managed Supports Over Yemen Attack

Five Gulf states said Thursday that they will protect Yemen’s embattled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against Shiite rebels.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE said they “have decided to answer the call of President Hadi to protect Yemen and his people from the aggression of the (Shiite) Houthi militia.”

Arab League chief Nabil Elaraby declared his full support for the airstrikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen. “I affirm complete support” for the campaign, he said at a meeting of Arab foreign ministers. “It is an operation against targets belonging to the Houthis who committed a coup.”

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman will lead the Saudi delegation to the 26th Arab League Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh.

Hadi who arrived in Riyadh on Thursday will also attend the summit.
The US is coordinating closely with Saudi Arabia and regional allies in the military action, including providing intelligence and logistical support, the White House said.

US forces were not taking direct military action in Yemen, she stressed, but were “establishing a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate US military and intelligence support.”
“We strongly urge the Houthis to halt immediately their destabilizing military actions and return to negotiations as part of the political dialogue,” added Meehan.
“The international community has spoken clearly through the UN Security Council and in other fora that the violent takeover of Yemen by an armed faction is unacceptable and that a legitimate political transition can be accomplished only through political negotiations and a consensus agreement among all of the parties.”

British Prime Minister David Cameron told Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in a phone call on Thursday that “other countries” should not be supporting Houthi militants in Yemen, Cameron’s spokeswoman said, something Tehran is already doing.
“In order to restore stability what we need is a political process and ... as part of that other countries should not be supporting the Houthi rebels and instead be encouraging all the different parties in Yemen with different interests to come together in a political process,” the spokeswoman said.

Pakistan’s government said Thursday it will dispatch a top civil-military delegation to Saudi Arabia following Riyadh’s request that it join the coalition.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to send the group to Saudi Arabia on Friday after meeting with top defense and military officials in Islamabad late Thursday, his office said in a statement.
“The meeting concluded that any threat to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan,” it said, adding that Pakistan’s defense minister and Sharif’s national security adviser would travel to the country, along with top military figures.

Sharif told the meeting: “Pakistan enjoys close and brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries and attaches great importance to their security.”
Morocco also joined the coalition, the Foreign Ministry said Thursday.Rabat has “put at the disposition” of the coalition Moroccan warplanes already based in the UAE, a statement said. Morocco had “decided to provide all forms of support to the coalition to sustain legitimacy in Yemen through the political, intelligence, logistical and military dimensions,” the statement added.

The objective was to help “remove Yemen from the crisis in which it is mired,” as well as to “stand up to all foreign conspiracies woven against the country, and against Gulf and Arab security.”
Turkey said it supports the operation and called on the militia group and its “foreign supporters” to abandon acts which threaten peace and security in the region.
President Tayyip Erdogan was quoted on Thursday as saying Turkey may consider providing logisitical support to the Saudi-led mission and called on Iran and “terrorist groups” to withdraw from the country.

“Turkey may consider providing logistical support based on the evolution of the situation,” Erdogan told France 24 in an interview, extracts of which were published on its website and by Turkish broadcasters.
“Iran and the terrorist groups must withdraw,” he said.
Four Egyptian naval vessels have crossed the Suez Canal en route to Yemen to secure the Gulf of Aden, maritime sources at the Suez Canal said on Thursday.

“It was necessary for Egypt to assume its responsibility... through the participation of elements of the Egyptian armed forces from the air force and Navy,” the presidency said in a statement. It said the action came in response to “demands by the Yemeni nation for the return of stability and to preserve its Arab identity.”
Former Lebanese Premier Saad Al-Hariri praised King Salman’s decision to launch an attack. “Iranian intervention in domestic affairs in Yemen requires an urgent Arab reaction.

Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders said his country stands behind the Arab coalition. “The military operation which has been launched by Saudi Arabia and some GCC countries is necessary to support the legitimacy in Yemen,” Reynders said.
Saudi Arabia has planned to beef up security at its borders and around oil and industrial facilities, SPA said Thursday, citing a statement by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif.

Prince Mohammed, who is also the interior minister, stressed “strengthening all security measures on the borders of the Kingdom and in all public utilities and around the oil and industrial facilities,” at a meeting to review security developments in Yemen, SPA said.
Kuwait said earlier on Thursday it had raised security around its oil facilities inside and outside the country.
Massive support for KSA campaign to save Yemen.

Source: Arab News

That Must've Suck

Russia-Ukraine Fire Power Comparison

A Glimpse of Al-Khalid MBTs: The Immortal Tank (In Service with Forces)

The Al-Khalid MBT (The Immortal Tank) is jointly developed by Pakistan and China during the 1990s, which is one of the world's most modern main battle tanks. The design is considerably smaller and lighter but this is an amazingly very effective and capable main battle tank. The design has the combination of some western and Sino-Russ technological influences. 

Pakistan & China signed a joint development deal in January 1990. First prototypes were tested in Pakistan in August 1991. The Director General of Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) Lt Gen Hamid Javaid and Major General Muhammad Asad supervised the project. The design team modified the tank to accept a foreign-built engine. A number of different prototypes were evaluated.

In light of high ambient temperatures and the fine sand or dust that would be encountered in operational areas such as the deserts of southern Pakistan, the development of high performance cooling and air filtering systems was emphasised during the planning stage of the project. Implementation of a hydro-gas suspension system was considered but, after detailed technical evaluations, it was found to be impractical due to various limitations such as problems with reliability and maintainability.

The final tank design resulting from a decade of co-operative development was designated Type 90-IIM in China & Al-Khalid in Pakistan.

A pilot batch of fifteen tanks was inducted into the 31st Cavalry Regiment of Pakistan’s Armoured Corps on 20 July 2001.

An additional batch of Al-Khalid tanks was delivered on 23 September 2004. Pakistan planned to build a total of 600 Al-Khalid tanks for its armed forces.

In 2006 a US-based market and special research organisation reported findings showing that the Al-Khalid, along with two other MBTs, would account for nearly 45% of all new MBTs built until 2015.

The Saudi Arabian Army began conducting trials of the Al-Khalid's desert performance in April 2006, after expressing interest in purchasing a batch of the tanks 2 years earlier.

Al-Khalid was revealed on 17 July 1991, by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, along with the then Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Mirza Aslam Beg, in a ceremony held at the Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF), Taxila. In his speech, the Prime Minister said that that the completion of the project was a big step towards self-reliance. The Army Chief said that for the first time in history, not only had technology been transferred to Pakistan, but the design was also made by Pakistani engineers themselves.

Armament

 

* Al-Khalid is designed with a 125 mm (length: 48 calibres) smoothbore, auto-frettaged and chrome-plated gun barrel which can fire the following types of conventional ammunition: APFSDS, HEAT-FS and HE-FS.

* Gun-launched, laser-guided anti-tank guided missiles can also be launched.

* Al-Khalid also fires a Pakistani DU round, the Naiza 125 mm DU round (armor penetration: 550 mm in RHA at 2 km). It is equipped with a muzzle reference system and dual-axis stabilisation system. Elevation and azimuth control is achieved by electro-hydraulic power drives. The automatic ammunition-handling system for the main gun has a 24-round ready-to-fire magazine and can load and fire at a rate of eight rounds per minute

* The tank is also equipped with a 7.62 mm-coaxial machine gun, a 12.7 mm externally-mounted air-defence machine gun that can be aimed/fired from within the tank, and smoke grenade launchers.

* A project to manufacture the first Pakistani tank gun barrel was started by Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 2000. In April 2011, it was reported that the first Pakistani-produced tank gun barrel was ready to be delivered to HIT for installation on the Al-Khalid and Al-Zarrar. 

Previously, HIT imported 125 mm gun barrel blanks from France for the two tanks which would then be machined in Pakistan by HIT. The first Pakistani gun barrel blank was produced at Heavy Mechanical Complex (HMC) in a joint project involving HIT, People's Steel Mills Limited (PSML) and other defence-related organisations. 

 The specialist grade steel was produced at PSML and the resulting steel block was passed on to HMC. HMC then pressed the block to a length of 5 metres and square cross-section, before forging it into a 125 mm smoothbore barrel. The barrel was then heat treated several times in facilities such as a large vertical furnace. The process took 2–3 months and was watched by experts from other defence-related organisations. 

 The barrel was to be capable of firing at 4 rounds per minute as well as being compatible with the autoloader and its 24 round magazine. According to a HIT official, a joint team proved to the Pakistan Army that strict standards would be met before the army approved production of a first batch of 50 gun barrels by HMC. 

The Pakistani gun barrels would likely be installed on upgraded versions of the Al-Khalid which are under development by HIT. A Rs200 million PKR contract has been finalised by HIT for the first 50 barrel batch.

Systems & Sensors

* The gunner is provided with a dual-magnification day sight and the commander with a panoramic sight for all-around independent surveillance. Both sights are dual-axis image stabilised and have independent laser range-finders. The tank has true hunter-killer capability, giving the commander the ability to acquire new targets independently while the gunner is engaging another target. The automatic target-tracking system is designed to work when tank and target are both moving. Night vision for the gunner and commander is achieved through a dual-magnification thermal imaging sight. Both sights are integrated with the fire-control system. The production Al-Khalid tank has a fire-control system of western origin. The ballistic computation time is less than one second. The manufacturer claims routine first round hits on standard 8 ft (2.4 m) square targets at ranges over 2,000 meters.

Targeting Range & Accuracy

• Effective range: 200 to 7,000 metres
• Sensor: laser ranging from 200 to 9,990 metres
• French Auto-tracking, interfaced with gunner station, firing four types of munitions, gunner's thermal imaging sight, commander's image intensification night vision sight, gyro-stabilised and UPS power supply system.

* Although prototypes were demonstrated with various fire-control systems of Chinese and western origin, the production model Al-Khalid MBTs use a Western fire-control system (FCS) and gun control system (GCS).

* The tank is equipped with the "Integrated Battlefield Management System" (IBMS), named 'Rehbar', a digital communications system developed domestically by HIT and CARE (Centre for Advanced Research in Engineering). It comprises a flat-screen display mounted inside the tank which communicates with those of other vehicles, including command posts such as the HIT Sakb. It uses a data-link to facilitate secure communication of battlefield information between units, including tank video footage and information from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

 

Design and protection

The Al Khalid layout is conventional, with the driver’s compartment at the front, turret in the centre and the power pack at the rear. The turret and hull are of all-welded steel armour construction and an additional layer of composite armour has been added over the frontal arc, to which explosive reactive armour (ERA) can be added if required. Al-Khalid has modular composite armour and explosive reactive armour, nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) defences, an effective thermal smoke generator, internal fire extinguisher and explosion-suppression system. 

 

Propulsion

The production model Al-Khalid is powered by a 6TD-2 liquid-cooled diesel engine, designed by the Kharkiv Morozov Design Bureau (KMDB) of Ukraine. The 6TD-2 is a supercharged 6-cylinder engine delivering 1,200 horsepower (890 kW). The 2-stroke design, with the pistons arranged horizontally in an opposed piston configuration, makes the engine very compact and therefore more suitable for being fitted into relatively small vehicles such as the Al-Khalid MBT.



The 6TD-2 engine drives a French-designed hydro-mechanical automatic transmission, the SESM ESM500, which is also fitted to the Leclerc MBT. Capable of manual and fully automatic power-shifting, the transmission has 5 forward and 2 reverse speeds along with a braking system that incorporates carbon friction brakes and a secondary speed-retarding system. Gear shifts are controlled by a torque converter which is made more efficient by addition of an automatic lock-up clutch. There is also a mechanical back-up system for use in emergencies, able to shift 2 gears forward and reverse^.
The Al-Khalid is fairly lightweight as compared to the Western tanks, weighing 46 tonnes compared to the 60 tonne M1 Abrams and Leopard 2. A power-to-weight ratio of 26.66 hp/tonne gives acceleration from 0 to 32 km/h (0 to 20 mph) in 10 seconds and a maximum speed of 70 km/h, the speed and agility also helping to improve survivability.

 

Accessories 

The standard version of the Al-Khalid is equipped with a snorkel. The snorkel system allows the tank to cross water obstacles up to 5 meters deep, after some preparation by the crew. Navigation is assisted by an inertial navigation system (INS) and a GPS satellite navigation system.

 

Protection

Al-Khalid has modular composite armour and explosive reactive armour, nuclear-biological-chemical defences, an effective thermal smoke generator, internal fire extinguisher and explosion-suppression system. The infrared signature of the tank is reduced by infra-red reflective paint. Al-Khalid 1 is equipped with a newly developed indigenous explosive reactive armour, which is not only lightweight, but also more resistant to APFSDS, HEAT and HE-FS rounds. ERA is developed by Global Industrial Defence Solutions (GIDS) Corporation. Al-Khalid is also equipped with an Active protection system known as VARTA. HIT is also working on an indigenous APS system for future batches especially for Al-Khalid 2. In tests it has 350mm~450mm vs APFSDS and 450mm~550mm vs HEAT.
An advanced laser detection system from Al Technique Corporation (ATCOP) is present, the ATCOP LTS 1 laser threat warning system developed by Institute of Industrial Control Systems. LTS 1 consists of a mast-mounted sensor and operator's control box, which includes a display showing threats 360 degrees around the tank. It can detect laser rangefinders and laser target designators and responds automatically by triggering acoustic alarms, smoke generators and other countermeasure systems. LTS 1 can detect laser devices operating in the 0.8 to 1.06 µm waveband, has a 360° field of view in azimuth (resolution of 15°) and a field of view in elevation of -15° to +90°. Operating voltage is 12V or 24V DC nominal with power consumption being 8 W nominal. The sensor head is 165 mm in diameter and 35 mm high while the control box is 80 x 130 x 55 mm in size. Laser Threat Sensor LTS786P is an early warning device which gives audio and visual alarms of threat by sensing a laser beam aimed at it from any direction. The exact location of the threat (incoming beam) is indicated by nine LEDs, covering all directions above horizon. It has the capability to differentiate between a Laser Range Finder, Laser Target Designator or a Laser Target Tracker Signal. In addition, provision of sensor output signal, interfacing for appropriate countermeasures, is also available. It can be used on stationary or moving objects of any size or shape. The maximum operating range is 10 km.

ATCOP LTS786P Technical Specifications

• Response: Enhanced for Nd:YAG Laser Signal
• Range: >10,000 m
• Field of view: Capable of detecting any signal aimed towards LTS786P.
• Detector type: Silicon Photodiode
• Size (approx): 214 x 134 mm (sensor Head)
• 126 x 123 x 100 mm (Display Unit)
• Weight 2 kg (sensor Head), (Approx): 1 kg (Display Unit)

U.S. Weighs Options In Possible N. Korea Conflict

by JJ Sutherland

July 27, 2010 4:05 PM

 Deck crew members stand on the flight deck of the USS George Washington for joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea in South Korea's East Sea on Monday.  

Lee Jin-man/AFP/Getty Images

About 20 ships and submarines and the aircraft carrier USS George Washington are participating in joint U.S.-South Korea naval exercises that began Sunday. 

North Korea has promised "sacred war" in response to these maneuvers, taking place in the Sea of Japan, east of the Korean peninsula.

That kind of rhetoric is not new — the North used similar language after an international investigation blamed them for the sinking of a South Korean warship this spring. Still, the U.S. military must prepare for the worst. 

The man in charge of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific is Adm. Robert Willard. When North Korea threatened war earlier this year, he acted like he'd heard it all before. 

"The rhetoric from North Korea is not unusual. We're prepared for any contingency in this region. It's my responsibility that we are," Willard said. 

Now, with the latest naval exercises, there is a new standoff.

 U.S. Navy and South Korean ships sail in a 13-ship formation led by the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Tucson on Monday in the East Sea off the Korean peninsula. North Korea has promised "sacred war" in response to the naval exercises, which began on Sunday. U.S Navy via Getty Images

The U.S. military has a number of plans on the shelf, but John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org, explains the two primary scenarios.

One is based on North Korea initiating an attack — the "major theater war plan," or OPLAN 5027. The second situation would be the collapse of North Korea. This second possibility, Pike says, "is no one's initiative — that's something that just happens." It's known as OPLAN 5029.

The First Scenario: War

War might begin with North Korea launching an artillery barrage against Seoul, South Korea's capital. 

Michael Green is with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served on President George W. Bush's National Security Council. He says the U.S. and South Korea would have to respond quickly.

"There would be enormous pressure. In fact, I think the war plans would argue for immediately suppressing the North Korean artillery capability, if they fired at all," Green says.

One risk is that North Korea could launch chemical or biological weapons with that artillery. The North has thousands of guns at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) — many of them in hardened positions such as caves. A few hundred could reach Seoul.

Pike says the Americans and South Koreans have been aware of the artillery threat to Seoul for some time.

"They have counter-battery radars that would detect these guns firing, and counter-battery fire would probably destroy those guns before the first shells that they had fired had hit Seoul," Pike says.

Even so, the first round of fire would still hit the city of 10 million people, possibly killing thousands. 

Responses To The First Scenario

Destroying North Korea's artillery would be a U.S. Air Force and Navy fight. Precision-guided munitions would fall from warplanes. Warships stationed nearby would launch guided missiles. 

Michael O'Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution, says responding to a North Korean attack with artillery may not be adequate.

"[Y]ou have to say, 'Well, OK, if we've got to the point where we're dropping hundreds or thousands of bombs on them, and they are shelling Seoul with hundreds or thousands of rounds — is this thing really containable?' " O'Hanlon says.

And if it's not, then OPLAN 5027 offers options for what comes next.

O'Hanlon says one possibility in this scenario is taking the fight on the ground into North Korea.

"Do we move in and secure at least a certain swath of land north of the DMZ to push back the artillery more systematically, or do we actually make a quick strike for Pyongyang and try to get the North Korean leadership?" he asks.

Should it come to that, the U.S. would still be in command. But South Korea's army would likely take the lead, driving north across the DMZ, moving into the cities and trying to secure the surrender of individual North Korean commanders.

Despite the planning, most experts agree that the war scenario is unlikely. 

The Second Scenario: Collapse

Another plan exists for the second scenario, called OPLAN 5029 — regime collapse.

Pike, with GlobalSecurity.org, says this is the plan that the South Koreans have increasingly focused on.

"Over time, South Korea has concluded that an invasion from North Korea is improbable, but a collapse of North Korea may be inevitable. And then the question becomes: What do you do when North Korea falls apart?" Pike says.

O'Hanlon adds that a collapse scenario is "very complicated."

He and others note that in addition to everything planners must anticipate in the first scenario — the barrage on Seoul, for example, or how China would react — a North Korean collapse poses other challenges. That includes securing the nuclear weapons the North is believed to possess, says O'Hanlon.

"I tend to think that one of the most important priorities is going to be to establish, essentially, a cordon sanitaire around the country's perimeter, because you can't risk the nuclear weapons getting out," he says. "And what if some North Korean commander decides that he'll do a deal with al-Qaida?" 

O'Hanlon admits that situation is unlikely, but he says reality can be unanticipated. 

"We also have to acknowledge that the scenario can surprise us all. We don't get to choose the scenario. The enemy gets a vote, so to speak," O'Hanlon says. 

Even 60 years after the Korean War began, some things still can't be planned for.

 Source: www.npr.org

 

US heads 41-Nation War Games In Gulf, Iran Fears Conflict In Volatile Region

Massive US-led military drills began in the Persian Gulf in a second such show of maritime might in under a year. The US says the exercises are not aimed at Iran, who earlier vowed to close the Hormuz Strait, and now expresses concern over the drills.

The US Navy has issued a statement that the mass exercises are aimed at “enhancing capability to preserve freedom of navigation in international waterways.” The drills will reportedly focus on mine-sweeping and search-and-seizure operations, and some on-shore training.

An S-3B Viking, assigned to the "Scouts" of Sea Control Squadron Two Four (VS-24), is launched from the bow of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in the Persian Gulf (Reuters/Nathan Laird/U.S. Navy photo)

The Pentagon is directing the maneuvers, which will reportedly involve 35 ships, 18 unmanned submarines and unmanned aircraft. The 40 other countries participating in the drills have not yet been named; Britain, France, some Middle Eastern states, and nations as distant as New Zealand have previously participated in similar exercises.


The Obama administration has stated that the maneuvers are not a warning to Iran, and are intended solely to secure a key oil route in the region.

Tehran has said it will be monitoring the exercises, and voiced concerns about how the maneuvers come in the run-up to the Iranian elections.


Iran has previously threatened to close the Hormuz Strait, through which 40 percent of the world’s oil is transported by ship, if "its interests are in serious trouble". The US condemned the threats and warned that such a move would provoke US Military action.


The last drills of this scale were held in September 2012 in the Gulf, with 29 nations participating. At the time, Israel was pushing for a strike against Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program.


Iran has also been building up its military presence in the area, and plans to deploy submarines to bolster its defenses. In January, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) conducted military exercises in the Strait, stating that it was “prepared for any threat.”


“Our present capabilities are incomparable to the past. Today, our youth, banking on the past experiences and modern science, have managed to show their capabilities to the world and be prepared for any threat,” IRGC Navy Commander Rear-Admiral Reza Torabi was quoted as saying.


The US has punished Iran with heavy economic sanctions for its supposed atomic weapons program. Tehran has denied that it is producing nuclear weapons on a number of occasions, and maintains its atomic program is purely for civilian purposes.
Israel called on the US last year to strike at nuclear sites in Iran, but the Obama Administration refused, preferring to pursue sanctions as a means of curbing Tehran’s supposed nuclear ambitions.

Why the Anti-Syrian War Coalition is losing the War

Damascus, Rally for the Government

Here, in the blog (source is linked below), it is already to read for weeks: the Zionist-Wahhabi war front against Syria has no more a chance to win the terror and propaganda war against Syria due to a number of strategic successes of the Syrian army.

In the first weeks and months after the begin of the NATO and GCC states supported Ramadan offensive “Volcano in Damascus – Earthquake in Syria” by the militias from July 2012 were the successes of the Syrian army mainly of a defensive nature.

The attempt of the storming of Damascus was blocked, in Aleppo and other cities of Syria, the government has kept, if not the whole city, then at least each a significant part of the city under control, and the army has managed to maintain the substantial army bases and civilian as well as military airports in all provinces under their control.

However, the anti-government forces have succeeded, coming from neighbouring states, to push beyond the borders and to conquer border crossings and areas near the borders as well as to have de facto control of the ground in many villages, some smaller towns and neighbourhoods of large cities, but nowhere was the control of the anti-government forces strong enough to establish somewhere in Syria a location for an alternative “government”, which then, according to the model of Benghazi, would have asked the NATO states (from within Syria) for military aid in order to carry out a military campaign on Damascus.

With wide attacks, organized out of neighbouring countries, the anti-government forces admittedly succeeded to conquer further villages and smaller town, to make the roads impassable for the supply of the army and also to force the Syrian army to abandon small posts and military bases, but the Syrian army managed to keep the major military bases and airports as well as its presence in the major cities in all provinces, so that the situation, that the anti-government forces had no territory in Syria strong enough under their control in order to establish a government in exile, nothing has fundamentally changed.

Given the conquests of increasingly more territory by the anti-government forces, their supporters were euphoric and encouraged to carry out their offensives until the victory and to reject any negotiations with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad about a peaceful plan for the transitional period up to the democratic elections.

But the superficial image of an increasing territory, which is controlled by the anti-government forces, has deceived them. Driven from their foreign sponsors and cheered on by the permanent propaganda about the imminent fall of the Syrian president, the anti-government forces made mistakes in their impetuous offensives, which now lead to their inevitable defeat.

The most serious mistake of the foreign-backed anti-government forces was, apart from the mistake that they have disdains the democratic path and rejected their participations in elections that would have conferred legitimacy, that they have behaved as a bunch of robber bands and they have carried out endless rows of serious crimes almost everywhere in Syria where they won something or where they occupied it.

The regularly committed crimes by the anti-government forces, everywhere where they have the power, range from kidnapping, highway robbery, looting, and robberies in order to get money up to the establishment of a tyranny, the persecution of members of religious minorities as well as the desecration of sacred religious sites, drug use, spontaneous violence, rapes, senseless vandalism, and the brutal suppression, torture, and killing of arrested government forces and other, somehow not acceptable, persons.

The anti-government forces have perpetrated several bombings, murders and kidnappings in the areas that are controlled by government supporters. The serious crimes of the anti-government forces on their military campaigns were far too numerous and also directly to experience by the population, who supposedly has to be liberated from the yoke of dictatorship in Syria, as it would have been still possible to blame the crimes of the anti-government forces successfully onto the government forces with the help of the propaganda campaign, or to downplay such crimes, carried out by the anti-government forces, as regrettable exceptions.

Generally detested crimes are not carried out by all armed opponents of the government in Syria, but are those among them who commit such crimes in series, and by this, their crimes are correctly blamed on the anti-government forces, which has an effect on the public opinion. With their countless crimes, the anti-government forces have scared away their followers, supported, and the undecided in large numbers, while they encouraged the government forces and supporters in their cohesion and their steadfastness. Of course, the alienation from the people is for a force, which claims about itself to represent a people’s revolution, just devastating.

The criminal behaviour of the anti-government forces ultimately resulted in the situation that the conquests and territorial gains of the anti-government forces at the first sight ended in the result that it became a huge bloody advertising campaign for their opponents, and thus, for the Syrian government and its supporters

Another strategic mistake of the anti-government forces in their military campaign to obtain the power in Syria was to completely bet on a full offense, maximum territorial gains, and on a quick victory with the use of foreign support.

Although the offensive strategy produced many euphoric headlines about the gains on ground by the always victorious rebels, but finally brought the anti-government forces in militarily hopeless positions.

The population fled immediately from many places, where the foreign anti-government forces have appeared on their conquest, whereby it is anyone’s guess whether the population fled from the anti-government forces or from the battles.

The anti-government forces have thus lost in the places where this has happen, at least the possibility to hide themselves as guerrilla fighters between the population and they had instead to fight like an army; and this against an army that has the air supremacy in its operations and that has been trained, equipped and also prepared over decades exactly for such a scenario – namely, to fight against invading armies. In addition, the large-scale conquest campaigns of the anti-government forces had the inevitable result for them that the ways for the supplies from abroad became longer.

The military situation has literally changed into its opposite by the withdrawal of the army in large bases, big cities, and small towns with people who are more likely to be supporters of the army.

Were the military achievements of the anti-government forces based on the situation that they have attacked small military bases and supply lines of the Syrian army by the use of ambushes and with a certain surprise effect in the early days, and thus, they inflicted heavy losses at the army with a kind of “needle stick tactics” on the principle of “hit and run”, so it is now the Syrian army that started to attack the long supply lines of the anti-government forces, leading through many small bases, from the air and by the use of unexpected ambushes, and this has led to the situation that the Syrian army constantly inflicted heavy losses on the anti-government forces.

The soldiers of the army were thereby generally in front of modest but solvable problems, so as to hide in large bases and in areas where the population is likely to support them, and if it is possible, to protect essential infrastructure such as stockpiles for food, power plants, and communication nodes, and to provide transports on ground or by air between the military bases and the population centres that are protected by the Syrian army, while the army units weakened the anti-government forces, depending on the strength and capacity, by surprise attacks and targeted “needle sticks” on their supply routes and bases – and, whenever the army leaders thought it is possible and useful, they have begun with troop concentrations in preferable less populated areas to encircle the anti-government forces – also by the use of the local established material superiority as well as the personnel superiority in order to defeat the groups of the anti-government forces.

Aleppo Souk – Once beautiful and peaceful.

Solvable tasks provide reserves. Those government forces, to which these tasks were insufficiently challenging, and which had the intention to particularly stand out in the defence of the home land against the terrorist war, carried out by foreign powers, were able to do so; for example, by accepting dangerous military operations or missions such as the infiltration of anti-government groups.

The anti-government forces, for which retreats, talks, and ceasefires were and are no options, stood and stand often in front of unsolvable tasks with their long supply routes, the distribution of their fighters on numerous small bases for the securing of conquered territory and the dysfunctional friend-or-foe detection due to their indiscipline and by the infighting.

The failure to solve their duties were often only recognized by the anti-government forces, when they were arrested or were killed; not least because of the relentless propaganda of GCC and NATO countries from the imminent and inevitable “victory” of the anti-government forces.

While the anti-Syrian propaganda rambled nonstop about the imminent victory of the NATO and GCC-supported robbers and terrorist gangs against the supposedly fundamental evil Syrian government forces, and pushed the anti-government forces by this from one devastating offensive operation to the next devastating operation, the defensive strategy of the Syrian governance actually had unique successes on the ground, which were usually overlooked and deliberately concealed by the anti-Syrian propaganda of the West and regional powers.

The success of the Syrian governance, based on a patience defensive strategy, is probably most clearly to see in the central megacity of Homs, which is located in the west of Syria. The finally besieged centre of the city of Homs by Syrian troops was previously called the “centre of resistance” and the “capital of the Syrian revolution” by the BBC and other opponents of Syria in autumn 2011.

The anti-Syrian TV channel “Sky News” reported from Homs after the successful February army offensive in Homs in May 2012, so at the time of a ceasefire, which was overlooked by the UN observers, and as the armed anti-government forces still had the control about “large areas of the city”.

In those days when the anti-government forces controlled areas of the city of Homs, despite some territorial gains of the army in the south of the city centre, they still practically controlled the whole northern city centre of Homs and also some northern and south-western districts, including large parts of the countryside of Homs, for example, the areas of Talbiseh and Rastan in the north and Houla and Husn in the north west, but also the town of Qusair and its surroundings in the south west of Homs.

How it has been proven by many Western journalists, who travelled illegally from Lebanon to the Syrian city of Homs, the anti-government forces also possessed functional smuggling routes for the supply of weapons and ammunition from Lebanese territories under control of the March 14 Alliance to the Syrian city of Homs. Since some months, the anti-government forces and their supporters have stopped to publish maps, in which they have bragged about how much control they would have in the areas of Homs.

In December 2012, the British newspaper “The Independent” confirmed the Syrian reports that the city of Homs is again relatively peaceful and safe and for the most part also under control of the government. Shortly afterwards, the Western media confirmed Syrian reports that the existing neighbourhood security groups, consisting of Syrian men and women, are upgraded to a paramilitary force by the Syrian government with the name “National Defense Force”, whose job it is, in cooperation with the Syrian army and other government security groups, to secure their neighbourhoods against the attacks of the anti-government forces.

Meanwhile the situation in Homs has slowly and steadily improved. While the life in most areas of Homs is already almost back to normal, the remaining anti-government forces in Homs are encircled in a very low populated area in the northern centre of the Syrian city of Homs. And on 3 May 2013, the Lebanese newspaper “Daily Star”, sympathizing with anti-government forces in Syria, reported that the Syrian Arab army managed it to gain more ground after clashes against the armed anti-government forces in Homs and that the already small areas, which are still occupied by the anti-government forces, were divided into two small parts by the successful operations of the Syrian army.

Thus, the city of Homs, a half year ago still referred to by Western media as the “centre of resistance” and “Capital of the Revolution”, has become within one and a half year a stronghold of the government, protected by the “National Defense Force” – and thus, protected by Syrian men and women against the attacks of the US-backed anti-government forces.

In parallel, the Syrian army and the forces of the “National Defense Forces” – how the neighbourhood watch that is cooperating with the army is officially called – have in the south-western region of Homs secured Qusair (Qusayr) and its countryside in recent weeks, and thus, they have cut off the smuggling routes for the supply of weapons across the border to Lebanon.

The situation of the last persevering armed opponents of the Syrian government in the enclaves in the city of Homs is so completely hopeless.

The anti-government forces have mainly failed in Homs because they had overestimated their temporarily acquired position of power by the foreign support in the form of propaganda, money, and weapons, and they have used this temporary position of power in the areas for almost nothing else than to commit heinous crimes, and thus, they made themselves permanently unpopular within the majority of the population of the Syrian city of Homs. Because of this, it is also not unlikely that the current Syrian government in the former “opposition stronghold” Homs will also receive a lot of voices in the forthcoming free and fair elections.

In the suburbs of Damascus, Aleppo, and other cities, which are controlled by the anti-government forces, similar psychological and military processes are taking place currently like in Homs, where they are almost as good as finished.

The anti-government forces, which themselves see them as the “revolutionists of the people”, penetrate into these areas, where an oppositional attitude towards the Syrian government is existent within the population. Afterwards, they behave like hordes of bandits and bloodthirsty extremists. They force the population to flee by their reckless behaviour or they change the stance of the parts of the population who have previously supported them by their heinous crimes in the occupied areas until a clear majority of the population sees the government at least finally as the lesser evil of both sides and starts to actively support the Syrian army in order to get rid of the so-called “revolutionists of the people”.

In Daraya, the hundreds of thousands inhabitants stronghold of the opposition, which is located in the south of Damascus, the anti-government forces have virtually lost the complete support of the population in the time when they started to invite all kinds of anti-government fighters to Daraya in order to storm the centre of Damascus at the end of November 2012.

To encircle several thousand militiamen in a deserted town, even if the militia are very well equipped, is for a large and well equipped army like the Syrian army a tedious but not unsolvable task, especially when they has the air superiority. The task would be unequal more difficult for the army when the armed opponents would be able to hide between a sympathizing population, what is, for example, the main reason for the remarkable stability of the weak Hamas against the strong Israeli army in Gaza.

The support of the population decides in a guerrilla war between a victory and a defeat. A people’s revolution is impossible without the support of the population.

The situation in the rural areas of Syria is slightly different than in the big cities and urban centres of Syria, where the villages have developed based on religious communities over the centuries.

While the neighbourly relations and the circles of friends of the Syrians, despite the emergence of local denominational priorities, are practically interdenominational in all areas of the major cities in Syria, a one-dimensional denominational stance of the population has remained in the many villages and small cities despite the secular ideology of the Syrian state.

This one-dimensional denominational stance of the population of small villages and towns in Syria is still often organized around a house of worship within the community and thus, the importance of religious preference remained stronger than in the major cities of Syria (a good and also sad example is Syria’s Idlib). When a second house of prayer eventually has been built in a village, then it sometimes has been the situation that two faiths live together without problems, but in small villages with only one house of prayer, there is practical often only one denomination.

Whoever relocates into this small village, or marries into a family in this village, or converted (in terms of his religious stance), remains in some ways an outsider. It is possibly that a different denomination (sect) is the dominant denomination in the neighbouring village – this has, over time, established a carpet of villages, and in which is often a different denomination (sect) dominant.

The juxtaposition of villages, each with different denominations, makes communities vulnerable to the sowing of distrust and sectarian incitement up to religious violence (just search for “Salvador option”).

When a crime takes place in a heated atmosphere or something else is destroyed, then it is very convenient to collectively accept that this was not been done by one of the own brothers, sons, or fathers – but that somebody from the neighbouring villages, where the people are mainly strangers because they have a different religion, bears the responsibility for the crime or destruction or whatever..

Well, so it is not surprising at all that the incitement to sectarian hate and rage by the TV preachers from the GCC states and the massacres under false-flag as well as by the use of propaganda against the government and the religious minorities, especially Alawites (Alawis), has shown to be even more effective in numerous Sunni-dominated villages and small towns in rural areas of Syria, than in the large cities, where the religious affiliation of the population has virtually played no important role in recent decades.

Unlike in the major cities in Syria, the local armed anti-government forces have not alienated so much from the population in the villages and small cities than this happened in the larger cities because they did not commit their crimes regularly in their local town but against the residents of other neighbouring villages and cities – and if crimes were committed in their “home towns”, then the residents of other neighbouring cities were blamed for the crimes, and these often had a different faith than the residents of the village, where the crimes were committed by the armed anti-government forces.

The incitement to sectarian hatred has led to the situation that the men of numerous Sunni towns have joined the anti-government forces with the approval of their local communities in order to fight against the government and the believers of a different religion. The motivation by sectarian hatred has so far worked to the result, that many rural anti-government forces have started the fight against the Syrian soldiers.

At the same time, however, they have just committed countless horrible massacres and other crimes of all kinds against people of other faiths, such as against Alawites and Shiites, but also against Christians and Ismailis, in other villages because of their sectarian hatred.

They have spread a founded fear of their sectarian madness of the anti-government forces, due to all of their crimes, in the ranks of people with a different faith, which has led to the situation that the people of other beliefs are working hand in hand with the Syrian army and even with the utmost determination against the anti-government forces.

Wherever it has been possible, mainly in villages inhabited by Alawites, Shiites and Christians, these villages were jointly transformed into areas with heavily armed forces, including the residents, and even into something like fortresses – due to the fear of the sectarian madness of the anti-government forces. The mass executions in villages inhabited by other faiths, also carried out by the anti-government forces, ultimately only lead to the fact that the determination of the other faiths continued to grow to defend themselves against the violence of the anti-government forces, driven by a racist madness.

The war strategy, built on sectarian hatred, is finally only defeating itself. Instead to fetch more and more government supporters on their side in order to strengthen the anti-government forces with each victory, the anti-government forces have only strengthen, with every victory (and the following crimes), the unity of the government supporters and their determination to defend themselves.

Given the fact that virtually all rural areas are a patchwork of villages with different denominations in all provinces of Syria, the anti-government forces had almost nowhere success to completely expel the Syrian from the rural areas in Syria. Everywhere in Syria, there are towns and villages of government supporters and religious minorities, whose inhabitants protect themselves together with the Syrian army against the murderous hatred of the anti-government forces.

With their heavy weapons as well as their better organization and better training, the Syrian army is able to counter all the attacks of the anti-government forces. The villages of other faiths can serve as bases for the army to fight against the armed gangs in the area who are driven by racial hatred. If the anti-government forces carry out assaults on persons or things outside of their villages or areas, the Syrian army eliminates the anti-government forces in this town and if there is no other possibility, they do it by the use of heavy weapons or even by the use of the Syrian air force. In case if there are many anti-government forces in one place, then there will be inevitably many dead by the battles of the Syrian army against the anti-government forces, and usually, much will be destroyed in this place – and this even more, the more aggressive the anti-government forces do represent themselves in the area and the better they are armed. This ultimately leads to the situation that even in the small towns similar painful psychological processes are triggered like in the cities.

The euphoria of the early days of the attempt of an armed overthrow of the government in Syria has long gone. The realization that the armed struggle against the government and its supporters is hopeless and just leads to nothing but more and more death, suffering, and destruction in their own towns, gains more and more space.

The offers of the Syrian government about an amnesty for the ending of the armed struggle is winning, over time, increasingly more acceptance even in smaller villages, although some of the anti-government forces are driven by sectarian hatred and thoughts of revenge for the suffered defeats, and thus, they only agree grudgingly to local peace treaties.

The declining enthusiasm of the parts of the population who supported the anti-government forces initially, is currently also limiting the effects of the outside-led invasion of Syria by the use of irregular forces, which are trained by the anti-Syrian war coalition in the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan, while they are recruited from prisons and slums in the Arab world.

While the irregular fighting units, were coming from Turkey, from Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, over the Syrian borders in their violent campaigns of conquest, and were able to still find some areas in Syria were at least some significant parts of the population have greeted them as liberators, the population in Syria now regularly quite closed seeks the escape in case if the foreign anti-government fighters arrive in order to invade their town or their district.

Massacre in Khan al-Assal (Source: SANA)

The gangs of mercenaries, who are penetrating on Syrian soil from abroad, have sometimes the success, also by the use of a surprise effect, to conquer some territory in Syria, and because – as it has just happened in Hatla and Khan al-Assal – they carry out gruesome massacres among the government supporters and the pro-government civilians, the gangs of the anti-government forces are missing – as in Daraya – the necessary coverage by the residents in order to keep the control of the occupied areas in the battles against the Syrian army. The gangs of mercenaries are thus not able to protect their occupied areas against the attacks of the Syrian forces. In effect, these attacks result now, in case they do not completely end with the death of the attackers, at most to losses on both sides. Tangible progress for the anti-government fighters are missing since a long time.

Were the previous offensives of the anti-government forces still to considerable conquests such like the conquest of about half of Aleppo and the larger suburbs of Damascus, the current major offensives of the anti-government forces usually have no more success while faced with the bullets of the army. The current major offensives of the anti-government forces lead to nothing else but heavy losses among the attackers.

Not least, this creates the increasing disillusionment of the opponents of the government in regards of their chances of success, which means currently that the anti-Syrian war coalition, despite continuous promises of more and better weapons, has less and less the chance to make use of reserves of “partisan” and mercenaries from the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan for the war against Syria. Only government forces are currently able to regularly achieve their goals. Virtually no one has changed the side and left the Syrian army / government forces in order to join the ranks of the anti-government forces in recent months, and their combat power and strength through an increasing number of volunteers of all denominations for the neighbourhood militias is also constantly increasing.

Sooner or later, this shift of popularity of the anti-government forces will result in their complete defeat. The anti-government forces have made themselves simply thoroughly unpopular with their criminal behaviour in the Syrian population in the last year.

The rising popularity of the government since the start of the open attack by the anti-government forces in contrast to the sinking popularity leads, via the associated continuous strengthening of the neighbourhood guards, to the fact that the anti-government forces are finally no more able to win this war. The incitement of anti-government forces to sectarian hatred and its associated incitement to atrocious crimes are finally just counterproductive tactics. Without the support of significant parts of the Syrian population, this unconventional warfare, by which the Wahhabi-Zionist war coalition wanted to conquer Syria, just does not work.

The only theoretical option, which remains available for the anti-Syrian war coalition in order to achieve their war goal, the establishment of an anti-Iranian puppet regime in Syria, is an open war of aggression by the use of U.S. units. However, the problem with this direct U.S. military option is still that this option is incalculably expensive. But the costs of about a billion dollars a month, which were recently made ​​available for an open U.S. attack military operations against Syria by the U.S. military chief, are not so much the reason why the United States still have not started to use this option. It is rather the view that, in case of an open war of aggression by the United States against Syria, the Iran will be in its treaty obligations and finally enter the war against the US-led anti-Syrian war coalition and this is a situation, which the U.S. government wants to still avoid.

In this case, a continuous war zone would arise from the Mediterranean up to the Hindu Kush. To wage a war against all U.S. enemies from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush at the same time, could become a much more expensive and a more protracted situation than the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan for the United States. Of course, there is still the possibility that the insane warmongers in Washington and Tel Aviv “envisage” such an (horrible) option, despite the high risks. However, they could be hit between the eyes, because such a war could easily become much larger and more expensive.

In case if Russia gives military aid for the protection of Syria against the US-led war of aggression, and China will lock the loan for the United States as a response of their war of aggression against Syria and instead start to provide economic aid for Syria and Iran, a war from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush could (in the end) significantly exceed the economic and military possibilities of the so-called “Western community of values”.

This is the reason that the U.S. military aid has not yet happened for their Syrian lackeys, and, as the situation of the U.S. lackeys in Syria deteriorated continuously for months, it is not to expect that something will change in the near future.

This means for the anti-government forces in Syria, that they have no chance to win this war and the main reason for this situation are their own carried out crimes on Syrian soil.